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ABSTRACT
This Article takes on a question at the heart of the longstanding
Israeli-Palestinian dispute: did Israel violate international law
during the conflict of 1947–49 either by expelling Palestinian
civilians or by subsequently refusing to repatriate Palestinian
refugees? Palestinians have claimed that Israel engaged in illegal
ethnic cleansing, and that international law provides a “right of
return” for the refugees displaced during what they call al-Nakbah
(the catastrophe). Israel has disagreed, blaming Arab aggression
and unilateral decisions by Arab inhabitants for the refugees’
flight, and asserting that international law provides no right of the
refugees to return to Israel. Each side has scholars and advocates
who have supported its factual and legal positions. This Article
advances the debate in several respects. First, it moves beyond the
fractious disputes about who did what to whom in 1947–49.
Framed as a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Article
assumes arguendo the truth of the Palestinian claim that the prestate Jewish community and later Israel engaged in concerted,
forced expulsion of those Palestinian Arabs who became refugees.
Even granting this pro-Palestinian version of the facts, however,
the Article concludes that such an expulsion was not illegal at the
time and that international law did not provide a right of return. A
second contribution of this Article is to historicize the international
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law relevant to the dispute. Many relevant areas of international
law have changed significantly since 1947–49—such as the law of
armed conflict, refugee law, human rights law, and law regarding
nationality, statelessness, and state succession.
Previous
scholarship and advocacy finding that international law requires
return of Palestinian refugees have impermissibly sought to hold
Israel to legal standards developed decades after the relevant
events. This Article’s third contribution is to assemble detailed
data, summarized in several tables in the Appendix, on the actual
practices of states regarding expulsions of ethnic groups and
repatriation of refugees. Analysis of these data sets allows the
Article to conclude that Israel’s actions regarding the refugees of
1947–49 was legal and consistent with the actions of many other
members of the international community.
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INTRODUCTION

The two-year war which gave birth to Israel also made refugees
of approximately 600,000 to 760,000 Palestinian Arabs. Starting in
1947, the Yishuv, the pre-statehood Jewish community in Palestine,
and its Palestinian Arab neighbors fought a guerilla war against
each other. That year, the Yishuv had accepted a two-state
solution proposed by the United Nations—called “partition,” just
like the contemporaneous partition of India and Pakistan. The
Arab states and Palestinians rejected partition because they would
not abide a Jewish state in any part of Palestine. After Israel
declared independence in May 1948, a more conventional war
ensued, pitting Israel against invading armed forces of Egypt,
Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and other Arab countries. That
conflict ended in 1949 with armistice agreements but no
comprehensive peace. Since then, Palestinians displaced by the
conflict of 1947–49 have claimed that international law provides
them a “right of return” to their homes and lands in what became
Israel. Israel disagrees, placing the blame for the refugees’ flight on
Arab aggression and denying that international law requires
return. Though tens of millions of other people made refugees by
twentieth-century conflicts resettled in new lands—including
many hundreds of thousands of Jews who fled oppression in Arab
lands in the 1940s and 1950s—the Arab leaders decided that most
Palestinian refugees would neither be granted citizenship nor
permanently resettled in the Arab states where they found refuge.
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The claimed “right of return” to Israel has been a crucial stumbling
block in the series of failed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in
recent decades.1
This Article evaluates whether the Palestinians’ claim of a
“right of return” to Israel is supported by international law—
international treaties or customary international law (“CIL”).2 It
concludes that no binding source of international law prohibited
expulsion of Palestinians or requires that Israel allow Palestinians
who fled or were expelled during the conflict of 1947–49 to return
to Israel. The basic legal issues have been debated for years,3 and
given the passions that this issue arouses, it is perhaps the case that
few minds can be changed purely by legal arguments.
Nevertheless, this Article seeks to advance the legal debate in
several ways. Stale factual disputes are put aside, where doing so
helps sharpen the legal issues. The legal debate is situated in a
broader historical and legal context. And the actual practices of
1 See, e.g., DENNIS ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR
MIDDLE EAST PEACE 3–4, 624, 655, 663–64, 812 (2005) (discussing the “right of
return” as among the concessions that were required to end the conflict between
Israelis and Palestinians); Akram Hanieh, The Camp David Papers, 30 J. PALESTINE
STUD., no. 2, Winter 2001, at 75, 82 (stating that Israelis would not discuss a right
of return for the Palestinians as it would amount to “declaring a war of
destruction” on Israel).
2 CIL is the consistent practice of states performed from a sense of legal
obligation, which crystallizes over time into norms that bind all states. See infra
notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
3 Leading works contending that international law supports a right to return
include VICTOR KATTAN, FROM COEXISTENCE TO CONQUEST: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1891–1949 (2009); W. THOMAS
MALLISON & SALLY V. MALLISON, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE PALESTINE QUESTION, U.N. Doc.
ST/SG/SER.F/4, U.N. Sales No. E.79.I.19 (1979) (published at the request of the
U.N. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People); Alfred de Zayas, The Illegality of Population Transfers and the Application of
Emerging International Norms in the Palestinian Context, 6 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. 17
(1990–1991); Kathleen Lawand, The Right to Return of Palestinians in International
Law, 8 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 532 (1996); John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a
Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 171 (1998); Lewis Saideman, Do Palestinian
Refugees Have a Right of Return to Israel? An Examination of the Scope of and
Limitations on the Right of Return, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 829 (2004); LEX TAKKENBERG, THE
STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998). Leading works
denying that international law supports a right to return include JULIUS STONE,
ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS (1981); Ruth Lapidoth, The
Right of Return in International Law, With Special Reference to the Palestinian Refugees,
16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 103 (1986); Kurt René Radley, The Palestinian Refugees: The
Right to Return in International Law, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 586 (1978); Robbie Sabel, The
Palestinian Refugees, International Law, and the Peace Process, 21 REFUGE, no. 2, 2003
at 52.
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nations are examined far more comprehensively than in any
previous study.
This Article does not base its legal analysis on an attempted
resolution of disputed facts. Instead, in the sections applying law
to fact, I assume the truth of the Palestinian version of history—
that most or all of the Palestinian refugees from the conflict of
1947–49 fled as a result of Israeli force or threats. This assumption
is made for the purpose of separating legal disputes from factual
disputes and focusing on the former. Think of this Article as a
judicial ruling on a motion for summary judgment.4
The
Palestinian legal arguments fail even when their version of the
facts is credited. This helps move the Article beyond the current
state of the literature—almost all previous analyses explicitly or
implicitly stake out positions on contested factual issues about the
reasons for the refugees’ flight, thereby muddying their legal
analysis.5
Previous studies finding that the expulsion of Palestinians was
illegal, or that international law supplies a right of return for
Palestinian refugees, have committed a number of common errors.
The most significant error is temporal.
Recent treaties,
declarations, and state practice are used to derive a right of return
for refugees displaced by war or other crises, and that right is then
retroactively applied by fifty or sixty years to the conflict in 1947–
49, when very different legal rules applied. A second, and related
error, is methodological. Instead of looking to treaties or CIL to
4 In American civil procedure, a litigant may ask the court to assume the
version of the disputed facts most favorable to the other side and then rule on
whether there is a viable legal claim based on those facts and any undisputed
facts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
5 Compare, e.g., KATTAN, supra note 3, at 170 (characterizing “the manner in
which some 750,000 Palestinian Arabs were forced to flee their homes” as “an act
of expulsion” by Israel); Quigley, supra note 3, at 173–80 (claiming to demonstrate
near total Israeli responsibility for Palestinian refugees’ flight); de Zayas, supra
note 3, at 35 (charging the Israelis with “the displacement of the indigenous
Palestinian population from their homeland and the implantation of settlers in
their territory”), and Wadie E. Said, Palestinian Refugees: Host Countries, Legal Status
and the Right of Return, 21 REFUGE, no. 2, 2003 at 89, 90 (2003) (“The only real
scholarly debate now is whether the ethnic cleansing of that part of Palestine that
became Israel was deliberate or merely the result of battlefield decisions.”), with
Lapidoth, supra note 3, at 111–12 (stating that “[i]n the wake of the 1948–49 ArabIsraeli war, many Palestinian Arabs . . . fled to the neighbouring Arab countries,”
and subsequently failing to consider whether international law might have been
violated by any expulsions of Palestinians); Radley, supra note 3, at 592–95
(claiming to demonstrate that many Palestinian Arabs left for reasons other than
direct Israeli coercion).
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locate binding law, proponents of a Palestinian right of return
often rely on so-called “soft law,” such as norms announced in
nations’ formally non-binding political statements in international
diplomatic forums—primarily the U.N. General Assembly—or in
the pronouncements of international commissions or conferences.6
The lexical status of soft law is quite unsettled and controversial
today.7 About the kind of soft law most relevant to this Article—
U.N. General Assembly Resolutions—there has been for decades,
and still is today, persistent disagreement about whether or how it
can function as binding law.8 This Article notes these debates but
ultimately moves beyond them because there was no agreement or
even widespread opinion in 1947–49 that relevant forms of soft law
could constitute binding legal obligations. The claim that soft law
binds states has only been made in recent decades; at the time of
the 1947–49 conflict and for many years afterward, a positivism
prevailed that located binding international law only in sources to
which states had consented, namely treaties and CIL.
There is a third common problem in previous studies of
international law as applied to Palestinian refugees, closely related
to the temporal and methodological issues just discussed. Though
advocates of the Palestinian view claim otherwise, there is in fact
very little relevant state practice on which to base a CIL right to
return in the unique circumstances of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. A few of the factors which distinguish this conflict from
situations where legal norms of return have developed in recent
years include its longevity (more than sixty years), the fact that the
refugees are noncitizens of the state to which they seek
admittance,9 the size of the refugee population compared to the
6 See infra Section 4.5. While there is no single accepted definition of “soft
law,” the phrase is generally used to refer to (1) statements of norms or
obligations made in formally non-legally binding texts, and (2) vague provisions
adopted in legally binding texts. See, e.g., C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law:
Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989);
Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 292
(2006). We are here dealing with the first kind of soft law.
7 See generally Daniel Thürer, Soft Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2011), available at
www.mpepil.com (last updated Mar. 2009).
8 See infra Section 4.5.
9 Supporters of the Palestinian right of return seek to overturn or render
irrelevant Israel’s municipal law decision about Palestinian non-citizenship by
resorting to an international law argument about state succession. As discussed
in Section 4.4, infra, this argument is unavailing.
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population of the state to which they seek admittance, and the fact
that there has been no comprehensive peace settlement between
the warring parties or even a permanent cessation of violence.
Even if these factual differences are not thought to make the case of
the 1947–49 Palestinian refugees unique, general CIL norms
favoring a right of return have only solidified in the last two
decades. Up through the time of the 1947–49 conflict and beyond,
forced transfers or expulsions of ethnic minorities were common
and, in many instances, legal, and there was no norm requiring
repatriation in the aftermath of a forced expulsion.
A few caveats are in order, to clarify what this Article covers
and what it does not. The Article is concerned solely with the legal
rights, if any, of Palestinian refugees created by the 1947–49 conflict.
The legal rights of the much smaller number of refugees from the
later Arab-Israeli wars are not considered;10 thus, the status of the
West Bank and Gaza, and the rights of Palestinian refugees to
return there, are beyond the scope of this Article. Religious, moral,
philosophical, and other non-legal considerations are similarly
omitted; this Article takes no position on the morality or justice of
the competing Jewish and Arab claims to the disputed land.11 By
now, more than half a century removed from the events of 1947–
49, many of the refugees from that conflict are no longer living.
The Article does not directly address the question whether, as
many Palestinians claim, second-generation or later descendants of
the original refugees may assert the rights of their forbearers;12 but,

10 The number of refugees displaced by the 1967 war is disputed. Probably
about 200,000 to 300,000 Palestinians were displaced from the West Bank and
Gaza, many of whom were already refugees from the 1947–49 conflict. See BENNY
MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS: A HISTORY OF THE ZIONIST-ARAB CONFLICT, 1881–2001,
327 (2001).
11 I do not question that, for many, the claimed “right of return” “has become
a major part of Palestinian identity and symbolizes Palestinian historical
narratives.” Abbas Shiblak, The Palestinian Refugee Issue: A Palestinian Perspective 1
(Chatham House, Briefing Paper MENAP/PR BP 2009/01, 2009), available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%2
0East/bp0209_pri_shiblak.pdf. My caveat is not meant to suggest that concerns of
morality and justice are entirely absent from the analysis. Human rights law,
which embodies many such concerns, is discussed in detail in Section 4.3.
12 Since the 1960s, the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East (UNRWA) has taken the position that descendants of original
refugees are themselves refugees entitled to its protection and services. See
BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, REFUGEES UNTO THE THIRD GENERATION: U.N. AID TO
PALESTINIANS 7 (1995). On the basis of this UNRWA definition, Palestinian
spokesmen now claim that anywhere from 3.5 million to 5.5 million Palestinians
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since the legal rights of descendants regarding expulsion and
return are derivative of the rights of their ancestors alive in 1947–
49, the Article’s analysis of the original refugees’ claims is
dispositive for everyone. A final caveat: this Article addresses the
return of people, not questions of property restitution, a related but
separate issue.13
This Article’s argument proceeds in four main parts. Section 2
is a historical overview of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the creation
of the refugee problem. Several contemporaneous population
transfers are discussed to provide factual context for assessing the
legality of the events of 1947–49 in Palestine and Israel. Section 3
addresses important background issues, notably, the intertemporal problem with applying changed law to preexisting
events. Section 4 examines treaty-based law—refugee law, human
rights law, the law of armed conflict (international humanitarian
law), the law of state succession, and immigration and nationality
law—and relevant U.N. resolutions, and concludes that none of
these provides a right of return for Palestinians. Section 5
examines the question under CIL through analysis of data sets I
collected of similar ethnic conflicts, expulsions or transfers of
ethnic groups, and repatriations of refugees.14 State practice in
these conflicts shows no right of return that could be applicable to
the Palestinians.
2.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

At the root of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the fact that two
peoples claim the same land. History provides support for both
claims. For significant parts of the first millennium B.C.E., the
Hebrews or Jews governed and were a majority of the population
in the area later known as Palestine.15 Persians, Greeks, and others
ruled at times as well. Romans invaded in the first century A.D.,
and had killed or exiled the largest part of the Jewish population
by the second century.16 After the Roman Empire disintegrated,
are refugees who have a right of return to Israel. See Sabel, supra note 3, at 54;
Said, supra note 5, at 89.
13 The leading treatment of this topic is Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private
Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT’L L.
295 (1995).
14 See infra Appendix Tables 1, 3.
15 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 4.
16 Id.
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the area was governed by a rotating cast of invaders—Mongols,
Crusaders, Arabs, Turks, and others—for a millennium and a
half.17 From the mid-sixteenth century until World War I, the area
was under the nearly unbroken rule of the Ottoman Turks,18 and
“Palestine” was a unit in the Ottoman administrative district of
greater Syria.19
Around the beginning of the nineteenth century, Palestine had
a total population of about 275,000 to 300,000, the vast majority of
which were Muslim Arabs; Jews numbered only about seven to ten
thousand.20 Starting in the 1880s, waves of Jewish settlers began to
arrive in Palestine. Many fled pogroms in Russia and Eastern
Europe; they were also driven by “age-old millenarian impulses
and values of Jewish religious tradition,” and the political ideology
of ethnic-national self-determination that was developing in the
latter part of the nineteenth century.21 A Zionist movement
emerged at this time under the leadership of Theodor Herzl, and
Jews began to purchase large amounts of land in Palestine.22 At the
outset of World War I—a conflict that would have profound
consequences for the Jews’ and Arabs’ national aspirations—about
sixty thousand Jews were living in Palestine.23
To gain Arab support against the Ottoman Turks during World
War I, Great Britain made territorial promises to the Arabs
concerning the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant.24 In the Balfour
Declaration of 1917, Britain also, perhaps inconsistently, promised
Zionist Jews that it “view[ed] with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and [would] use
[its] best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object,”
provided that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil
Id.
Id. at 4, 7.
19 See, e.g., Bernard Lewis, Palestine: On the History and Geography of a Name, 2
INT’L HIST. REV. 1, 5–6 (1980); George J. Tomeh, Legal Status of Arab Refugees, 33 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 110, 112 (1968).
20 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 4.
21 Id. at 14–19, 24–25.
22 Id. at 20–24, 38.
23 Id. at 37.
24 British promises were embodied in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence
of 1915–16. For this correspondence and the British High Commissioner in Egypt,
Sir Henry McMahon’s subsequent explanation of its meaning, see THE ARABISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 2–19 (Ruth Lapidoth &
Moshe Hirsch eds., 1992).
17
18
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and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine . . . .”25
With the war over, Britain, France, Russia, Arabs, and Jews all
sought their piece of the former Ottoman Empire’s Middle Eastern
territory. President Woodrow Wilson’s calls for an “association of
nations” committed to pursuing lasting peace and selfdetermination for formerly oppressed peoples26 had far-reaching
effects on the resolution of this territorial dispute. The victorious
powers—minus the United States after the Senate blocked U.S.
entry—formed a League of Nations with power to appoint and
oversee a “Mandatory” (trustee) nation which would govern
various territories “on behalf of the League” with the goal of
eventual independence for previously oppressed nationalities.27
France became the Mandatory power for the land comprising
modern-day Syria and Lebanon, while Britain took up the Mandate
in a territory covering modern-day Jordan, Israel, the West Bank,
and the Gaza Strip–denominated Palestine.28
The Palestine Mandate required Britain to administer the
territory to “secure the establishment of the Jewish national home,”
“develop[ ] self-governing institutions,” and “safeguard[ ] the civil
and religious rights of all inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of
race and religion.”29 Soon Britain decided to subdivide the
Mandate, and granted by far the larger piece, the sparsely
inhabited desert stretching from the Jordan River east toward
Mesopotamia, to a son of the Sharif of Mecca.30 The “Jewish
national home” provision of the Palestine Mandate was declared
25 Letter from Lord Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild (Nov. 2, 1917),
reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS,
supra note 24, at 20. See generally JONATHAN SCHNEER, THE BALFOUR DECLARATION:
THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (2010).
26 See, e.g., 53 CONG. REC. 8854 (1916) (reprinting Wilson’s speech).
27 Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 22 (June 28, 1919), reprinted in, THE
ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 24, at
23 (authorizing Mandate regimes for “[t]hose colonies and territories which as a
consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”).
28 QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 46 (1930).
29 Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine, art. 2 (July 24, 1922), reprinted in
THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note
24, at 25, 26.
30 See Marvin B. Gelber, The Palestine Mandate: Story of a Fumble, 1 INT’L J. 302,
304 (1946).
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inapplicable to this separated territory,31 which comprised threequarters of the original Mandate. This territory would become the
independent Kingdom of Trans-Jordan in 1946 (later Jordan). The
remaining piece, to which Jewish emigration was still allowed,
thus comprised about one-quarter of the original Palestine
Mandate.32
Fleeing violence and uncertainty in Europe, and encouraged by
the Mandate’s requirement that “a nationality law” be framed “so
as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews
who take up permanent residence,”33 waves of European Jews
rolled into Palestine. Arab inhabitants reacted angrily. During a
terrible week of riots in 1929, Arabs killed 133 Jews and wounded
hundreds.34 In the early 1930s, both sides armed themselves into
small paramilitaries. The British overlords were losing control of
the situation.
In 1937, Britain’s Peel Commission reported that the
burgeoning conflict was “irrepressible” and recommended a
partition of land and an “exchange of population.”35 Without the
transfer of 225,000 Arabs and 1,250 Jews, said the Peel report, the
prospective Jewish state would have as many Arabs as Jews. The
“exchange” should occur through agreement but if Arabs objected,
the report advised the British “in the last resort” to compel
partition and population exchange.36 The Peel Commission’s
population exchange recommendation was based on the view that
population exchange had recently resolved other long simmering
ethnic conflicts in the area.37 After World War I, war had broken
31 See MUTAZ M. QAFISHEH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW FOUNDATIONS OF
PALESTINIAN NATIONALITY 46–47 (2008) (describing the Council of the League of
Nations’ approval of Britain’s request to exclude Trans-Jordan from the scope of
Palestine’s territory and hence from the “Jewish national home” provision of the
Palestinian Mandate).
32 See EFRAIM KARSH & P.R. KUMARASWAMY, ISRAEL, THE HASHEMITES, AND THE
PALESTINIANS 55 (2003).
33 Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine, art. 7 (July 24, 1922), reprinted in
THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note
24, at 25, 26.
34 See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 116.
35 Id. at 138–39 (quoting Peel Commission report).
36 Id. at 139.
37 Some Zionists had long thought that a population transfer was the only
way to establish a viable Jewish state in Palestine. See id. at 139–42. Morris
concludes that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that the Zionist leaders played a role
in persuading the Peel Commission to adopt the transfer solution.” Id. at 142.
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out between Turkey and Greece. Turkey killed or expelled
hundreds of thousands of Christian Greeks within its borders and
within former Ottoman lands granted to Greece under the Treaty
of Sevres of 1920.38 With mediation by the representatives of the
victorious Allied powers, Turkey and Greece signed the 1923
Treaty of Lausanne, which mandated a compulsory population
exchange to “unmix the populations” to “secure the true
pacification of the Near East.”39 Either individually or pursuant to
treaty mechanisms, approximately 1.3 million ethnic Greeks
transferred from Turkey to Greece and nearly 400,000 ethnic Turk
Muslims in Greece were sent in the opposite direction.40 The Peel
Commission hoped that the parties to the Palestine dispute “might
show the same high statesmanship as that of the Turks and the
Greeks and make the same bold decision”—compulsory
population exchange—“for the sake of peace.”41 The British
government endorsed the Peel plan, and the League of Nations—
the supervisor of Britain’s mandate over Palestine—concurred that
partition and population transfer should be studied.42
Zionist leaders agreed that population transfer might be
necessary, but no part of the Peel plan was acceptable to the
Palestinians and Arab states, which “stridently opposed the Jews’
38 See Christa Meindersma, Population Exchanges: International Law and State
Practice, 9 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 335, 338 (1997).
39 The quotation is from the League of Nations’ representative to the treaty
talks. Id. at 339–40. According to the treaty: “[T]here shall take place a
compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion
[residing in] Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion
[residing in] Greek territory.” Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and
Turkish Populations, art. 1, Jan. 30, 1923, 32 L.N.T.S. 75, reprinted in 18 SUPP. AM. J.
INT’L L. 84 (1924) [hereinafter Treaty of Lausanne].
40 Meindersma, supra note 38, at 346. See generally STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE
EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES: BULGARIA, GREECE AND TURKEY (1932).
During
approximately the same time, Britain had partitioned Ireland in an attempt to
settle the ethnic-religious conflict there. The largely Catholic South was granted
independence in 1921, while Northern Ireland was separated and kept part of
Britain. With the population of Northern Ireland comprising about two-thirds
Protestant and one-third Catholic residents and characterized by “irregular and
commingled settlement patterns,” this partition did not in fact “separate the
antagonistic communities” and hence did not stop the conflict. See Chaim D.
Kaufmann, When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the
Twentieth Century, 23 INT’L SECURITY 120, 126–28 (1998) (arguing that mixed
demography was central to the relationship between the partition of Ireland and
violence in the early 1920s).
41 JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN, POPULATION TRANSFERS IN ASIA 87 (1949) (quoting
the Peel Commission report).
42 Id. at 88–90.
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getting any part of the country they viewed as rightfully theirs,
and as sacred Muslim soil.”43 The Arab Higher Committee (AHC),
the chief organ of the Arab residents of Mandate Palestine, rejected
both partition and the prospect of living under a Jewish state.44
When Arab gunmen assassinated a British official in 1937, the
British declared the AHC illegal and sought to arrest its members.45
Arab militias responded with more than four hundred attacks on
British police and Jewish settlements.46 The next year, over fifteen
hundred Arab attacks left 77 Britons and 255 Jews dead.47 This
Arab violence made the British government and the League of
Nations suddenly wary of partition and population transfer.48
In 1939, on the eve of war in Europe, about 1,070,000 Arabs and
460,000 Jews lived in Palestine.49 By now, the looming peril of
Germany, Italy, and Japan had become paramount for the British
Empire. The Middle East was strategically important because it
contained huge oil reserves and many British military bases. To
protect these assets, Arab and Muslim public opinion needed to be
propitiated.50 As a result of these considerations, the partition and
population exchange option, put on the table by the Peel
Commission, was taken off by the British government’s “White
Paper” in November; Jewish immigration was curtailed at this
especially inauspicious time.51 Churchill called the reversal of
Britain’s pledge to create a Jewish homeland another “Munich”
and a “surrender to Arab violence.”52 The AHC resisted even
greatly limited Jewish immigration.53 In October 1941, Churchill,
now prime minister, pledged that if the British won the war, the
“creation of a great Jewish state in Palestine inhabitated [sic] by
millions of Jews will be one of the leading features of the Peace
See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 138, 143.
Id. at 144.
45 Id. at 145.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 150–51.
48 SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 90–91.
49 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 122.
50 See id. at 155.
51 Id. at 155, 158. Many other countries, including the United States, also did
little to help Jews seeking to immigrate to escape the Nazis. See generally DAVID S.
WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS (1984).
52 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 159.
53 “The English to the sea and the Jews to the graves” remained the slogan.
Id. at 158.
43
44
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Conference discussions.”54 Roosevelt, for his part, managed to
avoid any commitment to a Jewish state; there was “the plight of
European Jewry” on one hand, but oil and realpolitik on the other.55
In 1944, Roosevelt did declare that “full justice will be done to
those who seek a Jewish national home,”56 and just before the war
in the West ended, Roosevelt, at Yalta, declared himself a Zionist,
as did Stalin.57 “The growing Zionist orientation of American
public opinion” found a surer champion in the next president,
Harry Truman, who advocated resettling Jewish displaced persons
from Europe in Palestine, even as the Arab League warned that
this could cause a religious war.58
At the Potsdam Conference of 1945, the victorious Allied
powers approved a massive population transfer. “The polyethnic
nature of East European states and territorial incongruity in the
region, where frontiers failed to conform to the natural boundaries
of ethnolinguistic communities, were considered particularly
troublesome.”59 Indeed, many considered them to be a leading
cause of two world wars.
At the conference, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary received the approval of the United
States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain to expel to Germany
their ethnic German populations, which had proved so
unmanageable in the inter-war years and in World War II.60

Id. at 168.
Id. at 171.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 171–72.
Stalin, a murderous anti-Semite, added that Jews were
“parasites.” Id. at 172.
58 Id. at 172.
The seven-nation Arab League, founded in fall 1945 in
Alexandria, had assumed control of the Palestine negotiations.
59 Bohdan Kordan, Making Borders Stick: Population Transfer and Resettlement in
the Trans-Curzon Territories, 1944–1949, 31 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 704, 704 (1997).
60 See, e.g., TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 25–26
(2005); Joseph B. Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers in Europe: A Survey, 15
REV. POLITICS 151 (1953) (specifying the number of German groups that were resettled in Europe between 1944 and 1951); Timothy William Waters, Remembering
Sudetenland: On the Legal Construction of Ethnic Cleansing, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 63, 75–76
(2006) (explaining that parties to the Potsdam Protocol were aware of German
expulsions and offered no fundamental objections). Article 13 of the Potsdam
Protocol provided: “The three Governments, having considered the question in all
its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or
elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to
be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in
an orderly and humane manner.” Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, A Historical Survey of
Twentieth Century Expulsions, in REFUGEES IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR 15, 24 (Anna
54
55
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Moreover, as the border between Poland and the Soviet Union was
to be delimited, populations of different ethnic groups were
relocated. Pursuant to the Potsdam agreement and unilateral
decisions of victorious Allied nations or nations freed by Allied
armies, approximately twenty million people belonging to ethnic
minorities were transferred and resettled between 1944 and 1951.61
The prevailing view of statesmen was that “the policy of
compulsory transfer of population [was a] solution of the
minorities problem.”62
After the war, in spring 1946, an Anglo-American Committee
of Inquiry toured European displaced-person camps and the
Middle East to hear testimony from all sides about the future of
Palestine.63 Despite this and further efforts, no compromise was
reached. Arab leaders insisted on independence and majority (i.e.,
Arab) rule for the entire Mandatory territory.64 Britain was ready
to rid itself of the bother. In February 1947, the exhausted British
handed the matter to the United Nations,65 the new and improved
international organization born out of the League of Nations,
which had collapsed from America’s absence and the inability to
restrain Axis aggression.
Violence was nearly out of control in Palestine, especially once
Britain began to evacuate its troops and civil officials.66 In early
1947, the U.N. General Assembly, in special session in New York,
formed a U.N. Special Committee on Palestine to forge a
settlement. The Palestinian leadership boycotted it,67 while the
Arab League, meeting with the U.N. mediators, rejected partition.
The Arab League and Palestinian leadership claimed that the U.N.
lacked legal competence to order partition68 and sought a unified
C. Bramwell ed., 1988) (offering political explanations for German population
transfers).
61 See infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 40, 41, 43–48, 50). A very large but still
disputed number of transferees died en route.
62 J.R., The Exchange of Minorities and Transfers of Population in Europe Since
1919: II. Repatriation of Germans by Agreement, 21 BULLETIN INT’L NEWS 657, 657
(Aug. 1944).
63 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 177.
64 SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 93; Henry Cattan, Recollections on the United
Nations Resolution to Partition Palestine, 4 PAL. Y.B. INT’L L. 260, 260–61 (1987–1988).
65 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 180.
66 Id. at 183.
67 Cattan, supra note 64, at 261.
68 FRED J. KHOURI, THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA 49 (3d ed. 1985); Cattan, supra
note 64, at 262.
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state from which illegal Jewish immigrants would be expelled and
where most of the remaining Jews would have no political rights.69
In November 1947, Resolution 181 came before the General
Assembly.70 It proposed, along the Committee’s recommended
lines, a second partition of Mandate Palestine. The plan was to
give fifty-five percent of the territory remaining in the Mandate to
the prospective Jewish state, with about 500,000 Jews and a large
Arab minority of more than 400,000.71 About 100,000 Jews and an
approximately equal number of Arabs would live in Jerusalem,
which would be placed under international control.72
The
proposed Arab state would have about 800,000 Arabs and 10,000
Jews.73
When the partition plan came to a vote, thirty-three nations
voted “yes” in favor of partition, thirteen voted “no,” and ten
abstained.74 The Zionists had won this round. But Arab states
declared the Resolution invalid and began to prepare for war.75 A
Jewish state itself, and a Muslim minority living under Jewish rule,
was unacceptable to the Arabs.76 The Yishuv indicated that it
accepted the U.N.’s two-state partition plan, but Britain refused to
implement it because of the Arab rejection. Instead, Britain
insisted it would simply terminate the Mandate and speedily
complete its withdrawal by May 1948, leaving events on the
ground to take their course. Thereafter, the U.N. Security Council
deadlocked over whether to enforce the partition plan,77 and an
Arab attempt to refer the matter to the new International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) failed.78
MORRIS, supra note 10, at 182; SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 97.
MORRIS, supra note 10, at 186; see also Resolution on the Future Government
of Palestine, G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947).
71 KHOURI, supra note 68, at 54; MORRIS, supra note 10, at 184.
72 KHOURI, supra note 68, at 47; MORRIS, supra note 10, at 184.
73 KHOURI, supra note 68, at 53.
74 The ayes were the United States, the British Commonwealth states,
Western Europe, the Soviet bloc, and most of Latin America. Abstainers included
Britain, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and China. The nays were the Arab and
Muslim states, Cuba, and India. MORRIS, supra note 10, at 186.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See Statement of Mr. Austin (U.S.), U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 271st Mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/PV.271 (Mar. 19, 1948) (memorializing the events that occurred up to, and
including, the negotiations regarding the partition of Palestine).
78 See Victor Kattan, The Nationality of Denationalized Palestinians, 74 NORDIC J.
INT’L L. 67, 70 (2005).
69
70
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Though Britain ultimately rejected this solution for Palestine,
its troops and administrators used territorial partition elsewhere,
in a different colonial possession, to solve an ethnic-religious
conflict. When World War II ended and independence seemed
inevitable, India was about twenty-two percent Muslim and sixtyeight percent Hindu, with Sikhs and smaller groups accounting for
the remainder. The Muslim community decided that, without
British control and protection, it needed its own state to protect its
interests. In the summer of 1947, Britain and Muslim and Hindu
representatives agreed to partition, which would begin in just a
few months.79 A new Muslim state of Pakistan would be created
out of majority-Muslim areas on both the western and eastern
edges of India, a secular Hindu-majority state would remain in the
middle, and Hindus or Muslims left in the area granted to the
other group would be allowed to transfer.
As it happened, the partition of India was exceptionally
bloody. Much of the violence occurred in, and around, Punjab
Province, home to most of India’s population of six million Sikhs.80
The wealthy and powerful Sikh community did not want to live
under Muslim rule, but it was denied an independent state in the
negotiations leading to partition.81 Muslims would not give
political or security guarantees to Sikhs, and thousands of Sikhs
were being killed by organized and unorganized Muslim
violence.82 Refugee flight and retaliatory Sikh violence began, and
violent chaos soon engulfed the province and spread to
surrounding areas. Overall, hundreds of thousands died and
perhaps twelve million people were exchanged between India and
West Pakistan.83 Most refugees fled on their own accord and
without assistance; however, some governmental and civil society
organizations assisted their own people’s flight or, less frequently,
helped to expel other groups.84 In the east of the country, where
Kaufmann, supra note 40, at 134–36.
Id. at 135.
81 Id. at 136–38.
82 Id. at 138.
83 Id. at 138–40; ANDREW BELL-FIALKOFF, ETHNIC CLEANSING 41 (1996).
84 See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 9–28, 41–42 (describing the HinduMuslim exchange of population); Gyanendra Pandey, “Nobody’s People”: The Dalits
of Punjab in the Forced Removal of 1947, in REMOVING PEOPLES: FORCED REMOVAL IN
THE MODERN WORLD 297, 307 (Richard Bessel & Claudia B. Haake eds., 2009)
(explaining the circumstances that lead to the expulsion of thousands of Muslims
in Tihar).
79
80
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the partition lines had fairly neatly separated the Muslim and nonMuslim populations of Bengal—part of which became East
Pakistan and later, after an intra-Muslim civil war, the
independent state of Bangladesh—there was relatively less
violence.85 After the mass refugee flights of 1947, some changed
their minds and attempted to return home.86 Both the Pakistani
and Indian governments immediately regulated this—allowing
only the holders of special permits to return,87 and then setting a
strict time limit.88
Back in Palestine, blood was flowing. From 1947 to 1949, the
Jews in Palestine fought Palestinian Arabs and armed forces from a
number of Arab nations for control of Palestine. A guerrilla or civil
war began in November 1947, immediately after the U.N. vote for
partition and the Arabs’ rejection. True to its word, in May 1948,
Britain formally ended its control of Palestine and soon completed
the withdrawal of its military and civil personnel. At the same
time, the Yishuv proclaimed itself the independent State of Israel,
and a more conventional war began between Israel and armed
forces from Syria, Trans-Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq.89
Atrocities were committed on both sides during the war.90 In all,
about six thousand Jews and ten thousand Arabs—both
combatants and civilians—were killed or died.91 Though smaller
in numbers, the Jewish forces proved stronger. They razed some
Arab villages and expelled a still-disputed number of Palestinian
civilians.

Kaufmann, supra note 40, at 138–41.
Schechtman estimates that 52,000 Muslims returned to India from Pakistan
in spring 1948. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 41.
87 Id.
88 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 54 & n.69).
89 See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 215–18. In addition, small numbers of troops
from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan came to fight the
Jews. See DAVID TAL, WAR IN PALESTINE 1948, 288 (2004); EDGAR O’BALLANCE, THE
ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 1948, 77–78 (1957).
90 Two are infamous. At Deir Yassin, investigations indicate that 100 to 110
Arab villagers, including women, children and other noncombatants, were
massacred by Jewish irregular forces. Then, days later, at Mount Scopus, Arab
guerillas burned alive in their vehicles a large group of Jewish civilians, including
nurses and doctors heading to Hadassah Hospital. Seventy or more were killed in
the attack. See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 207–09.
91 Kaufmann, supra note 40, at 144.
85
86
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Israel’s declaration of independence had avoided specifying the
borders of the state;92 Israel did not want to publicly reject the U.N.
partition boundaries, for fear of upsetting the U.N., the United
States, and other key players, but it also desired “to leave open the
possibility of expansion beyond the United Nations borders.”93
The war’s end found Israel in control of most of the territory
allotted to it under the U.N. partition plan as well as some territory
that the U.N. had allocated to the Palestinian Arabs or to
international control (Jerusalem and some suburbs).
Previously separated into three population clumps—Jerusalem,
eastern Galilee, and the coastal area from Haifa to Tel Aviv—with
Arab areas in between, the Jewish community of Palestine was
consolidated by war into a contiguous whole.94 Some 600,000 to
760,000 Palestinian Arabs were either expelled or fled of their own
accord from territory controlled by Israel.95 As noted at the outset,
the legal analysis in this Article assumes the truth of the Palestinian
claim that the refugee flight was wholly the fault of Israeli
misdeeds.
Somewhat more than 100,000 Palestinian Arabs
remained in Israel.96 Many refugees settled in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, controlled by Arab armies.97 The bulk of the rest
went to Trans-Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, while much smaller
92 See Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948,
reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS,
supra note 24, at 61–62 (declaring that “a Jewish state” was established “in EretzIsrael”—meaning in part of the entirety of the God-given Land of Israel—“on the
strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly,” but not
specifying the new state’s boundaries).
93 AVI SHLAIM, THE POLITICS OF PARTITION 169 (1990).
In fact, the Israeli
diplomat in Washington informed the United States that “the state of Israel has
been proclaimed as an independent republic within the frontiers approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947.”
Letter from Eliahu Epstein, Agent of the Provisional Gov’t of Isr., to Harry
Truman, President of the U.S. (May 15, 1948), reprinted in S. COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: BASIC DOCUMENTS 1941–1949,
S. Doc. No. 123, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 843 (1950). Epstein made an identical
statement in a contemporaneous letter to the President of the U.N. Security
Council. See TAL, supra note 89, at 163–64 (quoting letter).
94 Kaufmann, supra note 40, at 144–46.
95 See, e.g., MICHAEL DUMPER, THE FUTURE FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 37 (2007);
BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM REVISITED 602–04
(2d ed. 2004); Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 13, at 297; Sabel, supra note 3, at 53.
96 MORRIS, supra note 95, at 603.
97 Id. at 602–03. Trans-Jordan ended up annexing the West Bank, and Egypt
occupied Gaza. During the 1967 war, Israel took possession of both territories.
See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 329, 605; SHLAIM, supra note 93, at 368.
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numbers reached Egypt, Iraq and the states of the Arabian
Peninsula.98 During 1949, approximately 900,000 Jews lived in
Israel.99 The Palestinian refugees left behind a great deal of real
and personal property in Israel, which has been held by Israel or
disposed of through a complicated series of domestic Israeli legal
regimes, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article.100
Given the scale of the personal and financial tragedy for the
Palestinian people, and the negative impact on their national
aspirations, one can understand why Palestinians mourn these
events as a catastrophe (al-Nakbah).
In 1950, the Israeli parliament enacted the Law of Return,
which provided that “[e]very Jew” had the right to emigrate to
Israel and become a citizen.101 Because the parliament enacted the
Law of Return but has refused to recognize a Palestinian right of
return, Israeli citizenship and immigration policies are denounced
by many Palestinians and their supporters as racist.102 In 1952,
Israel enacted nationality legislation providing that only those
former citizens of Mandatory Palestine who remained in Israel
from its establishment in 1948 until the enactment of the law could
become Israeli citizens.103 Because almost all Palestinian refugees
abroad did not fit those criteria, they were not Israeli citizens under
98 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 252. According to Dumper, in 1949, 34% of
Palestinian refugees were in the West Bank, 26% in Gaza, 10% in Jordan, 14% in
Lebanon, 10% in Syria, and 1% or fewer in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and other Arab countries. DUMPER, supra note 95, at 46 tbl.2.3.
99 I am citing the average Jewish population for the year 1949.
Mainly
because of immigration from post-war Europe, the Jewish population increased
from approximately 759,000 at the end of 1948 to approximately 1,014,000 at the
end of 1949. For all of this data, see Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 61, subject 2,
tbl.2, Population, By Religion, ISR. CENT. BUREAU STAT., available at
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/shnatone_new.htm?CYear=2010&Vol=
61&CSubject=2.
100 Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 13, at 297–98, 300–01.
101 See Shlomo Guberman, The Law of Return, 1950, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFF., (Aug. 20, 2001), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/
2000_2009/2001/8/The%20Law%20of%20Return-%201950.
102 See, e.g., HENRY CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (1973);
Ali Abunimah & Hussein Ibish, The Palestinian Right of Return, AMERICAN-ARAB
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, ADC Issue Paper No. 30, at 15 (2001).
103 See, e.g., Don Peretz, The Arab Minority of Israel, 8 MIDDLE EAST J. 139, 146
(1954) (stating residency requirements to obtain Israeli nationality); see also
Acquisition of Israeli Nationality, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., (Aug. 20, 2001),
available
at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/
8/Acquisition%20of%20Israeli%20Nationality (explaining the implications of
Israeli nationality legislation for Palestinians). Here and elsewhere when I note
the views of the parties to this dispute, I do not mean to endorse them as my own.
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Israel’s municipal law.
Trans-Jordan, which, after its 1950
annexation of the West Bank, was home to about 500,000
Palestinian refugees,104 enacted nationality legislation in 1954
giving citizenship to resident Palestinians “except the Jews.”105 For
various reasons, with political and diplomatic considerations
foremost, all other Arab states besides Trans-Jordan resolved that
Palestinian refugees would retain their nominal Palestinian
nationality and not be naturalized in their states of refuge.106
For years, different tales about the reasons for the Palestinian
refugees’ flight were told by Israelis and Arabs. The Israeli
position was that almost all of the Arabs left voluntarily, urged or
ordered by leaders to make way for the conquering Arab armies.
Immediately after the war, some Arab journalists and government
officials told the same story that Israelis did. The shame of losing a
war to the Jews mandated that the Palestinians’ flight had been
voluntary and driven by military tactics or a principled refusal to
live a single day under Jewish rule.107 Arab states and Palestinian
leaders maintained that Israel had no legitimate, legal existence
and would soon be swept away by their resurgent armies. They
demanded that the U.N., Israel, and other nations of the world
recognize and enforce a right of the Palestinian refugees to return
to their homes and lands, and often made clear that this meant the

104 TAKKENBERG, supra note 3, at 20, n.62 (providing statistical data regarding
distribution of refugees).
105 The law stated: “Any person with previous Palestinian nationality except
the Jews before the date of May 14, 1948 residing in the Kingdom during the
period from December 20, 1949 and February 16, 1954 is a Jordanian citizen.”
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JORDAN: THE SILENT TREATMENT: FLEEING IRAQ SURVIVING IN
JORDAN, at 78 n.240 (2006).
106 See Jalal Al Husseini, The Arab States and the Refugee Issue: A Retrospective
View, in ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 435 (Eyal Benvenisti et al. eds.,
2007); OROUB EL-ABED, UNPROTECTED: PALESTINIANS IN EGYPT SINCE 1948 (2009);
Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 13, at 298; Abbas Shiblak, Residency Status and Civil
Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries, 25 J. PALESTINE STUD. 36, 38–39
(1996); Georgiana G. Stevens, Arab Refugees: 1948–1952, 6 MIDDLE E. J. 281, 287, 294
(1952). The collective decision that Palestinians in Arab states would not be
naturalized was formalized in the 1965 Casablanca Protocol. See TAKKENBERG,
supra note 3, at 141. In recent years, Jordan, the only Arab state to grant
citizenship to significant numbers of Palestinians, has been withdrawing it. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JORDAN: STATELESS AGAIN: PALESTINIAN-ORIGIN
JORDANIANS DEPRIVED OF THEIR NATIONALITY (2010).
107 See, e.g., JON & DAVID KIMCHE, A CLASH OF DESTINIES 122 (1960);
SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 124–25; Radley, supra note 3, at 587 n.7, 589 (citing
CHRISTOPHER SYKES, CROSSROADS TO ISRAEL 420 (1965)).
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destruction of Israel.108 It was only somewhat later that the
unanimous Arab narrative was that Palestinian flight had resulted
from a systematic and brutal expulsion by Jewish forces.109
Neither side’s explanation for the refugees’ flight is entirely
accurate, says Professor Benny Morris, the leading historian of the
Palestinian refugee problem.110 Morris’s revisionist history, which
found no Zionist master plan to expel Arabs but asserted that
numerous actions taken by Jewish forces, often with official
political connivance, caused the flight of many Palestinians,111 has
not been universally accepted. Professor Efraim Karsh, for
example, has argued that Morris misinterpreted the evidence and
that Palestinian Arabs fled for many reasons of their own besides
feared or actual Jewish violence.112 On the other hand, there are
those who claim that the Yishuv and then Israel planned and
implemented an illegal “ethnic cleansing.”113 Nevertheless, for
purposes of clarity, the following legal analysis of the Palestinians’
alleged right of return will assume the truth of the Palestinian
version of events—that the Palestinian refugees’ flight was the
direct or indirect result of Jewish violence or threats of violence.
Spurred by tensions in Palestine, in 1948 the ancient Jewish
communities in many Arab states began to flee or be expelled.
Overall, about half a million or more Jews eventually left Arab
states, such as Iraq and Egypt, and many came to Israel.114 In many
cases, the Jewish refugee exodus was accompanied by Arab
violence against Jews and official or unofficial property
confiscation. When Palestinian refugees and Arab states began to
demand post-war that refugees be allowed to return to Israel, Israel
responded that a de facto “population exchange” had taken place
between Arab countries and Israel and that this separation of the
108 See, e.g., Radley, supra note 3, at 602 n.64 (quoting Mohammad Sala el Din
Bin Bey, Foreign Minister of Egypt in 1949, as stating, “More clearly, they
envisage the liquidation of Israel.”).
109 See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 106, at 282–83; Tomeh, supra note 19, at 122.
Some Arabs did say contemporaneously with events that Jewish atrocities had
caused the flight of the Palestinian Arabs. See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 123
(quoting Henry Cattan of the Arab Higher Committee in 1948 that Arabs were
forced to flee through “Zionist terror and horror from their homeland . . . .”).
110 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 253.
111 See generally MORRIS, supra note 95.
112 See generally EFRAIM KARSH, PALESTINE BETRAYED (2010).
113 See, e.g., ILAN PAPPE, THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF PALESTINE (2006).
114 See infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 58 & 59).
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communities would not be reversed by Palestinian refugee
repatriation.
No Arab state agreed to formally end its state of war against
Israel, but under U.N. supervision, bilateral armistices were
reached in 1949 between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan,
and Syria. These armistices declared that they were made without
prejudice to future negotiation of the status of refugees and
borders.115
A U.N.-appointed mediator, the Swedish aristocrat Count
Folke Bernadotte, had reported mid-war his view that Palestinian
“Arab refugees” had a “right” to return to their homes inside
Israel.116 Neither Bernadotte nor his vision for an Arab-tilting
settlement survived; the Count was assassinated by Jewish
terrorists soon after his report to the U.N., and the complex
resolution on Palestine drafted and approved by the U.N. General
Assembly in December 1948 did not describe the return of
Palestinian refugees as a “right.” Resolution 194 (III) created a
Conciliation Commission for Palestine empowered to “facilitate
the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social
rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation,”
and:

115
Egypt, Trans-Jordan, and Syria each stipulated in their respective
armistice agreements with Israel that the territorial lines referenced were military
armistice lines rather than permanent political boundaries, and that the agreement
about military lines was without prejudice to later discussions of political matters.
See Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, Isr.-Syria, arts. II.2, IV.2 & V.1,
July
20,
1949,
No.
657,
42
U.N.T.S.
327,
available
at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm04.asp;
General
Armistice
Agreement Between the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom and Israel, Jordan-Isr., arts.
II.2, IV.2, VI.8 & VI.9, Apr. 3, 1949, No. 656, 42 U.N.T.S. 303, available at
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/F03D55E48F77AB698525643B00608D34;
Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Egypt-Isr., arts. IV.3, V.2 & V.3,
Feb.
24,
1949,
No.
654,
42
U.N.T.S.
251,
available
at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm01.asp. Lebanon agreed to call the
boundary between its territory and the former Palestine Mandate an
“international boundary,” even while insisting that agreement itself only
concerned military armistice lines and did not prejudice later discussions of
political matters. See Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Isr.-Leb.,
arts. II.2, IV.2 & V.1, Mar. 23, 1949, No. 655, 42 U.N.T.S. 287, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm02.asp.
116 See Progress Rep. of the U.N. Mediator on Palestine, 3rd Sess., at 18, U.N.
Doc. A/648 (Jan. 1, 1948) (“The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes
in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by
the United Nations.”).
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Resolve[d] that the refugees wishing to return to their homes
and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted
to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that
compensation should be paid for the property of those
choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to
property which, under principles of international law or in
equity, should be made good by the Governments or
authorities responsible[.]117
Israel did not outright accept or reject Resolution 194 (III) but
publicly indicated that it believed that resettlement in Arab
countries was required for the majority of Palestinian refugees;
privately, Israeli leaders had decided months earlier that no return
of any substantial size would take place.118 The Palestinians and
Arab states rejected Resolution 194 (III) because it presupposed the
legitimate existence of Israel and did not provide a total,
unconditional right to return—any return of refugees was made
conditional on peace and perhaps subject to Israeli approval.119 For
many Arabs at that time, the Palestinians would return only, as the
then Egyptian foreign minister put it, “as master of their country
and not as slaves,” and in the context of “the liquidation of
Israel.”120 For this reason, the Arab states voted against Resolution
194.121
G.A. Res. 194 (III), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/194(III) (Dec. 11, 1948).
See generally MORRIS, supra note 95, at 549–51, 559–60. Under pressure
from the United Kingdom, United States, and others, Israel in 1949 offered to take
back up to 100,000 Palestinian refugees as part of a comprehensive peace
settlement, but the Arabs rejected this offer. See id. at 570–78.
119 But today, some advocates of the Palestinian position on refugees claim
that the U.N. resolution required a right of “unconditional return” for the
refugees. See, e.g., PAPPE, supra note 113, at 188.
120 Radley, supra note 3, at 602 n.64 (citing Al Misri (Oct. 11, 1949), quoted in
Talmon, Israel and the Arabs and in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER 284 (Laqueur ed.,
1971)).
121 To obtain the vote tally, see, http://unbisnet.un.org, (follow “Voting
Records” hyperlink; then search “U.N. Resolution Symbol” for “A/RES/194(III)”
and search “Keyword” for either “Egypt,” “Iraq,” “Lebanon,” “Saudi Arabia,”
“Syria,” “Yemen,” or other non-Arab states which voted against the resolution;
then follow red arrow hyperlink). Trans-Jordan was not yet a U.N. member state,
but almost certainly would have voted ‘no.’ The Arab states’ vote against the
resolution on refugee return does not appear in the histories written by some
supporters of the Palestinian side. See, e.g., PAPPE, supra note 113, at 188 (touting
the significance of the supposedly “unconditional return” of refugees demanded
by Resolution 194 by noting that it “was overwhelmingly supported by most of
the member states” of the United Nations).
117
118
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BACKGROUND LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A “right of return” under international law for Palestinian
refugees has been asserted since Israeli independence in 1948.
Different substantive areas of treaty-based or customary law
potentially apply, namely refugee law, nationality and
immigration law, the law of armed conflict (also known as
international humanitarian law), law concerning state succession,
and human rights law. Some Palestinian advocates also claim that
the United Nations has created binding international law that
requires return through repeated General Assembly resolutions
specifically directed at the Palestinian refugee issue. Moreover,
some Palestinians claim that general CIL requires return.
This Section first sets out certain background principles that
must be kept in mind during discussion of the right of return.
Next it addresses the temporal question: does the law as it existed
in 1947–49 govern, or does international law as it has changed and
developed through the present day govern?
3.1. Legal Framework
There are three primary sources of international law: treaties,
CIL, and “general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.”122 Since World War II, numerous multilateral treaties
have come into force and treaties have become the most important
source of international law. “General principles” are the least
important and will not be considered here.123 CIL is a significant
source of international law but quite controversial. For centuries it
has been thought that binding international law can result from the
universal or at least general practices of states over time, if
performed from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris) rather than
122 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1033 U.N.T.S. 993 (listing these three as the primary sources of
international law).
123 There is no agreement on what are considered “general principles.” See
G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (1983)
(describing contrasting opinions about the meaning and relevance of the “general
principles” in the ICJ Statute). The leading view is that “general principles” are
gap-filling principles or presumptions, and are identified because they are used
universally or nearly universally in domestic courts. See id. at 139–41; Rudolf B.
Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations,
51 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 736 (1957). Many commentators hold that “general
principles” are applicable only in international courts and, perhaps, in
international organizations. See id. at 734–36 (discussing the vagueness of how
general principles are determined in international tribunals).
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for reasons of self-interest, comity, tradition, or the like.124 To
constitute CIL, consistent state practice over time must be done
under a “conscious[ness] of having a duty” to so act.125 But
accurately identifying which state practices have been consistently
performed over a sufficient period of time because of a state’s
sense of legal obligation has often proved difficult.126 Despite these
difficulties, CIL has been and continues to be recognized as a
crucially important form of international law. “Soft law” is
sometimes said to be a fourth kind of international law, in addition
to treaties, CIL, and general principles.127 Though the term soft law
has various meanings, here it is used to describe statements of
norms or obligations which, even though announced in non-legally
124 See generally PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (Routledge 7th rev. ed. 2007) (describing how customary
international law has traditionally been located: for a rule imposing a duty, state
practice must be “accompanied by the conviction that it reflects a legal
obligation,” rather than, for example, conduct motivated by “courtesy or
tradition,” while for permissive rules, state practice must be accompanied by “a
conviction felt by states that a certain form of conduct is permitted by international
law.”); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)
(“Wherever and as soon as a line of international conduct frequently adopted by
States is considered legally obligatory or legally right, the rule which may be
abstracted from such conduct is a rule of customary [i]nternational [l]aw.”).
125 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 7); see also
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20)
(“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”).
126 See generally ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1971) (“[T]he literature contains no standards or criteria
for determining how much time is necessary to create a usage that can qualify as
customary international law . . . .”); MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 57
(5th ed. 2008) (observing that CIL “is ordinarily found by a more or less subjective
weighing of the evidence, and subjective scales tilt differently in different
hands.”); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 1, 1 (1975) (“[I]nternational lawyers . . . invoke rules of customary
international law every day, but they have great difficulty in agreeing on a
definition . . . .“). Recent literature suggests that much state practice which has
been assumed to be done from a sense of legal obligation can often be more
parsimoniously explained as based on rational choices about national interest.
See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005). When states take actions simply to suit their interests, it is theoretically
difficult to explain why other states should be legally bound to follow the same
rules of conduct. For a sophisticated response to Posner and Goldsmith and an
attempt to provide a firmer foundation for CIL, see ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008).
127 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing “soft law” as either: (1)
standards and obligations created from formal but non-legally binding
agreements or (2) ambiguous terms of legal binding documents).
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binding texts, are said to have, or to have acquired over time, some
kind of binding legal quality. This Article will address one specific
form of soft law—formally nonbinding U.N. General Assembly
resolutions.
3.2. The Temporal Issue
Non-retroactivity is a foundational principle in both domestic
and international law. It is a default rule of treaty interpretation128
and a core component of the customary rules regarding the
responsibility of states for international wrongs: “An act of a State
does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless
the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act
occurs.”129 Human rights bodies130 and international courts apply
this rule.131 As the Vice President of the ICJ wrote, “acts should be
judged in the light of the law contemporary with their creation.”132
128 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 28, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter
VCLT] (“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which
took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into
force of the treaty with respect to that party.”). On the customary nature of this
rule, see Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 2 (Aug. 30); Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), Preliminary Objection, 1952 I.C.J.
28, 40 (July 1).
129 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 13, U.N. Doc. 10 A/56/10 (2001). “Article 13
states the basic principle that, for responsibility to exist, the breach must occur at a
time when the State is bound by the obligation,” and is thus “a guarantee against
the retrospective application of international law in matters of State
responsibility.” International Law Commission, Commentary on Article 13 of Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. 10
A/56/10 (2001).
130 See, e.g., X. and Y. v. Portugal, App. No. 8560/79, 8613/79, 16 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209 (1979) (refusing to apply a right gained from the
European Convention on Human Rights to an action occurring before the
Convention came into force).
131 See Phosphates in Morocco (It. v. Fr.), Preliminary Objections, 1938 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 74 (June 14) (dismissing a dispute where the French government
engaged in conduct prior to an agreement prohibiting such conduct); Minquiers
and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17) (determining British sovereignty
over the islets after analyzing claims of title dating back to the fourteenth
century).
132 T. O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 285, 286
(1980); see also Anthony D’Amato, International Law, Intertemporal Problems, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1234, 1235 (1992) (“Clearly, when
changes occur in rules of international law, the changes are normally expected to
apply prospectively and not retroactively.”); Inst. de Droit Int’l, The Intertemporal
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Most legal analyses finding a Palestinian right of return do not
acknowledge the temporal problem in seeking to hold Israel’s
conduct in 1947–49 to legal standards developed decades later.133
In a few instances where right-of-return proponents have
addressed the temporal problem, they have sought to evade it by a
strained application of the so-called “continuing violations”
doctrine,134 which originated in domestic law. In domestic law,
this doctrine is widely deplored for its theoretical confusion and
doctrinal instability,135 and it seems exceedingly unlikely that it has
somehow solidified into fixed and universally binding CIL.
Notwithstanding this, the doctrine on its own terms does not help
the Palestinian refugees. The doctrine has traditionally been
Problem in Public International Law ¶ 1 (Aug. 11, 1975) (“Unless otherwise
indicated, the temporal sphere of application of any norm of public international
law shall be determined in accordance with the general principle of law by which
any fact, action or situation must be assessed in the light of the rules of law that
are contemporaneous with it.”).
133 See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 3, at 196–98, 201–02 (assessing the right to
return under treaties subsequent to the 1947–49 conflict). The attempt to hold
Israel responsible today based on contemporary international law for actions
more than sixty years ago contrasts with the recognition by EU governments and
EU institutions that Czechoslovakia’s expulsion of its ethnic German minority
after World War II must be judged in light of law contemporaneous with the
expulsion. See generally Waters, supra note 60.
134 See, e.g., KATTAN, supra note 3, at 212–14 (arguing that if one views the
Palestinian expulsions of 1948 as part of a larger continuing offense on the part of
Israel, then the governing law is the law in force at the time the dispute is settled);
Gail J. Boling, The Question of “Timing” in Evaluating Israel’s Duty under
International Law to Repatriate the 1948 Palestinian Refugees, in ISRAEL AND THE
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 219, 231 (Eyal Benvenisti et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that,
under the continuing violation doctrine, if an issue is not resolved before the
signing of a new treaty, then the new treaty governs the continuing situation once
it comes into force). A partial exception is Saideman, who acknowledges that
non-retroactivity is the default rule for treaties and that CIL by definition cannot
apply retroactively. See Saideman, supra note 3, at 846–47. But he then asserts that
a treaty post-dating 1947–49 by many years (the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, ICCPR), binds Israel retroactively “because Israel could have
asserted otherwise by filing a reservation,” but did not. Id. at 847. This cannot be
right. The relevant articles of the ICCPR give no indication that they are meant to
apply retroactively, and non-retroactivity is a universally-recognized default rule
of treaty interpretation. Thus no special reservation was needed for the ICCPR to
apply only prospectively.
135 See, e.g., Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir.
1983) (stating that, in the Title VII employment discrimination context, “the
precise contours and theoretical bases” of the continuing violation doctrine “are at
best unclear”); Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 29 P.3d 175, 183 (Cal. 2001) (“A
review of federal case law regarding the continuing violation doctrine reveals the
doctrine to be, as one leading treatise has noted, ‘arguably the most muddled area
in all of employment discrimination law.’”) (citation omitted).
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applied with regard to statutes of limitations in tort or employment
discrimination cases—if a wrong was repeated or continuing,
sometimes a plaintiff’s time to sue was extended.136 But note that
the initial act needed to be wrong at the time it was committed.137
If there was no initial wrongful act, then there could be no
continuation of anything sufficient to toll a plaintiff’s obligation to
timely file suit.138 This part of the doctrine is ignored by some
proponents of the right of return, who argue that even if Israel
committed no wrong in 1947–49 under the law then in force, the
“situation” of the refugees being denied the ability to return has
continued in time—until today.139
Thus, it is concluded, Israel’s conduct in 1947–49 and any rights
of the refugees which arose from that must be evaluated under the
international law in force today—which happens to be after
decades of unprecedented growth and change in human rights law
and other relevant areas of international law. But treaties do not
apply retroactively unless their text specifies it. As discussed
below, relevant treaties post-dating 1947–49 do not contain
language indicating that they apply retroactively. And CIL by
definition does not apply retroactively.
Right-of-return proponents’ slippery inter-temporal claims
help them less than one might suppose. Since World War II, some
areas of international law have extended their scope dramatically
and grown very detailed; have been extensively codified in
binding legal instruments; have developed important international
and regional enforcement institutions; and have seen marked
improvements in compliance in state practice. This development
has failed to happen in other substantive areas of the law. In other
areas, there is still relatively little substantive coverage, states have
been wary about making binding written commitments,
enforcement institutions are few and relatively powerless, and
136 See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380–81 (1982)
(concluding that, under § 812(a) of the Fair Housing Act, a claim of a continuing
violation is not barred, even if some conduct occurred outside of the limitations
period, as long as “the complaint is timely when it is filed within 180 days of the
last asserted occurrence of that practice”).
137 Id.
138 Continuing consequences are not sufficient to toll a statute of limitations.
See generally McGregor v. L.S.U. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
This rule does not hold in the complicated area of Title VII hostile work
environment. See generally Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101
(2002).
139 Boling, supra note 134, at 231.
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state practice has generally not come close to conforming to
already-existing written commitments, much less the aspirations of
NGOs and other proponents of broader rights and greater
enforcement. The bodies of law most applicable to the issue of the
return of Palestinian refugees fall into this latter category. States
have been reluctant to make binding commitments about the
treatment of refugees in general. In particular, the major treaty on
refugees does not even address the issue of repatriation, much less
create any kind of specific and binding right.140 In the areas of
immigration and nationality law, most states have persisted in
zealously guarding what they see as a domestic, sovereign
prerogative to determine who will enter their borders and be
deemed citizens.141 States have been similarly loath to bind
themselves to rules governing state succession. The laws of war
governing international conflicts have been extensively codified in
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which essentially every state
has agreed to, and in other important instruments. By contrast,
there is a much smaller amount of written, binding law governing
non-international conflicts, and such as there is did not develop
until the 1970s through Additional Protocols of the Geneva
Conventions. As to CIL, even if the continuing violations doctrine
did somehow allow current CIL to be applied retroactively, I show
below in Section 5 that even today it is far from clear that CIL
would recognize a right of return for refugees in the highly
unusual circumstances of the Palestinian refugees from 1947–49.

See infra Section 4.2 (analyzing the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the
reason why it does not create a right of return for Palestinians).
141 See infra Section 4.4 (exploring the Palestinian argument that international
laws of state succession should supersede Israel’s domestic immigration laws that
deny citizenship to Palestinian refugees from 1947–49); see also Jan Penrose, The
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: The Case For and Against Reform, in
FORCED MIGRATION AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: CHALLENGES TO THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 17, 17–18 (Andrzej Bolesta ed., 2003) (“[A] world of nation
states which zealously guard their right to determine who shall gain entry to their
territory and enjoy state protection and the benefits of the social, cultural and
economic life of that country. . . .”). The statement in the main text above is
subject to limitations and qualifications. Within the European Union, for example,
there has been a remarkable move to drop internal barriers to movement and to
render citizenship unimportant. But the EU still vigorously protects its outer
boundary and its common citizenship from outsiders.
140
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TREATIES AND U.N. RESOLUTIONS DO NOT PROVIDE
A RIGHT OF RETURN

No positive laws—treaties or legally-obligatory U.N.
resolutions—were violated by Israel’s expulsion of Palestinians
during the 1947–49 conflict; nor does any positive law source
provide a right of return for Palestinian refugees. Because the
1947–49 Palestinian refugees were expelled or fled during armed
conflict, it makes sense to first examine the international law of
armed conflict. This Section then reviews treaties embodying
refugee law, human rights law and law governing nationality and
state succession, as well as U.N. General Assembly and Security
Council resolutions. Where relevant, CIL norms interstitial to
written law are discussed. However, the discussion of whether
CIL in general provides a right of return is not taken up until
Section 5.
4.1. Law of Armed Conflict
4.1.1. Geneva Conventions of 1949
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which governs the
treatment of civilians in war (hence the ‘Civilians Convention’), is
cited as recognizing a right of return applicable to the case of the
Palestinians.142 Specifically, Article 49 of the Convention bars
“[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country . . . .”143 But this
does not apply to the 1947–49 Palestinian refugees because Israel
only became a party to the treaty in June 1951,144 well after the
1947–49 conflict had generated the Palestinian refugee problem.
As discussed in Section 3.2 above, absent treaty language to the
contrary, the substantive provisions of the treaty cannot be applied
retroactively to judge prior conduct. Nothing in the Civilians
Convention indicates that the relevant provisions are meant to
142 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilians
Convention].
143 Id.
144 See State Parties, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P
(last visited Oct. 17, 2012) [hereinafter State Parties Geneva] (listing dates of
signature, ratification, and reservation by states to the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
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have retroactive effect.
In any event, the prohibition on
deportations is inapplicable to what occurred during the conflict
over Palestine because the treaty provision applies only in
“occupied territory.” As discussed below as part of the analysis of
the applicability of earlier treaties, the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907 concerning rules for land warfare in inter-state wars,
Israel was not a military occupier of a hostile nation’s territory
during the 1947–49 conflict.
4.1.2. Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907
In 1899, delegates to an international conference at The Hague
negotiated and signed the Convention with Respect to the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, which contained an Annex of
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.145
A second peace conference in 1907 adopted a revised but nearly
identical treaty and annex of regulations.146 But because some state
parties to the 1899 convention did not adopt its replacement, both
conventions have remained in force. Neither Israel nor its
adversaries during the 1947–49 conflict—Egypt, Yemen, Iraq,
Trans-Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia—were parties to either
treaty.147 During the time that it governed the Palestine Mandate,
the United Kingdom was a party to the 1907 Hague Convention.
Because Israel was created out of part of the territory of the
Mandate, it might be argued that Israel was a “successor state” and
succeeded to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Hague
Convention. As discussed in more detail in Section 4.4 below,
Israel has consistently denied that it was the successor to U.K.
145 Convention (II) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention].
146 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]. On the
two conferences and conventions, see James L. Tryon, The Hague Conferences, 20
YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1911) (discussing the history behind the conventions).
147 See State Parties, Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The
Hague, 18 October 1907, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=195&ps=P (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) (listing
dates of signature, ratification, and reservation by states to the 1907 Hague
Convention); State Parties, Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=150&ps=P (last visited
Oct. 17, 2012) (listing dates of signature, ratification, and reservation by states to
the 1899 Hague Convention).
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treaties or any other obligations of the United Kingdom or the
Mandate, and there is no basis, under international law in force at
the time, to question this.
But even if one believes that Israel somehow succeeded to the
U.K.’s treaty obligations, there is an alternative reason why Israel
was not directly bound by the 1907 Hague Convention. The
Convention’s “general participation clause” provides that the
Convention and the annexed regulations “do not apply except
between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents
are parties to the Convention.”148 The war over Palestine involved
many states that were not parties to the 1907 Hague Convention,
such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.149 As a result, even if it had
succeeded to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the
Convention, Israel was not directly bound by the Convention’s
provisions and regulations during the 1947–49 conflict.
Even though Israel was not directly bound by the Conventions’
provisions and their annexed regulations, Israel might still have
been bound indirectly, by virtue of the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions’ contents having become part of CIL at some time
before the 1947–49 conflict. In 1946, the International Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg judging Nazi war crimes declared that the
Hague rules had, by 1939 when World War II started, become CIL.
The Tribunal rejected the German defendants’ argument that the
general participation clause and the presence of non-parties among
the belligerents in World War II relieved Germany of its

148 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146, art. 2 (specifying when
regulations in the Convention apply).
149 Two of Israel’s adversaries—Trans-Jordan and Iraq—might possibly have
succeeded to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the 1907 Hague
Convention. Both states were created out of Mandate territory overseen by the
United Kingdom—Iraq in 1932 and Trans-Jordan in 1946. Upon independence,
both countries signed treaties with the U.K., which contained provisions
governing which treaty obligations of the United Kingdom’s would be deemed to
descend upon the newly independent states. See, e.g., Treaty of Alliance, U.K.Trans-Jordan, art. 8, Mar. 22, 1946, U.K.T.S. No. 32 (providing that Trans-Jordan
succeeded to (1) any treaty “obligations and responsibilities devolving on [the
U.K.] in respect of Trans-Jordan,” and (2) “[a]ny general international treaty,
convention or agreement which has been made applicable to Trans-Jordan by [the
U.K.] as mandatory”). Whether or not the United Kingdom had done anything
during the mandate to make the 1907 Hague Convention “applicable to TransJordan,” that Convention still would not have applied during the war over
Palestine because, as noted in the main text above, other parties to the conflict like
Egypt had not signed the Convention.
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obligations to follow Hague rules.150 One might perhaps quibble
about the strength of this precedent with regard to a non-party to
the Hague Conventions, such as Israel.151 The Israeli government
apparently did not believe that the Hague provisions and
regulations bound its actions during the conflict.152
But even assuming that Israel was, during the war, bound by
the Hague rules as CIL, an analysis of the provisions of the
Conventions shows that none was applicable to the unique factual
and legal situations presented by the conflict over Palestine. The
only arguably relevant provisions of the 1899 and 1907
Conventions are their essentially identical provisions on the
military occupation of “the territory of [a] hostile state.”153 In the
context of such a military occupation, both Conventions declare
that “the lives of persons” and “private property” “must be
respected;” that “[p]rivate property cannot be confiscated;” that
“public order and safety” must be “restore[d] and ensure[d], as far
as possible;” and that the occupying military force must “respect[ ],
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force” in the occupied
territory.154 Note that these provisions of the Hague Conventions
do not expressly prohibit the expulsion of enemy civilian
populations from occupied territory. And no right of return is
mentioned in either Convention for expellees. A number of
proponents of a Palestinian right of return explain the absence in
150 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment, Oct. 1, 1946,
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 248–49 (1947) (holding The Hague rules
applicable to Germany, a signatory, as of 1939).
151 Holding a treaty party like Germany to obey the parts of the Hague
Convention as CIL is arguably supported by the Martens Clause, a consideration
which does not apply to a non-party like Israel. See infra notes 157-58 and
accompanying text.
152 The legal adviser to the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs wrote in 1951,
while analyzing legal issues arising during the war, that he relied on provisions of
the 1907 Hague Convention “by way of exemplification only,” because “[n]one of
the states involved in the fighting in Palestine was signatory or had adhered to
this Convention.” SHABTAI ROSENNE, ISRAEL’S ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS WITH THE
ARAB STATES 25 n.1 (1951). Rosenne did not expressly state that the Hague
provisions were not CIL, but had Israel considered them to be binding CIL,
Rosenne would not have said that they were relied upon “by way of
exemplification only.” I have been unable to determine whether any of the Arab
states took a position on the applicability of the Hague rules as CIL.
153 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146, § III (enumerating actions that are
forbidden during military occupation of a hostile state).
154 Id. arts. 42, 43, 46. Essentially identical provisions of the 1899 Hague
Convention, supra note 145, are found in articles 42, 43 and 46 (specifying what
defines occupied territory and how to deal with private property in this territory).
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the Hague Conventions of treaty terms providing a right of return
with the mistaken historical claim that no nation in that era even
considered engaging in population transfers or forcible expulsions
and that therefore transfers were not on the minds of the treatymakers.155 In fact, forced population transfers occurred in many
armed conflicts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,156
and the learned delegates who drafted the treaties were surely
aware of this.
Nevertheless, there is reason to conclude that the Hague
provisions on military occupation of enemy territory should be
read expansively to prohibit the expulsion of civilians and,
perhaps, by implication, to require return of civilians illegally
expelled. The so-called Martens Clause of the Hague Conventions
is the reason for favoring a very broad construction of the treaty
terms.157 Though “there is no accepted interpretation of the
Martens Clause,”158 it should be uncontroversial to use the clause

155 See generally MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 3, at 28 (“Historically, the
right of return was so universally accepted and practiced that it was not deemed
necessary to prescribe or codify it in a formal manner.”); Abunimah & Ibish, supra
note 102, at 21 (quoting and agreeing with Mallison & Mallison’s statement). It
would have seemed equally unnecessary, wrote one, “to the delegates convened
at The Hague in 1907 to draft special articles to prohibit cannibalism or human
sacrifices.” Alfred M. de Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16
HARV. INT’L L.J. 207, 211 (1975).
156 Forced expulsion of civilian populations occurred during the American
Civil War (for instance, in parts of Missouri) and in many U.S. wars against
Indians. Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus was accompanied by the killing and
expulsion of Chechens, Circassians and other local peoples. After achieving
independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, Bulgaria forcibly expelled
hundreds of thousands of ethnic Turks. Britain in the Second Boer War (1899–
1902), Spain in putting down the Cuban revolution (1895–1898), and the United
States in putting down the Filipino revolt (1899–1902) all used the technique of
expelling the civilian population from areas where guerrillas drew their support
and then “concentrating” the civilians in camps or towns under armed guard.
The list could go on. Suffice it to say that diplomats, generals, and other officials
were well aware of the military use of forced expulsion of civilians when the
Hague Conventions were negotiated.
157 See 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146, pmbl. (“Until a more
complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties
deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection
and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates
of the public conscience.”).
158 Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 125, 126 (1997).
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as a reason to liberally interpret the humanitarian protections in
the Hague Conventions.
Assuming that the Hague Conventions are best read to prohibit
the expulsion of civilians from occupied territory and implicitly
require return of civilians illegally expelled, the question is,
therefore, whether any of the territory from which Palestinian
refugees were expelled was: (1) “territory of [a] hostile state,” and
specifically territory in which that hostile state had been “the
legitimate power,” and; (2) which territory Israel had “occupied”
and over which “the authority of” Israel’s “army” had “been
established and [was being] exercised.”159 The applicability of the
relevant Hague Convention rules thus turns on two inquiries about
the factual and legal status of territory from which Israel (or prestatehood Jewish forces) expelled Palestinian refugees: First, did
any state besides Israel, and “hostile” to Israel, have legitimate
sovereign authority over the territory at the time of the expulsions;
and, second, had the Yishuv’s armed forces or, after independence,
Israeli forces, displaced that legitimate authority and established
and exercised the authority of a military occupier, prior to the
expulsion of Palestinians from that territory.160
To analyze whether these two requirements for the
applicability of Hague regulations were met, it is helpful to look at
two distinct periods of time during which refugees fled. Upon
careful analysis, it emerges that the Hague rules regarding

159 See 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146 (describing Convention
guidelines for military occupation by a hostile army). The relevant provisions of
the 1907 Convention are the following:

SECTION III. MILITARY AUTHORITY OVER THE TERRITORY OF
THE HOSTILE STATE
Art. 42. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under
the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.
Art. 43. The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country.
160 In a recent case, the International Court of Justice construed the CIL of
occupation, as evidenced by the 1907 Hague Convention, in conformity with my
description of the governing law. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶172–73 (Dec. 19)
(interpreting Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Convention as reflected in CIL).
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occupied territory were not binding on the Yishuv or Israel, and
were not violated by the Yishuv or Israel, during either period.
4.1.2.1. Period 1. From the U.N. General Assembly Partition
Resolution until the End of the Palestine Mandate:
November 29, 1947 to May 15, 1948
A civil war in Palestine started when the U.N. voted for
partition in November 1947. During this period there was a
legitimate sovereign government in Palestine—the United
Kingdom—exercising authority under the Palestine Mandate and
the supervision of the League of Nations. During the civil war,
prior to Israeli independence, Jewish paramilitary units fought
Arab paramilitary units. Approximately 350,000 Palestinian Arabs
became refugees during this time period.161 The Hague regulations
(as CIL) did not apply during this period, for several reasons.
First, the Hague Conventions were not applicable to civil wars or
to non-state actors like the Yishuv.162 At the time, there was
substantial disagreement about which rules of international law, if
any, regulated internal conflicts in which one or more parties were
not recognized as formal “belligerents” under the laws of war.163
There was nothing approaching a consensus which could have
bound the Yishuv at the time. As it turned out, not until 1977,
through Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
was there a clear prohibition on expulsion of civilians in noninternational armed conflicts.164
161 Morris estimates that 100,000 Palestinian Arabs fled their homes in the
period from the U.N. partition resolution through the end of March 1948. See
MORRIS, supra note 10, at 67. Another 250,000 to 300,000 fled in April and May
1948. See id. at 262. Because I am seeking an estimate for a period two weeks
shorter than Morris’ (until May 15, instead of the end of May), I used the lower
number, 250,000.
162 See de Zayas, supra note 155, at 220.
163 See LAURA PERNA, THE FORMATION OF THE TREATY LAW OF NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 50 (2006) (noting that before World War II,
“states were not yet ready to accept binding legal obligations restraining their
action during the conduct of hostilities in internal armed conflicts. . . . Even later,
after the Second World War, when there was a growing international concern for
the protection of human rights . . . states clearly showed their reluctance to accept
international legal obligations during the conduct of hostilities in internal armed
conflicts”); id. at 52 (stating that during the draft of what became Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, there was great disagreement between states
about whether international rules should govern internal armed conflicts).
164 Article 17 provides that “1. The displacement of the civilian population
shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the
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Second, the United Kingdom, the Mandatory power that had de
jure sovereign control of the territory from which the refugees were
expelled, was not a “hostile” state whose territory could be
deemed occupied by the Yishuv forces, as would be required for
the Hague rules on belligerent occupation to be applicable.
Although Britain’s role in trying to maintain a chaotic and rapidly
deteriorating status quo sometimes brought it into conflict with the
contending parties, it is fair to say that the armed forces of the
Yishuv were fighting Palestinian Arab guerillas and some
infiltrated armed forces of the Arab Liberation Army, not the
United Kingdom.165
Finally, the Palestinian Arabs who fled appear to have done so
in advance of or during pitched battles for control of territory;166
they had already fled by the time armed forces of the Yishuv
consolidated control and could possibly have been said to
constitute an occupying army. Recall that Hague regulations apply
only once “[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact
passed into the hands of the occupant,” the occupying army’s
“authority has been established and can be exercised.”167 As a
British commentator on the Hague rules put it, the law
“distinguishes between the invasion and the occupation. . . .
Invasion ripens into occupation when the national troops have
civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. . . . 2. Civilians shall
not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the
conflict.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), art. 17, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Israel is not a party to this
Protocol. See State Parties, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) 8 June 1977, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Nov. 25, 2012) (listing
dates of signature, ratification, and reservation by states to Protocol II). Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which Israel is a party, is applicable
to “conflict[s] not of an international character.” See Civilians Convention, supra
note 142, art. 3. Even if this treaty is somehow retroactively applicable to the
1947–49 conflict—which it is not—there is no reason to think that it required a
right of return for the refugees of 1947–49. Even as late as 1975 a proponent of the
right of return had to concede that “[i]nternational law is silent on the question
whether mass deportations in the course of a civil war constitute a violation of
article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.” See de Zayas, supra note
155, at 221.
165 See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 191–204 (describing the first stage of the war
between Palestinian Arabs and the Yishuv, from November 1947 to May 1948).
166 See, e.g., id. at 181–262.
167 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146, arts. 42 and 43.
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been completely ousted from the invaded territory and the enemy
has acquired control over it.”168 The period of mere invasion, as
distinguished from occupation, is “the period of resistance, of
combats,” in which “neither belligerent was complete master of the
theatre of war.”169 Any refugees who were expelled during the
period of combat, or before combat began, are not protected by the
Hague rules on belligerent occupation. The great majority of
Palestinian refugees appear to have fled prior to or during combat
operations, not after the establishment of control by the Yishuv’s
armed units. Even though the facts are relatively clear about this, I
recognize that some might disagree and then point out that the
“summary judgment” posture of this Article requires taking the
pro-Palestinian view of all relevant disputed facts. And even if
readers accept that the great majority of Palestinian refugees left
before or during the military conflict, that still leaves some small
numbers who may have been expelled or fled after the Yishuv’s
forces established control. These two objections are ultimately not
necessary to resolve, however, because the prior points—that the
Hague rules did not apply to civil wars, and that the armed forces
of the Yishuv could not be described as a hostile occupying army
vis-à-vis the United Kingdom—are dispositive.
4.1.2.2. Period 2. From the End of the Palestine Mandate until
the Armistice Agreements: May 15, 1948 until Mid1949
The day after Israel declared independence, May 15, 1948,
armies from Egypt, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Syria, and Iraq,
assisted by small units and individuals from other Arab states,
168 J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 321 (1911); see also WILLIAM E.
BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 72 (3d ed. 1914)
(interpreting the Hague Conventions as holding that military occupation begins
“only from the time when, the original governmental authorities having been
expelled, the commander of the occupying army is able to cause his authority to
be respected.”); PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 297–98
(1908) (“Occupation exists only where the authority of the invading belligerent
can be effectively exercised. . . .The accepted criterion of the commencement of
occupation exists in the cessation of local resistance.”).
169 SPAIGHT, supra note 168, at 321; see also GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE
OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 28 (1957) (noting that territory is not considered
occupied under the Hague Conventions when “the invading forces have not yet
solidified their control to the point that a thoroughly ordered administration can
be said to have been established”); JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. U.S. ARMY, FIELD
MANUAL 27–10: RULES OF LAND WARFARE 74 (1940) (to the same effect).
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entered the territory that had been Mandatory Palestine. The Arab
states declared that they were acting to prevent partition, i.e., the
creation of a Jewish state; to protect Arab civilians from massacre;
restore law and order; and to prevent refugees and disorders from
crossing into neighboring Arab countries and destabilizing them.170
The armed forces of Israel resisted the invasions and pressed
offensive operations to expand the territory of the state and
neutralize internal Arab resistance. During this phase of the war,
approximately 300,000 to 400,000 additional Palestinian Arab
refugees fled or were expelled. As noted above, the legal analysis
in the Article will be based on that version of the facts most
favorable to the Palestinians—that the refugees fled directly or
indirectly as a result of Israeli military actions.
The Hague regulations (as CIL) did not apply during this
period, for several reasons. First, notwithstanding the end of the
Palestine Mandate, withdrawal of U.K. civil and military
personnel, and declaration of independence by Israel, the conflict
might still have been best characterized as an internal or civil war,
rendering the Hague rules inapplicable, for the reasons discussed
above.171 This legal view of the conflict–that it remained a civil war
even after May 15, 1948—is premised on the claim that Israel did
not then exist as an independent state. As Michael Akehurst
explains:
Arab states have always regarded the formation of the state
of Israel as a nullity from the point of view of international
law because it infringed the legal rights of the population of
Palestine (or, rather, of the Arabs who formed the majority
of the population of Palestine). In Arab eyes, the struggle
of 1947–1949 was more in the nature of a civil war than of
an international war . . .; a minority of the population [the
Jews], with foreign assistance, was trying to secede from or
dominate or expel the majority.172
By summer 1949, there can really be no question that Israel
existed as an independent nation. In May 1949, Israel was
170 See Arab League Declaration on the Invasion of Palestine (May 15, 1948),
reprinted in 1 ISRAEL’S FOREIGN RELATIONS, SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 1947–1974, 135–
38 (Meron Medzini ed., 1976).
171 See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (explaining the
inapplicability of the Hague regulations to a civil war).
172 Michael Akehurst, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and International Law, 5 N. Z.
UNIV. L. REV. 231, 236 (1973).
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admitted to the U.N.173 During the spring and summer of 1949,
Israel signed armistice agreements with its principal military
adversaries, Egypt, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan and Syria. By that time,
Israel had been diplomatically recognized by many countries,
including the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet
Union, and by the United Kingdom, the former Mandatory power
and the principal diplomatic supporter of the Arab states during
the conflict. Though Egypt, Trans-Jordan, and Syria refused to
confirm the political legitimacy and permanence of Israel’s borders
with them, the de facto borders were stable and conformed to the
agreed upon armistice lines; moreover, no other possible borders
had any international legitimacy. Therefore, by summer 1949 at
the latest, Israel met the four-part test for international statehood,
as specified by the Montevideo Convention: a permanent
population; a defined territory; an effective government; and the
capacity to enter into relations with the other states.174 However,
prior to summer 1949—and it was during this prior period that
essentially all of the refugees were expelled or fled—the question
of Israel’s de jure statehood is closer and more difficult to resolve,
particularly because of the lack of clarity about whether Israel had
a “defined territory.”175 If the Arab states were right that, while the
military conflict raged in 1948-49, Israel had not yet achieved fullfledged independent statehood, then Israel was not bound by the
Hague rules as CIL because it was still a non-state actor fighting in
a conflict, which was primarily a civil or internal one, even though
outside states—Syria, Egypt, and the other Arab nations—had
invaded and were giving military assistance to the Palestinian
population.
When Israel became a de jure independent state is a difficult
question that need not be definitively answered because the Hague
regulations (as CIL) did not apply during this period for a second,
alternative reason. In order for relevant Hague regulations to apply
during this time period, it must be found that Israeli forces were
military occupiers that expelled refugees from territory over which
another “hostile” state had previously exercised “legitimate”
authority. This cannot be done. Although the precise legal status
173 See G.A. Res. 273 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/273 (III) (May 11, 1949)
(documenting Israel’s official membership to the United Nations).
174 See Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (enumerating the four
qualifications for an international state).
175 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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of the territory of former Mandate Palestine was complicated and
to some extent ambiguous during this time period, there is no
plausible claim that any state besides Israel had actual and
“legitimate” authority over territory of the former Mandate which
was then displaced by an Israeli occupation.
As noted above, Israel’s declaration of independence had
avoided specifying the borders of the state, but Israel indicated to
the United States that its borders were those of the U.N. partition
resolution.176 Nevertheless, Israel’s position was that the partition
resolution was a dead letter because the British and the Arab states
had rejected it, and the Security Council had declined to enforce it.
Israel announced that the partition plan borders were “an
irreducible minimum” and that it intended to take and incorporate
into the state more territory during the war.177 The United
Nations’ mediator for the conflict, as well as key players such as
the Arab states, the United States and the United Kingdom,
concurred that the partition resolution’s demarcation of borders
had no legal effect; final borders would be determined by war and
diplomacy.178
During the relevant time period, no other state besides Israel
existed in Palestine. Trans-Jordan had territorial designs on part of
the area, but did not effectuate those until 1950, when it annexed
the territory now known as the West Bank.179 This action was not
recognized by other Arab states. To counter Trans-Jordan’s
designs, Egypt supported the creation of an Arab government for
Palestine. At the end of September 1948, the Arab League, acting
at Egypt’s behest, announced the creation of the All-Palestine
Government, to be based in Gaza, and with a writ purporting to
extend over all of the territory of former Mandatory Palestine,
including the part held by Israel.180 During its brief and essentially
See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
See Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel [to the U.N.],
Letter dated July 7 1948 from the Representative of the Provisional Government of
Israel [to the United Nations] addressed to the Secretary-General Containing
Israel’s Reply to the United Nations Mediator’s Suggestions (Document S/863),
U.N. Doc. S/870 (July 8, 1948).
178 See, e.g., SHLAIM, supra note 93, at 161, 198, 215–17 (detailing the difficulties
of recognizing the demarcation of borders and the difficulty in implementing the
scheme peacefully).
179 See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 605 (describing Trans-Jordan’s annexation of
the West Bank in 1950).
180 See SHLAIM, supra note 93, at 219 (discussing the formation of the AllPalestine government and the new administration).
176
177
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notional existence, the All-Palestine Government had “no civil
service, no money, and no army of its own.”181 Trans-Jordan
rejected the validity of this government, and attempted to organize
a council of Palestinians in Amman as a competing power center.182
No nation besides members of the Arab League recognized the AllPalestine Government.183 Soon after it was proclaimed, the
government had to leave Gaza because of Israeli military
pressure.184 The All-Palestine Government never met the four
Montevideo criteria for independent statehood—permanent
population, defined territory, effective government and the
capacity to enter into relations with the other states.185 Therefore,
the Hague rules as CIL did not apply because Israel was not
occupying the territory owned by another legitimate sovereign
nation. In any event, by the time the All-Palestine Government
was proclaimed, in late September 1948, the vast majority of
Palestinian refugees had already left their homes.186
In sum, neither the 1949 Geneva Conventions nor the earlier
Hague Conventions rendered the expulsion of Palestinian refugees
illegal at the time it occurred or required that they be returned.
4.1.3. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
Some proponents of the Palestinian right of return claim that the
charter of the post-World War II Nuremberg war crimes tribunal
and the tribunal’s judgments, by treating forced expulsion of
civilian populations as a “war crime” or “crime against humanity,”
implicitly recognized a customary international right to remain in
or return to one’s home country, applicable to the Palestinian
181 Id. (characterizing the All-Palestine government as a “farce” in claiming
jurisdiction over Palestine, but having no civil or armed services).
182 See id. at 219–20 (detailing Trans-Jordan’s resistance and denunciation of
the All-Palestine government).
183 The All-Palestine government was given diplomatic recognition by Egypt,
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Afghanistan. See JOHN QUIGLEY,
THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
109 (2010).
184 SHLAIM, supra note 93, at 244.
185 See Montevideo Convention, supra note 174 and accompanying text.
186 An unknown number of Palestinian Arabs, including many Bedouins,
probably numbering 20,000 to 40,000, fled or were expelled after October 1948 in
border-consolidating military operations by Israel. See MORRIS, supra note 95, at
536. Subtracting these numbers from the total of 600,000 to 760,000 refugees (see
supra text accompanying note 95), means that approximately 580,000 to 720,000
total refugees fled or were expelled by October 1948.
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refugees of 1947–49.187 The Nuremberg charter’s grant to the
tribunal of jurisdiction over war crimes, however, was limited to
“violations of the laws or customs of war,”188 which in 1947–49, as
previously shown, did not contain rules governing expulsion of
civilians in civil wars like the conflict in Palestine. Moreover, the
charter’s jurisdictional grant covers only expulsion of civilians
from “occupied” territories,”189 and, as discussed above, in the
relevant territory Israel was not a belligerent occupier of another
sovereign’s territory.
The charter’s jurisdictional grant over “crimes against
humanity” was broader, however, including “murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,”190
and thus might potentially have been applicable to Israeli actions.
At the time of Nuremberg, there were significant concerns that the
concept of “crimes against humanity” had been created as an
international wrong only after the fact and applied retroactively to
Nazi defendants, violating the maxim nullum crimen sine lege.191
One prominent justification for enforcing a seemingly newlyinvented and somewhat amorphous international criminal law was
that the Nazis’ crimes had been so massive and immoral that
justice was served by punishing them even under impermissibly
Another
retroactive or otherwise defective legal rules.192

187 See, e.g., BADIL RESOURCE CENTER FOR PALESTINIAN RESIDENCY AND
REFUGEE RIGHTS, SURVEY OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED
PERSONS 2008–2009, at 96 (2010).
188 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis
art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 [hereinafter London
Charter].
189 Cf. de Zayas, supra note 3, at 25 (“[T]he Nuremberg judgment held that
population transfers and colonisation in occupied territory constituted both a war
crime and a crime against humanity.”).
190 London Charter, supra note 188, art. 6 (emphasis added).
191 See, e.g., Kirsten Sellars, Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo, 21 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1085, 1089, 1092 (2010). See also William A. Schabas, Retroactive Application
of the Genocide Convention, 4 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 36, 50 (2010) (“[F]or
crimes against humanity . . . the Tribunal produced no real authority, nor did it
even seriously try to demonstrate that such acts had been punishable under
international law in the past.”).
192 See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a
Precedent in International Law?, 1 INT’L L.Q. 153, 165 (1947) (“[I]ndividual criminal
responsibility [was] certainly also morally most objectionable, and the persons
who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, [so]
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justification was that the crimes actually alleged in the Nuremberg
indictments were penal under domestic law in most civilized
countries, and hence there was no surprise or prejudice from
applying them to the Nazis.193 Recognizing the legal problems
associated with “crimes against humanity,” the Nuremberg
tribunal decided that such crimes would be punished only when
they occurred in connection with recognized war crimes or crimes
against the peace.194 In sum, it was recognized that the legality and
justice of Nuremberg’s punishment of “crimes against humanity”
was intimately bound up with the exceptional scale and barbarity
of the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities, and their connection to
Nazi war crimes.195 The link of “crimes against humanity” to
specific and astoundingly widespread Nazi atrocities is seen in the
fact that the post-World War II Tokyo tribunal for Japanese crimes
essentially ignored “crimes against humanity,” though its charter
allowed those to be punished, and focused instead on nonretroactive international wrongs like war crimes based on
preexisting law-of-war treaties.196 As discussed elsewhere in this
Article, in the post-World War II period, Western statesmen and
international lawyers thought that the compulsory transfer of
ethnic minorities for the purpose of preserving international peace
was legal and morally justified.197 Given all of this, it seems
the retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely
incompatible with justice.”).
193 See, e.g., Leslie Mansfield, Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on the
Fiftieth Anniversary of Nuremberg and a Forgotten Legacy, 64 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 293,
295 (1995) (quoting Justice Jackson’s argument for the recognition of crimes
against humanity); Max Radin, Justice at Nuremberg, 24 FOREIGN AFF. 369, 375
(1946) (“Every one of the acts described in the indictment as crimes against
humanity would be punishable by the penal codes of every one of the United
States, the penal codes of France and of the Soviet Union, and of the eight other
nations which with France took part in the London Conference, the penal codes of
the British Dominions and of India which were guests at that Conference.”).
194 See Mansfield, supra at 193, at 307; Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against
Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. IN’T L. 178, 205 (1946).
195 See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 193, at 309 (stating that “a central feature of
‘Crimes Against Humanity’. . . [is]. . .the scope or magnitude of the crime. ‘War
Crimes’ were already defined at the time of the Charter; however, the systematic,
large-scale effort to exterminate millions of people, which characterized the Nazi
war effort and set it apart from previous war crimes, demanded a separate
category of war crimes.”).
196 Sellars, supra note 191, at 1092. A “decisive factor[] must have been the
Allies’ tacit recognition that nothing committed by Japan could compare to
German crimes . . . .” Id.
197 See supra notes 59–62 and infra Section 5.1.
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extremely unlikely that statesmen or international lawyers in 1947–
49 would have thought that expulsion of civilians in the sui generis
context of partition of Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
accompanied as it was by very small-scale and isolated atrocities
by Jewish or Israeli military forces, would have constituted “crimes
against humanity.”198
4.2. Refugee Law
For two basic reasons, the Refugee Convention of 1951199 does
not create or recognize a right of the 1947–49 Palestinian refugees
to return to live in Israel. First, the Convention was drafted, at the
behest of Arab states and Palestinian representatives, to exempt
most Palestinians from its coverage.200 Second, even if Palestinian
refugees from the 1947–49 conflict were not excluded from the
198 Recall that only about ten thousand Arabs total (combatants and civilians)
were killed or died during the conflict, and no one contends that more than a
fraction of those deaths can be attributed to intentional Jewish or Israeli attacks on
civilians. Compare the scale to Nazi atrocities: depending on the definitions used,
as many as seventeen million civilians and prisoners were killed by the Nazi
regime, including five to six million Jews. DONALD NIEWYK & FRANCIS NICOSIA,
THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO THE HOLOCAUST 45 (2000). Of course any deaths are
tragic; nothing said here is intended to deny or minimize that. My point is about
the factual predicate for invoking new legal rules concerning war crimes in 1947–
49.
199 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
200 Article 1(D) excludes from the protections of the treaty “persons who are
at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.”
Refugee Convention, supra note 199. In 1949, the U.N., acting at the behest of
Arab states and Palestinian representatives, created an entirely separate agency to
serve only Palestinian refugees, called the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (“UNRWA”). See Assistance to
Palestinian Refugees, G.A. Res. 302 (IV), ¶ 7, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 12,
U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 23 (1949) (establishing the UNRWA). It has operated since
that time, and currently works in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and
Gaza. These actions have effectively removed from the jurisdiction of the 1951
Convention the vast majority of Palestinian refugees from the 1947–49 conflict.
See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Revised Note on the Applicability of Article
1D of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian
Refugees, para. 1 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
pdfid/4add77d42.pdf (“[Article 1D] excludes from the benefits of the 1951
Convention those Palestinians who are refugees as a result of the 1948 or 1967
Arab-Israeli conflicts, and who are receiving protection or assistance from the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(“UNRWA”).”). See generally Sabel, supra note 3, at 54 (“[D]ue to political pressure
from Arab States, Palestinian refugees were excluded from the U.N. Convention
definition of refugees.”).
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Refugee Convention, it still would not support a right of return
because the Convention does not purport to grant such a right to
any type of refugee in any situation. In fact, the Convention does
not address the issue of a right of return at all. The parties that
drafted the treaty could not or would not agree to that kind of
provision. The Convention is primarily concerned with preventing
the return of refugees to their state of origin and guaranteeing their
rights in the state to which they fled. The Convention was only
acceptable once it promised states “the right ultimately to decide
which, if any, refugees, would be allowed to resettle in their
territories” on a permanent basis.201
Notwithstanding the
exclusion from the Convention of any right related to refugee
return, some assert that a right of return is a fundamental
background principle of refugee law, or a rule of “customary
refugee law,” and therefore binds Israel to allow the Palestinian
refugees to return.202 As discussed below, even in 2012, when CIL
norms against expulsion and in favor of repatriation are so much
more robust compared to 1947–49, it is debatable whether CIL
would require return in the unique circumstances of the
Palestinian refugees. As of 1947–49, it is clear that CIL did not
provide any such right.203
4.3. Human Rights Law
4.3.1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly announced the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). Article 13, providing
that “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country,”204 is cited by advocates of a
201 James C. Hathaway, The Meaning of Repatriation, 9 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 551,
552 (1997). It is also not clear that Palestinians, even were they not specifically
exempted from coverage of the 1951 Convention, would be covered by its
definition of “refugee.” A person is a refugee under the Convention only if he or
she is currently outside the country of residence “owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion,” and is unable to seek the protection
of the home country on account of such a fear. Refugee Convention, supra note
199, art. 1(A)(2).
202 See, e.g., TAKKENBERG, supra note 3, at 233 (declaring that refugees’ rights of
returning to the places of their origin should be recognized as a general principle
of international law).
203 See infra Section 5.1.
204 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), art. 13(2), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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right of return for Palestinian refugees.205 But by the terms of the
U.N. Charter, General Assembly resolutions like the UDHR are not
legally binding.206 In fact the non-binding, non-legal nature of the
UDHR was stressed repeatedly in the U.N. debates prior to
voting.207 Many commentators have urged that some or all parts of
the UDHR have subsequently become binding customary
international law. But in 1994, a report for the International Law
Association concluded that there was not “sufficient consensus” on
whether Article 13, regarding return, had yet become a customary
norm.208 If not in 1994, “the UDHR surely was not a binding
instrument” at the time of the 1947–49 conflict.209
The UDHR does not by its terms ban the individual or mass
expulsion of foreign nationals. It only speaks to the issue of
“exile,” that is, expulsion of a national, and only bans “arbitrary”
exile.210 The lack of a ban on collective expulsions is explained by
the fact that the Allied powers at the time thought that mass
expulsion of German minorities from Eastern Europe was

205 See, e.g., FRANCIS A. BOYLE, PALESTINE, PALESTINIANS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 69, 156–57 (2003) (claiming that the UDHR requires the “absolute right of
return” for Palestinian refugees and viewing it as a legal obligation which Israel
must fulfill before it can allow more Jewish settlers to settle).
206 See Dinah Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 449 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2003) (stating that the UDHR is “non-binding,”
though it was hoped that, as a “first step,” it might “lead to a binding
agreement”). On the general question of the binding nature of General Assembly
resolutions, see infra Section 4.5.
207 H. Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 354, 354 (1948) (citations omitted) (reporting the statement of the
President of the General Assembly that the UDHR “does not provide by
international convention for States being bound to carry out and give effect to
these rights”). Eleanor Roosevelt, the United States’ spokesperson on the issue,
told the General Assembly that the proposed declaration on human rights “is not
and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation.” Id. at 358.
Some delegates thought UDHR’s wording was not important because it was not a
legal document. Id. at 360.
208 COMM. ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, INT’L LAW ASS’N,
FINAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, in 66 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 525, 547 (1994).
209 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE 89 (1995).
210 UDHR, supra note 204, art. 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.”).
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necessary to achieve lasting peace and hence had to be considered
legal.211
4.3.2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) provides in full: “No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”212
Proponents of a Palestinian right of return frequently assert that
Article 12(4) gives refugees from the 1947–49 conflict the right to
return to their homes in what is now Israel, because they were
citizens of the Palestine Mandate and thus the territory that
became Israel was their “own country.”213 Article 13 of the ICCPR
is relevant to the Palestinian refugees on a somewhat different
theory, that even if Palestinians were not nationals of the newlycreated state of Israel, they were lawfully present there because of
their habitual residence. Article 13 provides that:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the
present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law
and shall, except where compelling reasons of national
security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the
reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed
by, and be represented for the purpose before, the
competent authority . . . .214
The ICCPR entered into force in March 1976, after it had been
ratified by enough states. Israel became a party in 1991.215 It
211 HENCKAERTS, supra note 209, at 8–9. See also supra notes 59-62 and infra
notes 305-17 and accompanying text (discussing the views and actions of the
victorious Allied powers regarding the compulsory transfer of ethnic minority
populations).
212 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
213 See, e.g., Saideman, supra note 3, at 848–54 (defining “own country” as
“place of habitual residence” and adding that first generation Palestinian refugees
also had British-authorized passports naming them as citizens of Mandatory
Palestine).
214 ICCPR, supra note 212, art. 13.
215 Data on states parties to this and other multilateral treaties is available at
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited
Nov. 25, 2012).
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would be extraordinary if, by Israel’s 1991 ratification, the words of
Articles 12(4) or 13 reached back retroactively more than forty
years and implicitly overturned Israel’s consistently maintained
legal position that it had no obligation to allow the return of
refugees from the 1947–49 conflict. Yet that claim is made
repeatedly by supporters of the Palestinian right of return.216 It is
not persuasive.
As discussed above in Section 3.2, nonretroactivity is a default rule of treaty interpretation. Nonretroactivity is also a core component of the customary rules
regarding the responsibility of states for international wrongs.217
Nothing in the ICCPR suggests that Articles 12 or 13 are meant to
have retroactive effect.218 As of 1991 when Israel became bound by
the ICCPR, Article 13 had no applicability to Palestinian refugees
from the 1947–49 conflict because they were not “lawfully in the
territory of” Israel, but rather were abroad.
Even assuming that Article 12 can be retroactively applied to
the events of 1947–49, it does not necessarily provide those
refugees with a right of return. According to a leading expert,
“[t]here is no evidence that mass movements of groups such as
refugees or displaced persons”—rather than individuals asserting
an individual right—“were intended to be included within the
scope of article 12 of the Covenant by its drafters, particularly
where those seeking to return are not nationals of the state of
destination.”219 This “individual only” reading may be correct, but
216 See, e.g., BADIL, supra note 187, at 96; Lawand, supra note 3, at 546–53;
Quigley, supra note 3, at 202–04; Saideman, supra note 3, at 848–54.
217 This rule is eminently sensible. Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, for example,
which joined the ICCPR regime in 1982, 1970 and 1969, respectively (see supra note
214), would no doubt be quite surprised to learn that Article 12(4) retroactively
requires them to repatriate or compensate the Jews they drove out in the 1940s,
1950s and 1960s. Certainly Israel (and presumably many Arab states parties too)
would have acceded to the ICCPR only with a specific reservation regarding
Article 12(4) if it has the retroactive meaning that is ascribed to it by some
proponents of the Palestinian right of return. Similarly, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and other Eastern European states did not expect that their accessions to
the ICCPR (in 1977, 1975 and 1974, respectively, see supra note 215) required them
to repatriate or compensate the hundreds of thousands of German nationals they
expelled at the end of World War II.
218 Compare ICCPR, supra note 212 (showing no reference to retroactive
application), with Refugee Convention, supra note 199, art. 1(A)(2) (stating
explicitly that the term “refugee” applies retroactively to individuals with certain
characteristics).
219 HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE 59–60 (1987). See also Stig Jagerskiold, The Freedom of Movement, in
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 166, 180 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (determining
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it must be conceded that it is not compelled by the text. There are
other reasons, however, to find Article 12 unavailing for
Palestinian refugees from 1947–49. By its terms, Article 12 does not
purport to announce an absolute right of return. It only speaks of
return to one’s “own country,” suggesting that the right may only
apply to citizens. Even if the article extends beyond citizens, it is
hard to see how it covers noncitizens who have not been in a
country for forty years by the time that country joined the ICCPR
and became bound by Article 12. Article 12 also contemplates the
legality of denials of return not considered “arbitrary.” It is not a
stretch to think that reasonable demographic or national security
concerns could be a non-arbitrary basis to refuse entry to
Palestinian refugees or their descendants.
4.3.3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination
Under this multilateral human rights treaty, member states
pledge to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination and guarantee
certain enumerated rights without distinction as to race, ethnicity,
and the like. Among the guaranteed rights is the “right to leave
any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s
country”—taken verbatim from the UDHR.220 Israel became a
party to this convention only in 1979.221 The relevant provision
contains no indication that it is meant to apply retroactively to
events occurring before ratification, so Israel’s conduct in 1947–49
cannot be measured by this convention. Moreover, in 1979, Israel
was not “one’s country” to Palestinians who were not Israeli
citizens and had not been in the territory of Israel for forty years.
4.4. Nationality and Citizenship Law and the Law of State Succession
Since enactment of its nationality legislation in 1952, Israel has
taken the position that only those former citizens of Mandatory
Palestine who remained in Israel from the establishment of the
that the ICCPR’s right of return was “intended to apply to individuals asserting
an individual right” and was not intended “to address the claims of masses of
people who have been displaced as a byproduct of war or by political transfers of
territory or population”).
220 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 5(d)(ii), opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
221 See supra note 215.
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State in 1948 until the enactment of the law became Israeli
citizens.222 Because almost all Palestinian refugees from the 1947–
49 conflict did not fit those criteria, they were not Israeli citizens or
nationals under municipal law. Therefore, Israel concludes that
the return of Palestinian refugees is not mandated because
international law gives it full sovereign discretion to decide
whether or not to admit non-citizens into its territory.
The primary Palestinian response to this reasoning is to assert
that international law overrides Israel’s municipal law decision to
bar Palestinian refugees from citizenship. In legal terms, the core
claim is that Israel is the “successor” state to the British Mandate in
Palestine and that international obligations to the Palestinians flow
from this status.223 From independence, Israel took the position
that it was “in no sense a successor of the Palestine [Mandate]
administration,”224 and in 1950 announced that it was not the
successor to Mandate Palestine with regard to treaties.225
Nevertheless, according to the argument made on behalf of the
Palestinians, (1) international law requires that a successor state
grant citizenship to all citizens, nationals or permanent inhabitants
of the predecessor state; and (2) because many or most Palestinian
Arabs were citizens of Mandate Palestine,226 Israel was and is
required by international law to grant citizenship to refugees from
the 1947–49 conflict who, before flight or expulsion, lived within
the territory that became Israel.
On the contrary, in 1947–49, and arguably even today, there
was no such obligation in international law. There has never been
much agreement among states about the international rules
governing state succession and, as a result, there is little binding
222 See Peretz, supra note 103, at 146. Before 1952, Israeli courts had taken
inconsistent positions on whether former citizens of the Palestine Mandate
automatically acquired Israeli citizenship. See U.N. Secretariat, Digest of Decisions
of National Courts Relating to Succession of States and Governments, Int’l Law
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/157 (1963), reprinted in [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
95, at 98, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963/ADD.1.
223 See, e.g., BADIL, supra note 187, at 96; Lawand, supra note 3, at 558–63;
Quigley, supra note 3, at 206–10; Saideman, supra note 3, at 850–51.
224 D.P. O’Connell, Secured and Unsecured Debts in the Law of State Succession,
28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 204, 217 (1951).
225 See Anthony Lester, State Succession and Localized Treaties, 4 HARV. INT’L
CLUB J. 145, 153 (1962).
226 See Mutaz Qafisheh, Genesis of Citizenship in Palestine and Israel: Palestinian
Nationality During the Period 1917–1925, 11 J. HIST. INT’L L. 1 (2009), for a general
overview of citizenship in Mandate Palestine.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3

03 KENT (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/21/2013 4:00 PM

PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF RETURN

201

law. Only a handful of relatively unimportant states are parties to
the Vienna Convention on Succession in Respect of Treaties.227
Before, during and after the 1947–49 conflict, there were no fixed
state practices regarding state succession and nationality that were
consistently followed from a sense of legal obligation. In other
words, there was no CIL on point. During the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, it was often held by treatise writers that “the
inhabitants of ceded territory automatically lose their old political
allegiance and acquire that of the annexing state.”228 But modern
problems posed by the rise of nationalism and self-determination
greatly complicated things. In the wake of World War I, various
international agreements were made regarding transfer of
ownership of territory and nationality of inhabitants. Rather than
follow any supposed rule of CIL that all inhabitants in the
successor state automatically receive its nationality,
new principles were introduced as a solution of some of the
problems peculiar to the peace settlements. An effort was
made to adapt the acquisition of new nationality to existing
conditions with the predominant purpose of uniting on the
same territory and under a national government
individuals of the same race, language, and civilization. . . .
[N]ationality was acquired ipso facto only in certain cases;
by reclamation and by naturalization in others; and in still
other cases, only in accordance with conditions prescribed
by the local laws.229
The mid-twentieth century’s leading expert on the effect of
state
succession
on
nationality
wrote—essentially
contemporaneously with enactment of Israel’s nationality law—
that there were then three different, competing theories about state
succession and nationality in the conventional context where an
existing country absorbs a new territory: (i) the nationality of
inhabitants automatically becomes that of the successor state; (ii)
227 See supra note 215. Similarly, the Vienna Convention on Succession in
Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts is not now in force and likely will
never be due to lack of agreement about the relevant rules of conduct. By
stipulation in the treaty, only fifteen states need to ratify before it goes into force,
but as of 2012, only seven had done so. See Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 80/31, 17 I.L.M.
1488 (1978).
228 C. Luella Gettys, The Effect of Changes of Sovereignty on Nationality, 21 AM. J.
INT’L L. 268, 268 (1927).
229 Id. at 269.
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“the inhabitants in question acquire the nationality of the successor
state only by an express or tacit submission to the new sovereign”;
or (iii) “[t]he more recent and widely accepted theory regards
nationality as a matter solely of domestic jurisdiction, and contends
that the successor State has a discretion as to the manner in which
it extends its nationality to the inhabitants . . . .”230 If the rules were
disputed in conventional contexts, there surely could have been no
CIL consensus of how they should apply in the novel context of the
death of the British Mandate, the aborted U.N. partition of territory
abandoned by the Mandatory power, and the subsequent birth of
Israel through war in part of that territory.231
In 1968, Mohammed Bedjaoui, the International Law
Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Succession of States in
Respect of Rights and Duties Resulting from Sources other than
Treaties, considered it an open question “whether, if no agreement
[between predecessor and successor state] exists, the successor
State has unlimited sovereign power to undertake the
‘denaturalization’ of persons or groups of persons, resulting in
their expulsion de facto . . . or de jure (through mass transfers).”232
Even as late as 1995, the International Law Commission (“ILC”)
conceded that, with regard to state succession and its impact on
nationality, “the rules of customary law are still at the elementary
stage and provide a merely rudimentary basis.”233 “According to
the predominant opinion, the role of international law with respect
to nationality is very limited,” and it is the recognized “principle
230 D.P. O’CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 245 (H.C. Gutteridge et al.
eds., 1956).
231 Cf. 5 J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
NATIONALITY AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO INDIVIDUALS 37 (1972) (“The
national status of the Palestinian refugees . . . is extremely difficult to define
juridically. Various theoretical constructions are possible.”).
232 Special Rapporteur, First Rep. on Succession of States in Respect of Rights and
Duties Resulting from Sources Other Than Treaties, ¶ 133, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/204 (Apr. 5, 1968) (by Mohammed Bedjaoui), reprinted in [1968] 2
Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 94, A/CN.4/SER.A/1968/Add.1. A leading expert
concluded in 1956 that “there is no rule of international law under which the
nationals of the predecessor State acquire the nationality of the successor State . . .
.” Additionally, “[t]here is no basis in present international law for a right to a
nationality; . . . nor does international law prohibit loss of nationality after birth by
deprivation or otherwise.” See P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 149, 249 (1956).
233 Special Rapporteur, First Rep. on State Succession and its Impact on the
Nationality of Natural and Legal Persons, ¶ 70, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/467 (Apr. 17, 1995) (by Václav Mikulka), reprinted in [1995] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 157.
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that it is for each State to determine under its own law who are its
nationals . . . .”234 In 1999, the ILC drafted rules on state succession
and nationality, providing: “When a State dissolves and ceases to
exist and the various parts of the territory of the predecessor State
form two or more successor States, each successor State shall,
unless otherwise indicated by the exercise of a right of option,
attribute its nationality to . . . [p]ersons concerned having their
habitual residence in its territory.”235 In short, only in the late
1990s was the international community beginning to develop a rule
of CIL that, had it existed half a century before, might have
required that Israel grant citizenship to Palestinian Arabs expelled
by war.
There are several international conventions dealing with
statelessness, but none of them compelled Israel to treat Palestinian
Arabs who fled the 1947–49 conflict as citizens of Israel. At the
time the Mandate ended, Great Britain was party to the 1930
Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, but, as noted
above, Israel took the position that it did not succeed to any of
Britain’s treaty obligations. In any event, the 1930 Protocol says
nothing about the effect of state succession on nationality and
grants no rights relevant to the dispute about the Palestinian right
of return. In 1958, Israel ratified the 1954 Convention Relating to
the Status of Stateless Persons, but this treaty has no application to
the Palestinian refugee situation discussed in this Article.236 Israel
Id. at 167–68, ¶¶ 52, 61.
Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the
Succession of States with Commentaries, [1999] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 22, pt. II,
art. 22, U.N. Doc. A/54/10. Because “the divergence between States was too
considerable,” the ILC drafted only “principles” rather than “exact rules.” Roland
Schärer, International Law and Nationality, in Particular in the Context of State
Succession, in CITIZENSHIP AND STATE SUCCESSION 88, 96, ¶ 29 (Sci. & Technique of
Democracy Ser. No. 21, 1998).
236 First, Israel’s acceptance of the treaty post-dates the creation of the refugee
situation, and nothing in the treaty suggests it is retroactive. Second, the treaty
contains the same exemption of Palestinian refugees from its coverage as does the
1951 Refugee Convention. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons art. 1(2)(i), Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S 117 (stating that persons presently
receiving assistance from a United Nations organ or agency other than the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees do not qualify as stateless). Third, the
rights granted by the treaty have no bearing on the right of return. Generally,
states that become party to the Convention only agree to grant stateless persons
within their borders the same rights as other aliens. See id. arts. 7(1), 13–19. In
some instances, for example, regarding public elementary education, state parties
agree to treat stateless persons in their territory the same as nationals. See id. art.
22.
234
235
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has signed but not ratified the 1961 Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness.237 This treaty grants certain rights which are
theoretically relevant to the dispute regarding the 1947–49
Palestinian refugees—for instance, a prohibition of depriving a
person of nationality “if such deprivation would render him
stateless,” and a prohibition of group denationalization “on racial,
ethnic, religious or political grounds.”238 However, these rights do
not accrue to the 1947–49 Palestinian refugees. Israel never ratified
the treaty, but its 1961 signature did create an obligation to refrain
from acts that would defeat the objects of the treaty.239
Nevertheless, the treaty did not enter into force until 1975 and the
relevant provisions contain no suggestion that they are retroactive;
they therefore do not apply to the events of 1947–49. Relatively
few populous or important states have ratified this treaty,240
making it exceedingly difficult to imagine that its provisions
represent CIL. There can be no serious argument that in 1947–49—
or for decades thereafter—there was any settled rule of CIL
requiring that Israel treat Palestinian refugees no longer in its
territory as Israeli citizens. Many Arab and Muslim states, for
example, have often acted as if international law does not impose
obligations on them to treat as citizens those people in their
territories—such as the Palestinian refugees—who would otherwise
be stateless.241
Since international law did not require that Israel treat the
Palestinians expelled during the 1947–49 conflict as Israeli citizens,
Israel was within its rights to consider them aliens under domestic
law. As non-citizens, Israel could refuse them admittance to its
territory under its sovereign power over immigration.
Furthermore, as the ILC has reported, international law did not
begin to put real limits on the “collective expulsion of aliens”—
237 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, opened for signature Aug. 30,
1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975) [hereinafter Statelessness
Convention]; for state parties, see supra note 215.
238 Statelessness Convention, supra note 237, arts. 8(1) and 9.
239 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[a] State is obliged
to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when . .
. it has signed the treaty. . . .” VCLT, supra note 128, art. 18(a).
240 See supra note 215 (providing instructions to find data showing that the
United States, China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Mexico, Egypt, Iran,
Nigeria, Poland and South Africa are not parties to the Statelessness Convention).
241 On the lack of citizenship for Palestinian refugees in Arab states, see supra
notes 105–06 and accompanying text. On other incidents of statelessness in Arab
and Muslim nations, see, for example, infra Appendix Table 1, cases 58, 59, 77, 97.
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apart from specialized contexts involving the belligerent
occupation of enemy territory or the refugees covered under the
1951 Convention on Refugees—until the 1960s, at the earliest.242 A
country’s collective expulsion of enemy aliens who are present in
its territory during wartime was considered lawful at least until the
latter part of the twentieth century.243 This will be considered in
more detail in Section 5 below. Even if, contrary to both
international and Israeli law, the Palestinian refugees had
somehow automatically become Israeli citizens in 1948,
international law at that time likely would not have prohibited
Israel from in turn deeming them denationalized.244 Therefore,
international law concerning state succession, immigration,
nationality and statelessness did not prohibit expulsion of
Palestinian refugees in 1947–49 or require their return.
4.5. U.N. General Assembly Resolutions
Many proponents of a Palestinian right of return place great
weight on some resolutions of the General Assembly about the
Palestine conflict, implying or contending that they represent
binding law.245 The most cited is Resolution 194 (III) of 1948, which
“[r]esolve[d]” that “refugees wishing to return to their homes and
live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at
the earliest practicable date.”246 As noted above, Palestinians and
Arab states at the time rejected this resolution because it implicitly
recognized Israel’s right to exist and did not require immediate
return of all refugees.247 After repeated failure to solve the refugee
problem by destroying Israel with military force, it seems a bit too
242 Special Rapporteur on the Expulsion of Aliens, Third Rep. on the Expulsion
of Aliens, ¶¶ 101–03, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/581 (Apr. 19, 2007)
(by Maurice Kamto).
243 Id. ¶¶ 116–31, 134 (tracing the history of the lawfulness of expulsion of
enemy aliens during wartime).
244 Cf. HERSH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 301 (1933) (“There is no clear rule of international law at present
which limits the freedom of action of States [with respect to denationalization]. . .
.”).
245 See, e.g., Lawand, supra note 3, at 545–46; Quigley, supra note 3, at 185–90.
246 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (quoting resolution).
247 MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 3, at 26 (“The Arab States not only
voted against partition, but they initially took the position that it was invalid.”);
Menachem Klein, Between Right and Realization: The PLO Dialectics of ‘The Right of
Return,’ 11 J. REFUGEE STUD. 1, 1–2 (1998) (noting that Arab states rejected the U.N.
Partition Resolution “because it conditioned return upon making peace”).
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bold (an example of profoundly “unclean hands”) to claim the
benefit of the Resolution that the Palestinians and Arab states
rejected. Moreover, the Palestinians and Arab states clearly did not
consider the General Assembly competent to make binding law—
and they were right. In rejecting the 1947 Partition Resolution, the
Arab states claimed that it was not legally binding because the
General Assembly, and even the Security Council, lacked authority
to legislate under the U.N. Charter.248 The General Assembly, they
noted, could only make non-binding recommendations about how
to settle international disputes.249 The only way that resolutions
and declarations of the Assembly became binding was if the
Security Council determined that there existed a threat to
international peace and security and issued orders to implement
General Assembly resolutions. The Council did not do this with
the Partition Resolution and so, according to the Arab states and
Palestinians, there was no legal authority to enforce the partition
plan.250 The reasoning of the Arab states and Palestinians, about
the limits of the General Assembly’s authority regarding the
Partition Resolution, applies fully to Resolution 194 on return.
The Arab states were quite correct in their legal analysis about
the General Assembly’s lack of binding authority over these issues.
248 See, e.g., Cattan, supra note 64 at 265 (noting that the Arab states opposed
the Partition Resolution for a variety of reasons, including that it “violated the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations” and was beyond “the legal
competence of the United Nations”); John W. Halderman, Some International
Constitutional Aspects of the Palestine Case, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 78, 86–88 (1968)
(explaining that the Arab states contended that the Partition Resolution was a
mere recommendation because of the limited authority of the General Assembly);
see also HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 196 n.8 (1950) (citing
statements from the 128th meeting of the General Assembly by delegates from
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Egypt to the effect that
the General Assembly lacked authority to make binding decisions on issues
related to Palestine).
249 See, e.g., Nabil Elaraby, Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition
Resolution and the 1949 Armistice Agreements, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 102–03
(1968); Halderman, supra note 248, at 80, 86–88. In rejecting the Partition
Resolution, the U.N. representatives of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Yemen each
stated to the plenary meeting of the General Assembly that the Resolution was
illegal and non-binding. The statements are reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAEL
CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 24, at 57–60.
250 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also Elaraby, supra note 249,
at 102–03 (stating that the U.N. General Assembly lacked authority to order
partition and Arab states did not violate international law in rejecting the plan);
Halderman, supra note 248 at 86 (reiterating that the Arab states who rejected the
partition plan saw it as a mere recommendation and not as binding international
law).
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Though there is today a substantial academic literature devoted to
arguing that the General Assembly can create binding international
law,251 “few governments have taken up international lawyers’
suggestions that the Assembly has actually acquired some degree
of legislative authority over states.”252 Moreover, a recent study
concluded that, apart from narrow circumstances not relevant to
the Palestinian refugee situation, the International Court of Justice
has not understood the General Assembly to have the power to
issue legally binding commands.253 And even the academic
commentary is by no means one-sided; there is persistent
disagreement about whether or how General Assembly resolutions
can be binding law. On an issue of such supreme importance to
the world community—whether the U.N. Charter has been
implicitly amended by custom such that the General Assembly
may now issue binding pronouncements about things the Charter
says it may only discuss and opine about—something approaching
consensus among states should be required before concluding that
a new rule is in place. Even today, there is nothing approaching
consensus. And at the time of the 1947–49 conflict, the newlywritten U.N. Charter was understood to mean what is said
regarding the General Assembly: apart from certain primarily
internal or housekeeping matters, it had only a power to debate
and recommend.254 This interpretation of the plain text of the
251 On the debates about this issue, see, for example, JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS (2005); JORGE CASTEÑEDA, LEGAL
EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (Leland M. Goodrich & William T.R. Fox
eds., Alba Amoia trans., 1969); EDWARD MCWHINNEY, UNITED NATIONS LAW
MAKING (1984); Rosalyn Higgins, The Role of Resolutions of International
Organizations in the Process of Creating Norms in the International System, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 21 (W.E. Butler ed., 1987);
Samuel A. Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly
Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 444 (1969); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (1993); Oscar M. Garibaldi, The Legal Status
of General Assembly Resolutions: Some Conceptual Observations, 73 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 324 (1979); D.H.N. Johnson, The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of
the United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 97 (1955–1956); Marko Divac Öberg, The
Legal Effects of Resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly in the
Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879 (2005).
252 M.J. Peterson, General Assembly, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED
NATIONS 97, 103 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007) (discussing the
General Assembly’s role and power as part of the U.N.).
253 See Öberg, supra note 251.
254 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 10 (“The General Assembly may discuss any
questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter . . . and, except as
provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United
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Charter was buttressed by the positivism prevailing at that time,
which located binding international law only in sources to which
states had consented, namely treaties and CIL.255 A 1949 work on
the United Nations stated: “Although the General Assembly may
make recommendations both to Members of the United Nations
and the Security Council, it should be kept in mind that
recommendations have no obligatory character, as has been shown
in the Palestine case, although they may be of the greatest political
importance.”256 Other leading commentators concurred.257
Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.”)
(emphasis added); id. art. 11(2) (“The General Assembly may discuss any questions
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security . . . and, except as
provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such
questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both.”)
(emphasis added); id. art. 14 (“Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General
Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation,
regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or
friendly relations among nations. . . .”) (emphasis added). The Article 12 limit
referred to in each of these quoted articles is the following: “While the Security
Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned
to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security
Council so requests.” Id. art. 12(1).
As noted in the main text above, the General Assembly does have binding power
with regard to certain housekeeping or internal functions. See, e.g., id. art. 4(2)
(“The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be
effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Council.”); id. art. 17(1) (“The General Assembly shall consider and
approve the budget of the Organization.”). The General Assembly also had certain
binding powers regarding the so-called international trusteeship system (see id.
chs. XII & XIII), the successor to the Mandate system of the League of Nations, but
Palestine was never a trust territory under the U.N. Charter.
255 See José E. Alvarez, Legal Perspectives, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 252, at 58, 59 (contrasting the mid-twentieth century’s
positivism and narrow view of the General Assembly’s powers under the U.N.
Charter with twenty-first century claims that international organizations, like the
United Nations, have some legislative power).
256 LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 151–52 (2d ed. 1949).
257 A 1950 discussion of the U.N.’s handling of the Palestine issue noted: “The
decision of the General Assembly on Palestine took the form of recommendations,
since the General Assembly itself has no executive authority.” EUGENE P. CHASE,
THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION 151 (1950). Hans Kelsen’s influential 1950 work
on the law of the United Nations system was quite clear that, apart from specific
exceptions, such as resolutions about internal or housekeeping matters, General
Assembly resolutions were “political” rather than “legal” because the General
Assembly was not empowered to create binding legal “obligations, rights or
competences.” KELSEN, supra note 248, at 193–94; see also id. at 195–96 (regarding
the Charter power of the General Assembly to make “recommendations,” stating
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Besides the general problem of relying on formally nonbinding
General Assembly resolutions to support the right of return, there
are problems with claims made on the Palestinians’ behalf about
specific General Assembly resolutions, particularly Resolution 194.
For instance, it is implied that Resolution 194, itself, states that CIL
requires the return of the refugees.258 This is false, as perusal of the
text demonstrates.259 Additionally, the claim that the General
Assembly’s repeated references to and reenactments of Resolution
194 have transformed the Resolution from non-binding to binding
cannot be correct because even today there is no consensus that
valid CIL forms in that manner—that is, solely through nonbinding votes in a diplomatic forum, the U.N. General Assembly.
This is particularly the case here, with the issue of refugee return.
The chief proponents of the theory that the General Assembly has
binding, legislative authority regarding Israel and Palestinian
refugees—the Arab and Muslim states— have declared for decades
in diplomatic forums that international law requires the return of
Palestinian refugees to Israel.260 At the same time, many of these
proponents have expelled large numbers of their own nationals

that “[r]ecommendations, by their very nature, do not constitute a legal obligation
to behave in conformity with them”); id. at 199–200 (“The intention was to
establish the General Assembly as ‘town meeting of the world,’ the ‘open
conscience of humanity,’ that is to say, as a deliberative and criticising organ.
Hence, legal functions [defined by Kelsen as the power to impose or create legally
binding obligations or rights] of the Assembly are to be considered as exceptions
and require special provisions in the Charter.”) (citing The Yearbook of the United
Nations, 1946–47 U.N.Y.B. 51, U.N. Sales No. 1947 I.18).
258 See, e.g., GAIL J. BOLING, THE 1948 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT OF RETURN: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS 15 (2d ed. 2007)
(“Resolution 194 unambiguously declared—in reliance upon then-existing
principles of customary international law—that Israel was obliged immediately to
allow all Palestinian refugees displaced during the 1948 conflict to exercise their
right of return.”).
259 See G.A. Res. 194(III), supra note 117.
260 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2535 (XXIV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2535(XXIV) (Dec. 10,
1969), pt. B, pmbl. (claiming that “the Palestine Arab refugees” have been denied
“their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights”); Arab League Stresses on the Palestinian
Refugees’ Right of Return, OCCUPIEDPALESTINE.COM (May 16, 2012),
http://occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com/2012/05/16/nakba64-arab-leaguestresses-on-the-palestinian-refugees-right-of-return/ (reporting that the Arab
League voted and decided that Palestinian refugees have a right to return to
Israel).
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and resident aliens, including Palestinians;261 have refused to agree
to minimal international standards regarding the treatment of
refugees;262 and have denied Palestinian refugees who reside in
their countries citizenship and some of the most basic of human
rights.263 “Cheap talk”264 in diplomatic forums that is contradicted
by states’ actual behavior when their own interests are at stake
does not create CIL binding on other states.
Proponents of the Palestinian right of return also assert that
Israel’s 1949 admission to membership in the U.N. was conditioned
on compliance with Resolution 194, including its provisions on
refugee return.265 Thus, it is said, even if Resolution 194 lacks
inherently binding force (recall that General Assembly declarations
of this kind are undisputedly treated by the U.N. Charter as nonbinding), nevertheless the General Assembly’s power to decide
whether or not to admit new member states has made return of the
1947–49 refugees a binding obligation.266 The factual assertion
underlying this claim—that the membership vote on Israel was
conditional—is false. In fact, Arab representatives at the General
Assembly meeting on May 11, 1949, concerning the admission of
Israel, complained that Israel was admitted without having to
261 For some examples, see infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 58, 59, 62, 64, 67, 71,
74, 75, 77, 78, 81, 84, 86–88, 91–92, 94, 97, 99–102, 107, 113, 114, 117, 120, 126, 133,
136, 138, 143–50, 152, 155–56, 159).
262 Among the states that have declined to sign any of the major treaties
concerning refugee rights (the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
the 1967 Protocol, or the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons)
are: Bahrain, Brunei, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Oman, Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates. Israel
is a party to all three treaties. For data on states parties to these conventions, see
supra note 215.
263 See, e.g., TAKKENBERG, supra note 3, at 131–71.
264 A term borrowed from economics that is used to contrast cost-free actions
that are unlikely to reveal the actor’s true preferences with “costly” actions or
signals which, because they are not free to make, are more likely to reveal true
preferences. See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part
of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1204 & n.139 (2007).
265 See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 205, at 69 (“[A]s yet another express
consideration for its admission to the United Nations Organization, the
government of Israel officially endorsed and agreed to carry out the
aforementioned U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194(III) of 1948, which
determined that Palestinian refugees have the right to return to their homes . . .
.”); see also BOLING, supra note 258, at 22–23 (to the same effect); Abunimah & Ibish,
supra note 102, at 7, 23 (same).
266 Voting on the admission of new member states is one of the few areas
where the U.N. General Assembly has binding authority. See U.N. Charter art.
4(2).
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commit to refugee return, despite their attempts to make Israel
comply.267 Moreover, those supporters of a Palestinian right of
return who tie return to the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership
ignore that the power of the General Assembly to make
membership conditional on factors not mentioned in the Charter
was debated in 1947, soon before Israel petitioned for membership
and the Arab states’ position was rejected. At the request of the
General Assembly, the International Court of Justice issued an
advisory legal opinion on the subject in May 1948, two weeks after
Israel proclaimed its independence. According to the Court, a
U.N. member called upon to vote on a state’s petition for
membership is not “juridically entitled to make its consent to the
admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by
paragraph [1]” of Article 4 of the Charter.268 The relevant Charter
provision provides in full: “Membership in the United Nations is
open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations.”269 On the basis that Israel fulfilled these written
requirements, the Security Council advised that Israel be
admitted,270 and the General Assembly approved Israel’s
admission.271 The claim that a right of return for Palestinians was
created by the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership is incorrect.
4.6. U.N. Security Council Resolutions
Since “ethnic cleansing” became a topic of international
concern with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s,
267 See INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM
180–81 (1955) (discussing the circumstances surrounding Israel’s application for
membership in the United Nations).
268 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations
(Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 65 (May 28); see also
Yuen-Li Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations: Conditions of
Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 288 (1949)
(introducing state membership admission questions that were addressed to the
ICJ for resolution).
269 U.N. Charter art. 4(1).
270 S.C. Res. 69, U.N. Doc. S/1277 (Mar. 4, 1949).
271 G.A. Res. 273 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/273(III) (May 11, 1949).
Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, and Yemen voted to deny Israel’s admission to the United Nations.
U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., 207th plen. mtg. at 330–31, U.N. Doc. A/PV.207 (May 11,
1949).
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the Security Council has repeatedly instructed or urged certain
states that, in the aftermath of an armed conflict, they should or
must allow refugees to return to their homes.272 Proponents of the
Palestinian right of return often contend that these Security
Council resolutions are evidence that CIL requires refugee
repatriations. However, these resolutions, coming decades after
the 1947–49 conflict, do not create CIL retroactively binding on
Israel in the war of independence, because by definition CIL
cannot be retroactive.273
The Security Council has never demanded that Israel allow
repatriation of the 1947–49 refugees.274 In May 1948, the Security
Council ordered a ceasefire, directed truce and mediation
negotiations to occur,275 and ordered the demilitarization of
Jerusalem.276 In 1949, Israel concluded bilateral military truces
with Egypt, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Syria—each specifically
designated as provisional and military only, with all parties
reserving all rights regarding non-military matters (such as
permanent borders and refugees).277
Under these truce
agreements, bilateral “mixed commissions” were created to
exchange prisoners of war, demilitarize certain border zones,
negotiate the movement of forces to new positions behind the truce

272 For examples concerning the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, see S.C.
Res. 947, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/947 (Sept. 30, 1994) (The Security Council
“[a]ffirms the right of all displaced persons to return voluntarily to their homes of
origin”); S.C. Res. 820, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (Apr. 17, 1993) (“[The Security
Council r]eaffirms its endorsement of the principle[] that . . . all displaced persons
have the right to return in peace to their former homes and should be assisted to
do so . . . .”); S.C. Res. 787, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (Nov. 16, 1992) (“[The
Security Council] insists that all displaced persons be enabled to return in peace to
their former homes . . . .”). See Vic Ullom, Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees and
Customary International Law, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 115 app. 1 (2001) (listing
Security Council resolutions on repatriation elsewhere).
273 For discussion of the non-retroactivity issue, see supra Section 3.2.
274 Cf. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 3, at 37 (describing the Security
Council’s involvement with the Palestinian refugee situation as “at the most, a
minor role”).
275 See S.C. Res. 50, U.N. Doc. S/801 (May 29, 1948) (specifying the duration
of the ceasefire and activities that would constitute violations of the ceasefire);
S.C. Res. 49, U.N. Doc. S/773 (May 22, 1948) (requesting a ceasefire and for all
parties involved to enter into negotiations for a truce).
276 See S.C. Res. 54, U.N. Doc. S/902 (July 15, 1948) (calling for “continue[d] . .
. efforts to bring about the demilitarization of the City of Jerusalem”).
277 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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lines, and the like.278 After Egypt complained to the Security
Council in 1950 that Israel had expelled some civilians during these
truce
implementation
processes,
the
Security
Council
“[r]equest[ed]” that the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice
Commission take up the issue, and “[c]all[ed] upon” the two
governments to implement any repatriation orders that might be
made by the Commission and “to take in the future no action
involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers or
armistice lines” without consulting the Commission.279 That was
the full extent of the Security Council’s contemporaneous
statements regarding refugees. The Security Council did not take
up the refugee issue again until the Six-Day War of 1967, when in
the aftermath it “[c]all[ed] upon the Government of Israel to ensure
the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas
where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the
return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the
outbreak of hostilities”280 and later affirmed the necessity of all
parties “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem . . . .”281
Note the omission of any express mention of the refugees from the
1947–49 conflict. Given the Security Council’s studied refusal to
urge or order the repatriation of the hundreds of thousands of
refugees from the 1947–49 conflict,282 it is a bit odd to find
advocates for the Palestinians citing after-the-fact Security Council
resolutions from different conflicts, which contain directives about

278 See, e.g., Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, supra note 115,
arts. VIII(1), IX(1), (4), X (indicating the requirements as to the demilitarization of
El Auja village and the vicinity, the exchange of prisoners of war, the search for
and exchange of missing persons, and the formation and operations of the Mixed
Armistice Commission).
279 S.C. Res. 89, ¶¶ 3, 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/1907 (Nov. 17, 1950).
280 S.C. Res. 237, ¶ 1, U.N. SCOR, 22d Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (June
14, 1967).
281 S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 2(b), U.N. SCOR, 22d Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov.
22, 1967).
282 The Security Council was clearly willing to recommend or even order
repatriation when it wanted to. For instance, in regard to the India-Pakistan
conflict over Jammu and Kashmir, in April 1948—the same month that Israel
declared independence—the Council “[r]ecommend[ed]” that India take certain
actions in conformity with the principle that “[a]ll citizens of the State who have
left it on account of disturbances are invited, and are free, to return to their homes
. . . .” S.C. Res. 47, ¶ 14(a), U.N. Doc. S/726 (Apr. 21, 1948).
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return that the Security Council specifically chose not to issue
regarding Israel and the Palestinians.283
More generally, viewing Security Council resolutions as
declarations of the requirements of international law can be a
mistake. The U.N. Charter does not empower the Security Council
to legislate as such, but rather to solve disputes and deal with
threats to international peace and security.284 Thus, when the
Council urges or demands the repatriation of refugees, it is not
thereby stating that repatriation is required by international law,
but rather that the repatriation is conducive to solving the dispute
and resolving the threat to international peace and security.285
5.

NO RIGHT OF RETURN IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

To date, analysis of whether there is a rule of CIL requiring the
return to Israel of Palestinian refugees from the 1947–49 conflict
has tended to be unsystematic, overly general, and focused on state
283 See, e.g., BOLING, supra note 258, at 79–81 (citing U.N. Security Council
resolutions on the Bosnia and Croatia, Georgian, and Namibian conflicts in
support of the argument that all refugees have a right to return to their places of
origin); Quigley, supra note 3, at 200–01, 215–16 (describing U.N. Security Council
resolutions positing the right of return for refugees in Namibia, Croatia, and
Georgia); Abunimah & Ibish, supra note 102, at 25 (referring to U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1255 proclaiming the right of all refugees and displaced
persons to return to their homes in Georgia).
284 See U.N. Charter art. 24(1) (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action
by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree
that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts
on their behalf.”); id. art. 37(2) (“If the Security Council deems that the
continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under
Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider
appropriate.”); id. art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”). Chapter I of the Charter, describing
the organization’s “purposes and principles,” declares that the U.N.’s dispute
settlement function is to be exercised “in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law . . . .” U.N. Charter art. 1(1). However, saying that U.N.
organs should follow principles of international law is very different than saying
that those organs’ pronouncements themselves constitute binding international
law.
285 It should always be the case that the Security Council directs conflicts to
be solved in ways that accord with international law. And consistent Security
Council action over time on a given issue contributes greatly to the development
of norms of CIL. But the relationship between Security Council action and CIL is
oblique.
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practice substantially post-dating the conflict which created the
Palestinian refugee problem.286 This Section demonstrates that, at
the time of the 1947–49 conflict, there was no established CIL
requiring that a state in Israel’s position allow refugees, situated as
the Palestinian refugees were—that is, refugees from an unsettled
ethnic conflict, who lacked the nationality of the state to which
they sought to return—to return to their homes. In addition, this
Section shows that CIL did not prohibit the transfer or expulsion of
civilian populations situated as the Palestinian population was in
1947–49. CIL norms against forced movement of populations and
in favor of refugee repatriation developed only in the decades after
the 1947–49 conflict. Even then, there are reasons to question
whether CIL has crystallized in a way that applies to the highly
unique facts of the case of Palestinian refugees from 1947–49. It is
not necessary to answer this definitively, however, because CIL is
not retroactive. This Section discusses these issues primarily
through discussion of several sets of data I have collected on state
practice related to mass population expulsions and refugee
repatriation. An extraordinary amount of human suffering was
caused by the many mass expulsions and compulsory population
transfers of the twentieth century that are discussed in this section.
My conclusions about legality under CIL at the time of the 1947–49
conflict are not meant to somehow deny or minimize that fact.
5.1. Compulsory Transfer, Mass Expulsion or Coerced Flight of Ethnic
Groups287
According to an expert on ethnic conflict in Europe, “forcibly
moving populations defined by ethnicity (race, language, religion,
culture, etc.) to secure a particular piece of territory . . . has been an
instrument of nation-state creation for as long as homogeneous

286 See, e.g., BOLING, supra note 258, at 12–17; TAKKENBERG, supra note 3, at 230–
50; Abunimah & Ibish, supra note 102, at 21–25; Quigley, supra note 3, at 211–26.
287 These are not legal terms of art. By “compulsory transfer,” I mean a
movement of a mass of people across an international border pursuant to an
international agreement. By “mass expulsion”, I mean a movement of a mass of
people across an international border by the unilateral action of one government,
accomplished by official force or compulsion. By “coerced flight,” I mean a
movement of a mass of people across an international border, caused by actions of
government officials or private citizens acting with their connivance, which
created fear in the affected population.
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nation-states have been the ideal form of political organization.”288
This actually substantially understates the longevity of the practice.
Long before the nation-state emerged, rulers forcibly removed
ethnic or religious groups for political, military or other reasons of
state. While population transfer or ethnic cleansing became
particularly prevalent after the birth of the modern nation-state, as
noted by the U.N.’s special rapporteurs of the 1993 report The
Human Rights Dimension of Population Transfer, “population transfer
has prevailed as an instrument of State-craft in every age in
recorded history . . . .”289
The normative status of population transfers or mass
expulsions in international law has changed over time and has
varied by factual context. By the first decade of the twentieth
century, the international community was generally recognizing
the illegality of the deportation of the population of foreign territory
by a wartime occupying army.290 But outside this narrow context,
international law had not developed prohibitions on compulsory
population transfer or mass expulsion.
On the contrary,
compulsory transfer of populations in order to solve longstanding
ethnic disputes was generally recognized as legal. As Professor
Ewa Morawska has noted:
[A]t the beginning of the twentieth century and still in the
early post-World War II era ethnic homogeneity was
perceived by international organizations and governments
of the Western world as beneficial for nation-states, and the
step toward this purpose—forced unmixing of people—as

288 Jennifer Jackson Preece, Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State
Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 817,
818 (1998).
289 Special Rapporteurs on the Human Rights Dimensions of Population
Transfer, Including the Implantation of Settlers and Settlements, Preliminary
Report on the Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer, Including the
Implantation of Settlers, ¶ 10, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17 (July 6, 1993) (by Awn Shawkat
Al-Khasawneh & Ribot Hatano). Indeed, the history of the Jewish people
provides many examples of the prevalence of ethnic cleansing and forced
migration over the millennia.
290 As noted above, the 1907 Hague Convention about the laws of war on
land contained general principles which seem to prohibit such deportation. See
supra Section 4.1.2. These principles were substantially strengthened by the 1949
Geneva Conventions and the post-World War II war crimes prosecutions.
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internationally sanctioned as the lesser evil to continued
interethnic turmoil.291
Another expert on population transfers and ethnic cleansing
concurs:
[The post-World War I] boundaries unavoidably created
both new nation-states and with them new national
minorities that could potentially threaten the territorial
division of the postwar settlement through separatism or
irredentism.
Ethnic cleansing—then [referred to as]
population transfer—was viewed as a legitimate means of
overcoming these national discrepancies (i.e., of improving
the fit between national boundaries and the ethnic
composition of the population within them).292
During the inter-war period, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, with
its provisions for the compulsory return of Greek and Turkish
populations to their ethnic homelands, “became an oft-cited
precedent” for the legality and desirability of population transfer
“throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.”293 The League of
Nations’ approval of the compulsory Greece-Turkey population
exchange treaty in 1923 was discussed above.294 The GreeceTurkey population exchange
was hailed by many as a legal measure intended to bring
peace on the basis of an international treaty and under the
auspices of the League of Nations. Thus, State interests
were given priority over human rights and mass expulsions
gained international respectability as a legitimate solution
of demographic problems . . . .295
During the inter-war years, the problem of refugees in Europe
became acute, and the seeds of the later international legal and
291 Ewa Morawska, Intended and Unintended Consequences of Forced Migrations:
A Neglected Aspect of East Europe’s Twentieth Century History, 34 INT’L MIGRATION
REV. 1049, 1067 (2000).
292 Preece, supra note 288, at 823.
293 Id. at 825. (citing Alfred M. de Zayas, International Law and Mass Population
Transfers, 16 HARV. INT’L L.J. 207, 222–23 (1975).
294 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. See also infra Appendix
Table 1 (case 13).
295 de Zayas, supra note 60, at 20. See also Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 13,
at 321 (“This [Treaty of Lausanne] approach to potential interethnic violence was
later praised as the optimal solution . . . .”).
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institutional regime for handling refugee flows started to develop.
Refugees came from the great “unmixing of populations” in the
Balkans and Eastern Europe; the disappearance of the Ottoman,
Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires and emergence of new
territorial states; the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the rise of
fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany.296 In this period, “three
norms characterized the international refugee regime: asylum,
Repatriation was not a
assistance, and burden-sharing.”297
significant part of the regime that actually developed in practice.
Respect for the sovereignty of states was still high, and a state’s
decisions to expel or admit peoples were more or less sacrosanct.298
Many refugee host states did view voluntary “repatriation as the
best solution to their refugee problems.”299 This was not because
repatriation was viewed as legally obligatory, but for practical
reasons; financial considerations were important, as was concern
about the potentially disruptive social and political effects of
armed, irredentist, politically radicalized or otherwise troublesome
refugee populations.300 Prejudice, particularly against Jewish
refugees, also motivated some host governments’ preference for
repatriation.301 But despite a preference for repatriation,
[it] did not play a significant part in the achievement of
durable solutions for refugees in the Inter-war Period.
More often than not, refugee-producing countries would
not accept refugees back into their territories, and the
refugees did not want to return to their home countries
because of the danger of persecution there.302
Additional compulsory population transfer agreements were
concluded after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, further
demonstrating the perceived legality of the practice of ethnic
transfer. The bilateral agreements that brought ethnic Germans
back to Germany at the beginning of World War II were generally
The Craiova Agreement of September 1940,
compulsory.303
296

See CLAUDENA M. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE: THE EMERGENCE
16–20 (1995).
Id. at 68.
See id. at 67–68, 72, 156.
Id. at 148.
See id. at 38–39, 149–50, 153.
See id. at 40.
Id. at 148.
See infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 22–27).

OF A REGIME
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
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concluded by Bulgaria and Romania, also provided for the
The massive
compulsory transfer of ethnic minorities.304
compulsory transfers of Sudeten Germans and other ethnic
minorities approved by the victorious allied powers at the 1945
Potsdam conference was introduced above.305 With the approval
of the victorious powers, approximately twenty million people
belonging to ethnic minority populations in Eastern Europe were
transferred at the end of World War II. This was considered a legal
and rational way to align ethnic nations with territorial boundaries
and, it was hoped, to thereby resolve one of the causes of the
conflicts that had so badly scarred Europe.
Of the post-World War II expulsion of German minorities from
newly-liberated Eastern Europe, Churchill said:
[E]xpulsion is the method which, so far as we have been
able to see, will be the most satisfactory and lasting. There
will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble .
. . . A clean sweep will be made. I am not alarmed by these
large transferences . . . .306
Roosevelt agreed that the Allies “should make some arrangements
to move the Prussians out of East Prussia the same way the Greeks
were moved out of Turkey after the last war . . . [;] while this is a
harsh procedure, it is the only way to maintain peace . . . .”307
Thus, during and after both world wars, but particularly World
War II, many statesmen and international lawyers in the West had
come to believe that compulsory population transfer was an
unpleasant but sometimes necessary tool to resolving certain
ethnic conflicts, which had defied other solutions.308 In the wake of
both world wars,
See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 31).
See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix Table
1 (case 45). In recent years, the Czech government reaffirmed the legality of the
transfers of Sudeten Germans, and although groups of surviving expellees and
their descendants claimed that the Czechs should make some kind of reparations
before being allowed to join the European Union, no EU member state or
institution endorsed that view. See Waters, supra note 60, at 86, 90, 93–97.
306 See Preece, supra note 288, at 828 (citing ALFRED DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS AT
POTSDAM: THE ANGLO-AMERICANS AND EXPULSION OF THE GERMANS 1 (1979). Cf.
Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 13, at 322 n.146 (citing 406 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th
ser.) (1944) 1484 (U.K.)) (noting that Churchill was influenced by the view that the
Greek-Turkish population exchange had been a success).
307 Preece, supra note 288, at 828 (citing DE ZAYAS, supra note 306, at 8).
308 See JUDT, supra note 60, at 25–28; JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN, POSTWAR
POPULATION TRANSFERS IN EUROPE, 1945–1955, at 389–95 (1962); see also J.R., The
304
305
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sizeable minorities were viewed as sources of instability . . .
by the great continental and world powers.
Discontented minorities could either be a focal point in
themselves for the interventionist or irredentist goals of
neighbouring states with some ethnic or religious affinity,
or a cause of internal disturbance which might, if severe
enough, again trigger external intervention.
Either
eventuality might lead to inter-state warfare, the avoidance
of which was the main concern of statesmen . . . .309
Diplomats saw two means of dealing with this problem:
“guaranteed minority protection” and “internationally sanctioned
minority eviction.”310
“[P]opulation exchange” was the “diplomatic solution of last
resort . . . .”311 The Allied powers, “from 1942 onwards, became
enamoured of compulsory population transfer as a potential
solution to the problem of rendering nation and state co-terminous
. . . .”312 At the time of the Israeli-Arab conflict of 1947–49, far from
being illegal, large-scale involuntary population transfers were an
accepted feature of international statecraft. According to Stefan
Wolff:
[O]nly in the post-Cold War period has there been
universal condemnation of [“ethnic cleansing”]. For almost
100 years prior, many states in their search for internal
Exchange of Minorities and Transfers of Population in Europe Since 1919, 21 BULL. INT’L
NEWS 657, 657 (1944) (noting that during World War II both democratic and
autocratic countries of Europe were coming to the view that “the policy of
compulsory transfer of population [was a] solution of the minorities problem . . .
.”); Preece, supra note 288, at 826–27 (“Enthusiasm for ethnic cleansing as a
solution to outstanding minority problems was not confined to the Axis powers.
As World War II progressed, both the British and US governments also came to
believe that population transfers would play a key role in the postwar
settlement.”).
309 Donald Bloxham, The Great Unweaving: The Removal of Peoples in Europe,
1875–1949, in REMOVING PEOPLES: FORCED REMOVAL IN THE MODERN WORLD 167,
199 (Richard Bessel & Claudia B. Haake eds., 2009).
310 Id. at 200. Cf. CLAUDE, supra note 267, at 191 (“The wartime trend toward
the general acceptance of the principle of transfer of populations as a solution for
difficult minority problems has continued during the early years of United
Nations activity, and has to some extent been fostered by the world
organization.”).
311 Bloxham, supra note 309, at 206–07.
312 KARL CORDELL & STEFAN WOLFF, GERMANY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC 109 (2005).
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stability and external security have sought to minimize the
political impact of ethnic minorities . . . by expelling them
or exchanging them for ethnic kin of their own.313
In the wake of World War II, the Soviet Union engaged in
compulsory population exchanges of ethnic minorities with
Czechoslovakia, as did the Soviet Union with Poland, and
Hungary with Czechoslovakia.314 At the same time, approximately
one million Japanese emigrants in China were transported back to
Japan by the Chinese government operating with U.S. military
support.315 The Soviet Union engaged in ethnic cleansing on a
massive scale, expelling hundreds of thousands of ethnic
minorities from new territories it incorporated by war. For
instance, approximately 400,000 ethnic Japanese were removed
from Sakhalin Island, about 400,000 ethnic Finns from Sovietincorporated Karelia, and about 420,000 Estonians, Latvians, and
Lithuanians during the armed resistance to Soviet rule of the
Baltics.316 The Soviets also expelled approximately 1.5 million
ethnic Poles and surviving Polish Jews.317
None of these compulsory transfers or mass expulsions was
authoritatively declared or widely understood to be illegal at the
time it occurred. On the contrary, as described above, international
institutions and powerful states approved many of these actions.
Nor was a requirement of a “right of return” for the expelled or
transferred authoritatively enunciated with regard to these actions.
What was declared illegal at the time was the Nazi practice of
deporting—often to their death in work camps or death camps—
the civilian populations of wartime occupied countries. But as
discussed, that does not describe the situation in Palestine in 1947–

313 STEFAN WOLFF, ETHNIC CONFLICT: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 141 (2006). Cf.
Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislocation:
The Bosnia Precedent?, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1091, 1120 (1998) (“Whereas in the first
half of the twentieth century population transfers were accepted as a means of
resolving and avoiding ethnic conflicts, as the century draws to a close, the
international community now seeks to maintain or recreate multi-ethnic
communities. Population transfers and mass expulsions are now deemed to
violate international law, and voluntary return and repatriation have come to
occupy a fundamental part of refugee policy . . . .”).
314 See infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 47, 40 and 48, respectively).
315 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 50).
316 See infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 41, 37 and 52, respectively).
317 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 40).
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49, and so the international legal rules developed in that context
did not apply.318
5.2. Ethnic Armed Conflict and the Creation of New States
To get another view of potentially relevant state and
international practice, in order to help determine whether the
expulsion of the Palestinian refugees in 1947–49 was illegal or
whether return was required, I sought to create a data set of
conflicts similar in relevant respects to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. This has proved a difficult task because the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is, in some respects, sui generis. Decolonization
has created many new states, and has often been associated with
ethnic armed conflict. However, Britain’s decision to simply
withdraw from its international trusteeship over Mandate
Palestine before any new states were created—and hence before
borders or rules of citizenship settled—made the conflict of 1947–
49 unique. The “decolonization” created by the collapse of the
Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires during and
after World War I was managed by the victorious Allied powers
through multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements, which
provided the international borders within which citizenship norms
could be applied.319 The decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East after World War II almost everywhere followed the
rule of uti possidetis, a norm of territorial integrity—that is, stability
of previous boundaries.320 Hence, when colonial regimes fell or
were removed, there were clearly designated international
boundaries in place, even if groups within those states contested
their continued inclusion in the state. But from the outset,
Mandate Palestine was pledged to two peoples, both of whom
wanted exclusive states within the same territory. From the outset,
and to this day, there has been no definitive agreement about
whether one or two states should exist within the territory of the
See supra Section 4.1.
See, e.g., infra Appendix Table 1 (case 10).
320 See SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTED WORLD:
THE ROLE OF UTI POSSIDETIS 3–4 (2002) (defining uti possidetis as a principle for
maintaining territorial stability and preexisting borders in the creation of new
states, whether through decolonization, dissolution of a state, or separatism); see
also Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 62–63 (Dec. 22); Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond: Nicar. intervening), 1992
I.C.J. 351, ¶ 67, 95–96 (Sept. 11) (showing the court’s resistance to altering
established boundaries).
318
319
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former Mandate, and, if two, where the international borders
should lie. This fundamental and persistent uncertainty over
sovereignty, authority, borders, and citizenship has rendered the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict unique, and international norms
developed in more ordinary circumstances arguably inapplicable.
To create a set of situations potentially analogous to the conflict
over the emergence of Israel, I focused only on civil or internal
wars where the parties disputed control over a piece of territory. I
also looked only at ethnic or ethnic-religious civil wars, as opposed
to ones driven primarily by political or ideological commitments.
The intense desire to create a national home for their own ethnic
group321 was a commitment shared by both Jews and Arabs in
1947–49. Because the conflict was ethnic and territorial, each side
directed its force not only against the enemy’s combatants, but,
occasionally, at the opposing civilian population as well.322
Conflicts sharing these characteristics are fundamentally different
than the many ideological or political civil wars that disfigured the
second half of the twentieth century. These ideological or political
civil wars were often settled when one side agreed to live under
the political-social system preferred by its adversary, or when both
sides compromised and created a new unity-type government.
Political beliefs and governmental structures are mutable, unlike
ethnicity.323 This is crucial to the development of CIL, because the
intention of the government allowing or refusing the return of
refugees is key. A government might well be perfectly happy to
invite home the civilian population of a rival political movement
that had given up the struggle and now desired peace and
321 Cf. Charles King, The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s
Unrecognized States, 53 WORLD POL. 524, 527 (2001) (“Ethnic groups may feel that a
particular piece of real estate is historically theirs and that allowing it to be
controlled by an alien group would be tantamount to national betrayal.”).
322 Cf. Chaim Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars, 20
INT’L SECURITY 136, 139 (1996) (“War hardens ethnic identities to the point that
cross-ethnic political appeals become futile, which means that victory can be
assured only by physical control over the territory in dispute.”).
323 See id. at 138–40 (asserting that ethnic conflicts are fundamentally distinct
from ideological ones because “ideological loyalties are changeable and difficult
to assess,” whereas ethnic loyalties “are both rigid and transparent”); Carter
Johnson, Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars, 32
INT’L SEC. 140, 147 (2008) (“In contrast to ideological wars, where loyalties are
more fluid both during and after combat, in ethnic wars, members of one ethnic
group are far less likely to fight for the opposing side, dividing communities and
making post-war reconciliation in an intermingled state very difficult—some
would argue impossible.”).
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political-ideological conformity. A voluntary repatriation like that
does not have the opinio juris that CIL requires to make a rule
binding against the will of the government, especially in other
dissimilar contexts.
Once I assembled a set of potentially analogous ethnic conflicts
in which groups fought over the creation of a new state—found in
Table 2 of the Appendix—I analyzed the events and circumstances
of the conflicts to determine whether there were large-scale
expulsions of ethnic opponents and, if so, whether and under what
circumstances refugees were repatriated. Most importantly, I
looked for evidence that states (or ethnic groups in the process of
creating states) refrained from expelling their ethnic opponents,
even if noncitizens, because of the belief that it would be illegal under
CIL, or for evidence that states allowed the repatriation of their
expelled ethnic opponents, even if noncitizens, because of a belief that
it was legally required by CIL.324 I found no evidence of these
occurrences in the conflicts predating the 1947–49 IsraeliPalestinian conflict.325 As discussed above, during the period from
World War I through the aftermath of World War II, repatriation
was not a significant part of the international regime for handling
refugees; moreover, compulsory transfer of ethnic minority groups
was considered legal and desirable in many circumstances. This is
additional evidence that neither the expulsion of nor the refusal to
repatriate the Palestinians was illegal at the time it occurred. As
the twentieth century progressed and human rights law and other
forms of international law developed stronger protections for
rights, customary norms against expulsion and in favor of
repatriation emerged. This evidence is discussed in the next part.

324 See MALANCZUK, supra note 124, at 44 (describing how evidence of
customary international law for restrictive versus permissive rules is located and
analyzed).
325 I recognize that being unable to locate evidence does not prove that no
evidence in fact exists. But it is noteworthy that the voluminous literatures on
ethnic cleansing and refugee repatriation do not appear to document any
prominent cases of the described phenomenon occurring, and my review of
historical monographs about the individual conflicts and individual states also
did not locate any. In any event, even if my research missed some instances of
states suggesting that they believed themselves required by international law to
refrain from expelling persons or to allow them to return, these events would
have been insufficient to create a rule of CIL. A widespread and general practice
of many states over time is required for CIL to develop, and this plainly had not
occurred as of 1947–49.
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5.3. Major Repatriations of Refugees, 1992–2008
A legal norm requiring repatriation of refugees has emerged
only at the end of the twentieth century, and its development was
driven by powerful non-legal forces. Wealthier Western countries
were increasingly loath to take in large numbers of refugees from
the Third World, and poorer countries lacked the financial means
to deal with the burdens imposed by hosting large refugee
populations.326 There were many reasons for this. The end of the
Cold War is frequently cited as one reason why the developed
world changed its views about the desirability of taking in
refugees.327 For less developed and stable host states, a primary
reason they came to favor repatriation is that refugees, “especially
when remaining in border regions, frequently become politically
active against their home government,” and not infrequently
launch or continue guerilla wars from their state of refuge.328 In
addition, the presence of refugees can “create an unstable ethnic
balance in the receiving state that encourages a previously
oppressed minority to confront the state.”329 Ideological and legal
changes were also important, as international norms against
statelessness, deprivation of nationality, forced removal from one’s
home territory, and ethnic separatism gained strength. But the
powerful non-legal motives driving changes in state behavior
326 See, e.g., B. S. Chimni, Post-Conflict Peace-Building and the Return of Refugees:
Concepts, Practices and Institutions, in REFUGEES AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT:
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN VULNERABILITY, AND THE STATE 195, 195 (Edward
Newman & Joanne van Selm eds., 2003) (noting the de-emphasis on “[l]ocal
integration and resettlement” due to the global North not accepting the evolving
demographic and political profiles of refugees and the global South not having
the resources to care for refugee populations); Rosand, supra note 313, at 1105–06
(explaining the European Community’s effort to limit refugees from the former
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s through increased funding for programs meant to
care for the refugees within that territory and thereby keep them there).
327 See, e.g., Monica Duffy Toft, The Myth of the Borderless World: Refugees and
Repatriation Policy, 24 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 139, 144 (2007) (citation
omitted) (“The end of the Cold War had magnified every variable of the refugee
equation. Instead of trickles of skilled, educated, and enterprising refugees,
OECD countries would soon be bracing to receive floods of peoples of all ages,
skills, and backgrounds.”).
328 John R. Rogge, Africa’s Resettlement Strategies, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 195,
200 (1981); cf. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 662 (2005) (“Particularly in Africa, the expulsion of refugees is often linked to
the fear that their presence will embroil the host state in armed conflict, or
retaliatory attack.”).
329 Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the
Forced Migration Crisis, 33 INT’L SEC. 95, 101 (2008).
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counsel caution before assuming that a state’s view that refugee
repatriation is desirable reflects requisite opinio juris—belief that
the action is legally required, as must be true if CIL is to develop.
Accurate and comprehensive data about refugee movements
have always been hard to obtain.330 The best sources of data on
historical refugee flows and refugee repatriation are the statistical
yearbooks produced by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (“UNHCR”). Comprehensive UNCHR data on the
number of refugees voluntarily repatriating in a given year is
readily available going back only to 1992. I assembled the
available data into Table 3 of the Appendix. According to the
UNHCR data, sizeable voluntary repatriations have occurred in
twenty-one countries since 1992. I define this as a repatriation of
ten thousand or more refugees in a given year, and 100,000 or more
during the 1992–2008 period.331
CIL is by definition not retroactive, and therefore a norm
emerging only in the 1990s—if that is what the UNHCR data show
—will not be binding in 1947–49. But looking at the data set from
the 1990s and 2000s is still instructive because, as discussed below,
each of these repatriations in recent decades involved
circumstances that arguably can be distinguished from those of the
Palestinian refugees. Each major voluntary repatriation is marked
by differences that make any analogy to the Israeli-Palestinian
situation strained if not inapposite. As a result, even today, CIL
may not have developed to a point where it is fully applicable to
the precise situation of the Palestinian refugees of 1947–49. My
claim is not that CIL must have developed in precisely similar
prior contexts in order to bind states, but rather that the IsraeliPalestinian situation is so dissimilar in so many ways that there is a
330 Refugee flows are typically produced by violent and chaotic events that
are, by their nature, opaque to outsiders. Whereas militaries have an interest in
keeping track of their own, typically no one in a conflict zone is charged with
identifying and counting refugees. Refugees do not all flee in the same directions,
or end up in obvious or known places of refuge, making behind-the-front-lines
counting inaccurate. Many refugee flows are produced by internal conflicts in
which the regime in power denies outsiders access to the battlefield and to
affected civilian populations. Often, all sides in a conflict—and perhaps NGOs as
well—have an interest in under- or over-counting refugees, or counting some but
not other fleeing populations as actual refugees. It has always been difficult to
distinguish between actual refugees fleeing violent conflict or other persecution,
on the one hand, and economic migrants, perhaps opportunistically using the
chaos to flee, on the other.
331 See infra Appendix Table 3.
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serious question whether today’s CIL covers it—even if CIL were
retroactively applicable, which it is not.
The reasons why the twenty-one major repatriations
documented by the UNHCR differ from the situation of the
Palestinian refugees are numerous. First, a chief difference
between any envisioned Palestinian return and the actual returns
that have occurred worldwide since 1992 is that, unlike the
refugees involved in modern returns,
virtually all of the
Palestinian refugees from 1947–49 were and are not citizens of the
country to which they desire to return.332
Second, another important distinguishing factor is the size of
the returning refugee population as a percentage of the population
of the receiving state. In 1949, the number of Palestinian refugees
was close to equal to the total number of Jews in Israel.333 But in
every case of a sizeable refugee repatriation since 1992, even the
largest repatriations (measured by size of returning refugee
populations relative to the population of the receiving state) do not
approach such equivalence. Consider Bosnia, to which about 1.7
million refugees returned, representing about thirty-seven percent
of the population.334 A more representative case, in percentage
terms, is Afghanistan, to which about five million refugees
returned, representing about eighteen percent of the population.
Third, major repatriations almost always occur not during a
state of war, but instead following a formal cessation of hostilities
or comprehensive peace treaty (often after a decisive military
resolution has been achieved). During the Bosnian War (1992–95),
Slobodan Milosevic’s campaign to create a “Greater Serbia” led to
the internal displacement of some 1.8 million (perhaps thirty-nine

332 For a discussion of the Palestinian refugees’ lack of Israeli citizenship, see
supra note 103 and accompanying text, and Section 4.4. There is an additional
complicating factor making return difficult, which is that the Palestinian Arab
refugees are ethnically and religiously different from Jewish Israelis, and that
many members of each group have ethnically and religiously centered notions of
what their homeland should be and who should govern it.
333 Palestinian refugees outside Israel numbered about 600,000 to 760,000;
well over 100,000 Palestinians remained in Israel after the war; and the 1949
population of Israel contained about 900,000 Jews. See supra notes 95–96, 99 and
accompanying text.
334 For the total population, see The World Factbook: Bosnia and Herzegovina
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/bk.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
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percent of the Bosnian population).335 His military reverses, armed
intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”),
and the Dayton Peace Accords allowed a Bosnian return;336 some
226,000 returned in the first three years after peace. Some 194,000
Iraqis returned home in 2004, after Saddam Hussein’s defeat by
U.S.-led coalition forces. Civil war in Mozambique ended with a
peace treaty in 1992.337 About 159,000 refugees returned that year;
and 1,408,000 did in the two years after that.338 In 1999 the U.N.
supervised a popular referendum in which the East Timorese
voted for independence from Indonesia.339
Under the
administration of the U.N.’s Transitional Administration in East
Timor (UNTAET),340 that year some 128,000 returned to old homes
in a new nation.341 There are many other instances of this—largescale, voluntary repatriation of refugees documented by the
UNHCR following the end of a conflict and signing of a peace
treaty.342 Out of the twenty-one major refugee repatriations from
1992 to 2008, only in Mali, Togo, and Myanmar did repatriation
335 See Henry Kamm, Yugoslav Refugee Crisis Europe’s Worst Since 40’s, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1992, at A1.
336 See HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS: LAWS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 31 (Scott Leckie ed., 2007)
(excerpting the refugee fight of return provisions of the General Framework
Agreement on Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement)–Annex 7:
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons (1995)).
337 See HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 336, at 30 (excerpting the repatriation and
reintegration provisions of The Rome Process: General Peace Agreement for
Mozambique (1992)).
338 See infra Appendix Table 3.
339 See, e.g., Jose Gusmao, Reconciliation, Unity and National Development in the
Framework of the Transition Toward Independence, in GUNS AND BALLOT BOXES: EAST
TIMOR’S VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE 1 (Damien Kingsbury, ed., 2000).
340 See S.C. Res. 1272, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999)
(establishing and describing the role of the transition government in East Timor).
341 See infra Appendix Table 3.
342 See HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 336, at 30–31, 36–38, 41–43 (excerpting the
repatriation provisions of the Cotonou Agreement (1993) (Liberia); Arusha Peace
Agreement (1993) (Rwanda); Erdut Agreement (1995) (Croatia); Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement (2000) (Burundi); Agreement between the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea (2000); Comprehensive
Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in
Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties (2003); and Comprehensive Peace
Agreement—Agreement on Wealth Sharing during the Pre-Interim and Interim
Period (2004) (Sudan)).
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occur without a comprehensive peace treaty that ended large-scale
hostilities. Togo and Mali had faced internal turmoil but not fullblown civil or inter-state war; repatriations followed political
liberalization and transitions to new governments.343 In Myanmar,
most of the refugees returned during a brief respite in the military
junta’s active repression. Returns following peace agreements—or
returns to societies where no wide-spread armed conflict calling
for a comprehensive peace has occurred—are not robust precedent
for a return in the absence of peace.
Fourth, from 1992 to 2008 internationally sanctioned military
forces were present for eighteen out of the twenty-one major
repatriations.344
United Nations peacekeeping forces were
deployed at the relevant times in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Burundi, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Macedonia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and East Timor.345

343 See JENNIFER C. SEELY, THE LEGACIES OF TRANSITION GOVERNMENTS IN
AFRICA: THE CASES OF BENIN AND TOGO (2009); SUSSANA D. WING, CONSTRUCTING
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: MALI IN TRANSITION (2010).
344 Again, only in Mali, Myanmar, and Togo was this not the case.
345 The U.N. peacekeeping missions were:
i. United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)
(1991–1995) and UNAVEM III (1995–1997)
ii. United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) (2004–2006)
iii. United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (MONUC) (1999–present)
iv. United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) (2000–
2008)
v. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (2003–present)
vi. United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (1992–
1994)
vii. United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (1993–
1996)
viii. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (1999–2005)
ix. United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) (1992–1993)
and (UNOSOM II) (1993–1995)
x. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET) (1999–2002)
xi. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (initially in Croatia
and extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia) (1992–1995)
xii. United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO)
(replaced UNPROFOR in Croatia) (1995–1996).
Current Peacekeeping Operations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). Past
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African Union peacekeeping forces were deployed in Somalia and
Sudan. Repatriations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia,
Afghanistan, and Sudan took place, in part, under the aegis of
NATO armed forces.346 In Iraq, the U.S.-led international military
coalition operated under the authority of the U.N. Security Council
from 2003 through 2008.347
Fifth, the time elapsed between displacement and return varies,
but in the last two decades, most major refugee repatriations have
occurred shortly after displacement. Only a handful of extant
conflicts in the world today feature refugee populations claiming a
right of return, or a right to territory, after more than fifteen years.
They include Cyprus (four decades), Kashmir (six decades), and, of
course, Palestinians, who were displaced some six decades ago. By
contrast, most Bosnians returned within three years of their
displacement. Most Eritrean refugees returned home within four
years of the peace agreement with Ethiopia and arrival of U.N.
peacekeepers.348 As time goes on, return is less plausible. For
instance, the Burundi Civil War (1993–2005), between the Tutsidominated government and Hutu rebels, left an estimated 250,000
Peacekeeping Operations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
operations/past.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
346 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force (1995)
was followed by a U.N.-mandated “Implementation Force” (IFOR) comprised of
nearly sixty thousand troops. A NATO “Stabilization Force” (SFOR), with thirtytwo thousand troops, was deployed in December 1996. EU forces took over in
December 2004. Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, N. ATL. TREATY
ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm (last updated
June 5, 2012). In Macedonia, three operations took place between August 2001
and March 2003. See Peace Support Operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_52121.htm (last updated Mar. 5, 2012) (explaining NATO’s role in
subduing tensions between ethnic Albanians and the Skopje government). In
Afghanistan, NATO’s largest commitment, the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), with 130,000 troops, has operated since August 2003. NATO and
Afghanistan, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_8189.htm (last updated Dec. 3, 2012). In Sudan, NATO assisted the African
Union peacekeeping forces between June 2005 and December 2007, coinciding
with the first mass repatriation in a decade. NATO Assistance to the African Union,
N. ATL. TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8191.htm
(last updated Mar. 30, 2012).
347 See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (noting the role
of and calling on member states and parties in Iraq to cooperate with the military
occupation forces headed by the United States and United Kingdom); S.C. Res.
1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007) (extending the multi-national forceIraq mandate until December 31, 2008).
348 See supra notes 342 (citing peace agreement) and 344 (citing U.N. mission)
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dead and displaced hundreds of thousands of people.349 Those
displaced during the war have since trickled home, except for a
small group of thirteen thousand people who were first displaced
in 1972.350 In 2006, this group was resettled in the United States,
after officials realized that their time abroad—many of them, of
course, had never seen Burundi—would make it difficult to
reintegrate.351 This shows what difference a generation abroad can
make—let alone, as with the Palestinians, two or more
generations.352
Sixth, and finally, any consideration of whether a repatriation
can serve as evidence of the development of a CIL right of return
must account for the intent of the repatriating state. In many
instances, it is questionable whether the nation resettling
substantial numbers of refugees did so primarily out of a belief that
international law required it. In the absence of this intent (opinio
juris) by the states and other relevant actors involved, CIL does not
form. Many states which “voluntarily” accept the return of their
refugees are pressured to do so by neighbors who cannot or will
not continue to bear the burdens and risks of supporting large
refugee populations, by powerful outside states seeking to impose
settlements on conflicts, and by the UNHCR or other international
organizations.353 Alternately, some states do, in truth, welcome
back refugees voluntarily, motivated not primarily by legal norms,
but by a desire to shore up support for a new, post-conflict regime
or some other motives. This Article does not deny that opinio juris
Burundi Rebel Group Expected to Disarm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2006, at A10.
See Burundi Refugees to Settle in US, BBC NEWS, Oct. 17, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6058288.stm.
351 See id.
352 In a 2003 report, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan discussed proposals
for property restitution between displaced Greek and Turkish Cypriots. U.N.
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in
Cyprus, U.N. Doc. S/2003/398 (Apr. 1, 2003). He acknowledged that the preferred
solution of the Greek Cypriots, full restitution of property, as opposed to the
Turkish scheme of liquidation and exchange, prevailed in the former Yugoslavia,
and further explained that the Cyprus situation was different because of “the fact
that the events in Cyprus happened 30 to 40 years ago and that the displaced
people (roughly half of the Turkish Cypriots and a third of the Greek Cypriots)
have had to rebuild their lives and their economies during this time.” Id. at 24.
353 See, e.g., Jeff Crisp, The Politics of Repatriation: Ethiopian Refugees in Djibouti,
1977–83, 30 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 73, 75 (1984) (scrutinizing the motives for
cooperation between the governments of Djibouti and Ethiopia for attempting to
repatriate Ethiopian refugees who had fled to Djibouti in order to escape war at
home).
349
350
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about refugee repatriation has been present in these conflicts, but
simply points out the mixed motives which have driven
preferences for repatriation by states and international
organizations.
Analyzing the sizeable repatriations characterized as
“voluntary” by the UNHCR reveals complex interactions between
refugees, host states, states of origin, international organizations,
and NGOs, with few instances where concerns about international
legality seem to have played the dominant motivating role. Take
Mozambique, for example, the largest repatriation to occur at the
outset of the 1992–2008 period.354 A long, bloody civil war ended
in 1992 with an agreement between the government and the
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) rebel movement.
The agreement guaranteed political and civil rights for all
Mozambicans and allowed RENAMO and its leaders to participate
in domestic politics without persecution.355
The U.N., the
government of Italy, and leaders of neighboring countries
sponsored the peace talks and brokered the necessary deals. The
civil war had wound down to the point of being resolvable because
the Soviet Union, patron of the Mozambique government, and the
white South African government, patron of the rebels, dramatically
reduced assistance to their clients because of more pressing
domestic exigencies—both regimes would soon fall. In October
1992, the U.N. Security Council authorized a peacekeeping force to
oversee the cease-fire and the transition to a more democratic
government in Mozambique.356 In the first year after peace,
approximately 200,000 refugees who had been camped in Malawi
spontaneously crossed the border and returned home to
Mozambique, without having been notified or assisted by any
national or international organizations.357
While this was
occurring, the UNHCR and certain refugee host states—Malawi
See infra Appendix Table 3.
See HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 336, at 30 (excerpting The Rome Process: General
Peace Agreement for Mozambique (1992) which pronounced the directives under
which Mozambican refugees and displaced persons would be repatriated and
reintegrated into society).
356 S.C. Res. 782, U.N. Doc. S/RES/782 (Oct. 13, 1992).
The U.N. force
deployed in December of that year. See Mozambique—ONUMOZ, Facts and
Figures, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
past/onumozF.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
357 See MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF
REFUGEES: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 398 (1997).
354
355
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and South Africa (the two states with the largest populations of
refugees from Mozambique), as well as Zimbabwe—negotiated
plans for refugee repatriation.358 After the initial spontaneous
return, however, fewer refugees agreed to return to Mozambique
because food rations were available in refugee camps, but
relatively less food was available to returnees in Mozambique.359
So the UNHCR and cooperating NGOs stopped providing food to
As one author
refugees in Malawi and South Africa.360
euphemistically puts it, this “encouraged” the return of refugees to
Mozambique.361 In these complex and untidy circumstances, it is
difficult to discern a dominant role for opinio juris.
One might think this is an exceptional case. But take another
massive refugee repatriation touted by the UNHCR as voluntary—
the case of Rwandan refugees. In December 1996, Tanzania
forcibly expelled approximately 500,000 Rwandan refugees, mainly
Hutus, into Rwanda; Tanzania was concerned with military
activities emanating from refugee camps and believed that many
who had committed genocide were sheltered in the camps.362
Burundi also forcibly expelled Rwandan refugees into Rwanda in
1996.363 The new Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government had
earlier agreed to accept the return of refugees,364 because it hoped
to protect fellow Tutsis, discover and arrest Hutu participants in
358 See Chris Dolan, Repatriation from South Africa to Mozambique—
Undermining Durable Solutions?, in THE END OF THE REFUGEE CYCLE? REFUGEE
REPATRIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 85, 87 (Richard Black & Khalid Koser eds.,
1999) (discussing UNHCR’s agreement with South Africa); HOUSING, LAND, AND
PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 336,
at 47 (excerpting the Agreement for the Voluntary Repatriation of Mozambican
Refugees from Zimbabwe (1993), an agreement between Zimbabwe,
Mozambique, and UNHCR to grant “returnees . . . the right of return to return
[sic] their former places of residence or to any other places of their choice within
Mozambique”); ZIECK, supra note 357, at 398–99 (describing UNHCR’s work with
Malawi to encourage voluntary repatriation into Mozambique).
359 See ZIECK, supra note 357, at 399–401.
360 See Dolan, supra note 358, at 87 (recounting the intentional reduction of
food provisions available to refugees in South Africa); ZIECK, supra note 355, at
400–13 (detailing the plan to cut food supplies in Malawi).
361 ZIECK, supra note 357, at 412–13.
362 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 134).
363 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 135).
364 See HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 336, at 51 (excerpting the Agreement on the
Voluntary Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees from Tanzania (1995), which held
that “the Republic of Rwanda shall take all measures possible to allow returnees
to settle in areas of their origin or choice”).
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genocide who were hiding among refugees, and obtain the
international legitimacy that would come from doing what the
U.N. and UNHCR desired.365 For the states involved, the return of
refugees seems not to have been motivated primarily by a desire to
abide by international legal norms for their own sake.
While it is clear that CIL norms against expulsion and in favor
of repatriation have gained substantial strength in the last two
decades, the considerations detailed in this subsection suggest the
difficulties of making a precise analogy between the 1947–49
Palestinian situation and the recent cases in which a right of return
has developed as a CIL norm. CIL does not impose retroactive
obligations, but even if it did, it is debatable whether CIL has
developed rules requiring return in the unique circumstances of
the 1947–49 Palestinian refugees.
6.

CONCLUSION

This Article is framed as a ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. It seeks to move beyond factual debates about what
exactly happened during the 1947–49 Arab-Israeli conflict and who
is responsible for the outflow of Palestinian refugees. I have
assumed the truth of the Palestinian claim that Israel is entirely to
blame, in order to sharpen the analysis of the applicable
international law. In this posture, it becomes clear that the claimed
Palestinian “right of return” for refugees from the 1947–49 conflict
has no substantial legal basis. While the aspirations of the
displaced to return to their homeland are understandable and
compelling, the data compiled for this Article show that tens of
millions of people were expelled from their countries during the
twentieth century before international law began to recognize that
practice as always illegal, and before international law began to
require that refugees be able to return home in some
circumstances.

365 On the background circumstances and factors motivating the Rwandan
government, see generally Beth Elise Whitaker, Changing Priorities in Refugee
Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from Tanzania (United Nations High Comm’r
for
Refugees,
Working
Paper
No.
53,
2002),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/3c7528ea4.pdf; Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis:
Repatriation Virtually at a Standstill, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (July 20, 1995),
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article_print.cfm?id=1467.
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It is a bit surprising to discover that the Palestinian refugees’
legal366 claims for repatriation to their homes of 1947–49 are not
well grounded in law. For it has long been reported that
Palestinian statesmen have thought it advantageous to introduce
considerations of international legality into their periodic “peace
process” dialogues with the Israelis, while the Israelis by contrast
have preferred to frame the issue of refugee return (and other
contested questions) in non-legal, pragmatic terms.367 Palestinians
have sought to retroactively judge Israeli actions in the 1940s under
new norms developing in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. But international law does not work like that. Though it
is no doubt deeply unsatisfying to Palestinians and their many
supporters, the correct legal answer to the question of whether the
1947–49 refugees have a right of return under international law
goes something like this: even if (or assuming that) the Israelis did
intentionally expel every Palestinian refugee, it was not illegal
when it occurred, though it almost certainly would be if done
today under the same circumstances; and the law at the time did
not require repatriation of the refugees to Israel, though it most
likely would if the expulsion were to occur today.

366 Again, I emphasize that I do not seek to judge the morality or justice of
Israel’s and the Palestinians’ competing claims, nor do I question the reality of the
Palestinians’ view that the 1947–49 conflict was a catastrophe—al-Nakbah, as they
call it—for their national aspirations and for many individuals and families.
367 On this topic, see generally Omar M. Dajani, Shadow or Shade? The Roles of
International Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 61 (2007).
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Partial List of Mass Expulsions, Compulsory Transfers, or
Coerced Flights of Ethnic Minority Groups, 1900–2010
Criteria:
1. Officially instigated or organized
2. Directed at masses of people, collectively
3. 25,000 or more persons displaced
4. Not voluntary: ranging from overt use of force during armed
conflict to intimidation causing flight
5. Ethnically-based expulsion or targeting
6. From 1900 to 2010
Case
No.

Date

State(s)
Involved

Event

Refugee group, approximate
number of refugees

1

1905
–07

Russian
Empire

Pogroms lead to
coerced flight of
own nationals

2

1912
–13

Bulgaria,
Ottoman
Empire

3

1913

Bulgaria,
Greece

Wartime
massacres and
flight; Convention
of Adrianople of
Nov. 1913 for
voluntary
population
exchange
Wartime
massacres and
expulsions of
foreign nationals
in occupied
territory

After Russia’s defeat in RussoJapanese war and failed attempt
by liberals to pressure the Czar
for reforms, scapegoating of Jews
led to officially-tolerated
pogroms, killing hundreds and
driving more than 300,000 Jews
to emigrate1
Approx. 45,000 ethnic Bulgarians
from Turkish Thrace exchanged
for 49,000 Muslims from
Bulgaria;2 in light of massacres
and flights of hundreds of
thousands during Balkan Wars
of 1912–13,3 “voluntary
character” is “questionable”4
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As Greek armies drove into
Bulgaria in Second Balkan War,
Bulgarian civilians were
massacred and about 150,000
fled deeper into Bulgaria5
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5

1914
–17
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Ottoman
Empire/
Turkey
Russian
Empire,
AustroHungarian
Empire

Eve of war and
wartime expulsion
of own nationals
Wartime
expulsion of own
nationals and
foreign nationals

1915
–16

Serbia,
Bulgaria,
AustroHungarian
Empire

Wartime
massacres and
expulsion of
foreign nationals
in occupied
territory

7

1915
–18

Ottoman
Empire/
Turkey

8

1916
–17

Bulgaria,
Greece

9

1920

USSR

Armenian
genocide: wartime
murder and
expulsion of own
nationals and
aliens
Wartime
massacres and
deportation of
foreign nationals
in occupied
territory
Post-civil war
expulsion of own
nationals
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Ottomans killed thousands of
ethnic Greeks and expelled
approx. 150,0006
During World War I, Russian
military expropriated and drove
from home, deported, approx.
500,000 to 1,000,000 Jews in its
own territory and occupied
enemy territory7
Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian
armies invade and occupy
Serbia, including newly-annexed
Albania; Serbian civilians
massacred and very large,
unknown number of Serb
refugees fled; then during formal
military occupation “[b]etween
150,000 and 180,000 people were
deported, most of them to camps
in Hungary, and others to
Austria. . . .”8
Perhaps 1,000,000 Armenians
died and another 1,000,000 fled
or were expelled9

Bulgaria invaded and occupied
part of Greece; massacred
civilians; deported approx.
42,000 to 100,000 Greek men to
Bulgaria for forced labor10
After Reds won the civil war,
approx. 45,000 Cossacks expelled
from Donbass region11
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10

1920

Hungary,
Romania,
Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia

Post-war, postcession expulsions
of alien ethnic
group in newlyacquired territory

11

1919
–26

Greece,
Bulgaria

Convention of
1920 on Voluntary
Reciprocal
Emigration,
signed after peace
treaty of Neuillysur Seine

12

1922

Germany,
Poland

Expulsion during
border dispute

13

1922
–33

Turkey,
Greece

1923 Convention
of Lausanne for
compulsory
population
exchange
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By 1920 Treaty of Trianon,
Hungary lost three-quarters of
territory; Romania, Yugoslavia,
and Czechoslovakia expelled
some 300,000 ethnic Magyars
from their new territories12
Treaty for voluntary population
exchange; when few on either
side voluntarily emigrated, force
was used; approx. 30,000 to
35,000 ethnic Greeks left Bulgaria
and approx. 55,000 to 92,000
ethnic Bulgarians and
Macedonians left Greece13
Germany expelled approx.
25,000 ethnic Poles from
disputed border area14
Compulsory exchange treaty;15
when signed, more than 1
million Greek refugees from
Turkey had already fled
following Greek army’s defeat in
1922; after treaty, approx. 190,000
additional Greeks removed from
Turkey and 356,000 Turks
removed from Greek Macedonia
and Epirus;16 those who fled or
were transferred “were
prohibited from returning”17
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14

1925
–39

Bulgaria,
Turkey

1925 convention
for bilateral
voluntary
population
exchange,
supplemented in
1936 and 1937

15

1933

USSR

16

1933
–39

Germany,
Austria

17

1936

Turkey,
Romania

Peacetime
expulsion of own
nationals
Peacetime forced
flight of
denationalized
people
1936 convention
for voluntary
transfer of
population

18

1937

USSR

19

1939
+

Poland,
Germany

20

1939
–40

USSR,
Poland

21

1939
–40

Japan,
Korea
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Peacetime
expulsion of own
nationals
Wartime
expulsion of
population of
occupied territory
Wartime
deportation of
population of
occupied territory
Wartime
deportation of
population of
occupied territory
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Increasing Bulgarian repression
of Turkish minority caused many
to leave; in all, approx. 125,000
Turks left Bulgaria;18 additional
agreement provided that Turks
of Bulgaria who previously
emigrated to Turkey and wished
to return to Bulgaria, and
Bulgarians of Turkey who
previously emigrated to Bulgaria
and wished to return to Turkey,
could not do so without consent
of, respectively, Bulgaria and
Turkey19
Approx. 200,000 nomadic
Kazakhs expelled from
Kazakhstan20
Nazi denationalizations,
expropriations and other civil
measures against Jews caused
approx. 360,000 to flee21
By 1936 agreement, the Muslim
and Turkish-speaking
population of the Dobruja were
transferred to Turkey; in all
approx. 61,00022
Approx. 172,000 ethnic Koreans
deported from sensitive border
area23
More than 1,000,000 Poles
expelled by Germany from
Warthegau into central Poland24
USSR removed approx. 330,000
Poles from occupied territory to
Central Asia and Siberia25
Approx. 440,000 Koreans
deported to Japan to work, often
in horrific conditions26
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1939
–44

Germany,
Italy,
USSR,
Estonia,
Latvia,
Lithuania,
Yugoslavia,
Romania

Brink of war and
wartime population
transfer agreements
demanded by Hitler:
Berlin Accord of
June 1939 and ItaloGerman Agreement
of Oct. 1939; RussoGerman Agreement
of Nov. 1939 on the
Evacuation of
Ukrainians and
Belorussians from
Polish Territory
(Treaty of Moscow);
Treaty of Prague
(Germany-Hungary)
of May 1940; Note
Exchanged Sept.
1940 with Romanian
Government
Regarding the
Transfer of
Bessarabia and
Bukovina (Moscow
Accord); SovietGerman Frontier
Treaty of Jan. 1941
(Convention of
Moscow); GermanEstonian Protocol of
Oct. 1939 on the
Resettlement of the
German Folk-group
in the German Reich;
German-Latvian
Treaty of Oct. 1939
on the Resettlement
of Latvian Citizens
of German
Nationality in the
German Reich

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3

[Vol. 34:1
Under bilateral treaties, several
granting option to remain,
Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans)
and Reichsdeutsche (German
expatriates) emigrated or were
transferred to Germany or
German occupied Poland:
approx. 185,000 from Italy,
49,000 from Latvia, 13,000 to
16,000 from Estonia, 26,000 to
33,000 from Yugoslavia, 66,000
from Romania, at least 135,000
from Soviet Union (including
USSR-occupied Poland,
Lithuania, Bessarabia, and North
Bukovina (former Romania));27
also 30,000 to 40,000 Ukrainians
and Byelorussians expelled from
German- to Soviet-occupied
territory;28 despite option
clauses, “[i]t is more accurate to
categorize these events as a
forced population transfer”29
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28

1939
–45

Germany,
much of
Europe

Wartime genocide
of own nationals
and populations
of occupied
territory

29

1940

USSR,
Finland

Post-conquest
population
transfer treaty

30

1940
–41

31

1940
–41

USSR,
Latvia,
Lithuania,
Estonia
Bulgaria,
Romania

32

1940
+

France,
Germany

33

1941
–44

Bulgaria,
Hungary,
Yugoslavia

Wartime
expulsion of
population of
occupied territory
Transfers under
compulsory
population
exchange
convention
Wartime
deportation of
population of
occupied territory
Wartime
expulsion of
population of
occupied territory
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Germany committed genocide
against Jews of Europe; approx. 6
million killed; wartime
governments of France,
Romania, Poland, etc. helped
out; also approx. 200,000 to 1.5
million Gypsies (Roma) killed30
After Finland lost Soviet-Finnish
war, forced to cede Karelia;
treaty gave any desiring to leave
a short time to do so; more than
400,000 Karelians fled31
After conquering Baltic states,
USSR expelled approx. 85,000 to
130,000; only stopped because
Germans drove out Soviets32
By Craiowa Agreement of Sept.
1940, compulsory exchange of
61,000 ethnic Bulgarians from N.
Dobrudja for 100,000 to 110,000
Romanians from S. Dobrudja33
More than 100,000 French
Alsatians expelled by Germany
into Vichy France34
After occupying parts of former
Yugoslavia with German
consent, Bulgarian and
Hungarian governments expel
approx. 190,000 Yugoslavs,
primarily Serbs;35 “Many of the
expelled . . . did not return to
Kosovo at the end of the Second
World War, but were instead
settled in Vojvodina in the
homes of Germans and
Hungarians who were killed or
expelled by the post-war
communist regime”36
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34

1941
–44

Albania

Wartime
massacres and
expulsions

35

1941
–44

Croatia

36

1941
–44

USSR

Wartime
massacres and
expulsions
Wartime
deportation of
own nationals

37

1944

USSR,
Finland

Post-conquest
transfer

38

1944
–45

USSR,
Baltic states

39

1944
–47

USSR,
Ukraine

Wartime
expulsion of
people claimed as
own nationals
Civil war
expulsion of own
nationals

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3

[Vol. 34:1
Fascist Albanian state (annexed
to Italy) annexed part of
Yugoslavia and killed 10,000
Serbs and Montenegrins and
expelled approx. 70,000 to
100,00037
During war, Croatia killed
approx. 300,000 Serbs and
expelled that many or more38
After invasion by Germany,
USSR forcibly transferred
approx. 182,000 to 200,000
Crimean Tartars, 393,000 to
400,000 Chechens, 120,000 to
135,000 Kalmyks, 92,000 Ingush,
38,000 to 43,000 Balkars, 70,000 to
76,000 Karachais and 92,000 to
200,000 Meskhetians from
western to eastern USSR39
After USSR re-conquered Karelia
from Finns who had invaded in
1940 at same time as Nazis,
purportedly “voluntary” transfer
of approx. 400,000 ethnic Finns
from Soviet-incorporated Karelia
to Finland; many of refugees had
also fled in 1940, briefly
returning with successful Finnish
counterattack40
After USSR “liberated” Baltics
from Germans, approx. 150,000
ethnic Balts were deported41
More than 200,000 ethnic
Ukrainians suspected of
supporting the nationalist
insurgency deported from
Ukraine to Siberia42
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40

1944
–47

USSR,
Poland

Compulsory
population
exchange
agreements

41

1945
+

USSR,
Japan

Forced expulsion
of ethnic Japanese

42

1945
+

USSR

Post-war forced
“repatriation”

43

1945
+

Greece,
Yugoslavia

Post-war
expulsion

44

1945
+

Post-war
expulsion or flight

185,000 ethnic Hungarians
expelled or fled from Romania,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia48

45

1945
–46

Romania,
Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia
Germany,
Poland,
Hungary,
Czechoslovakia

Post–war
expulsion to
Germany of ethnic
German
populations

Authorized in principle by U.S.,
USSR and UK agreement at
Potsdam in Aug. 1945,49 3.5
million Germans expelled from
Poland; approx. 3.2 million
Germans expelled from
Czechoslovakia,50 and about
225,000 from Hungary;51 the
expellees were resettled in
Germany52
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Approx. 518,000 ethnic
Ukrainians, Byelorussians and
Lithuanians removed from
Poland to USSR;43 approx. 1.5
million ethnic Poles and Polish
Jews expelled from USSR to
Poland44
Approx. 400,000 ethnic Japanese
removed by USSR after it
conquered Sakhalin island45
About 2,270,000 “displaced
persons” in Germany at end of
war were claimed by USSR as its
nationals; shipped to USSR for
execution, gulag, labor camps;
15–20% survived46
120,000 ethnic Bulgarians
expelled from Greece,
Yugoslavia47
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46

1945
–46

Romania,
Yugoslavia,
USSR

Wartime and postwar expulsions
and deportations

Without permission from Allied
powers, approx. 70,000 ethnic
Germans expelled from Romania
and approx. 100,000 from
Yugoslavia;53 in addition, the
USSR forcibly removed some
70,000 ethnic Germans from
Romania and 100,000 from
Yugoslavia to the USSR54 for
“reconstruction work”55

47

1945
–46

USSR,
Czechoslovakia

Approx. 4500 to 50,000 ethnic
Russians and Ukrainians
transferred from Czechoslovakia
to USSR, approx. 42,000 ethnic
Czechs and Slovaks from USSR
to Czechoslovakia56

48

1945
–48

Hungary,
Czechoslovakia

Protocol for
compulsory
population
exchange,
attached to treaty
signed at Moscow
in June 1945;
agreement of July
1946 for
repatriation of
Czechs from
Soviet Volhynia
Forced expulsion
of ethnic
Hungarians from
Czechoslovakia;
also population
exchange treaty of
Feb. 1946

49

1946

Yugoslavia,
Hungary

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3

Population
exchange treaty of
Sept. 1946

Approx. 25,000 to 30,000 ethnic
Hungarians, including many
Nazis and Nazi sympathizers,
expelled;57 Treaty of 1946
between Hungary and
Czechoslovakia agreed to
exchange ethnic Hungarians of
Czechoslovakia for ethnic
Slovaks of Hungary; anywhere
from 60,000 to 400,000 people
ultimately exchanged;58 treaty of
exchange was “compulsory for
the Hungarians living in
Czechoslovakia and optional for
Slovaks living in Hungary”59
1946 agreement for the exchange
of 10,000 Magyars and 40,000
Serbs and Croats between
Yugoslavia and Hungary60
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50

1946
–48

China,
Japan

Post World War II
(inter-state war)
expulsion of
foreign nationals

51

1946
–49

Greece

Intra-state war;
flight or expulsion
of own nationals

52

1946
–53

USSR,
Baltic states

53

1947

USSR

Intra-state war;
expulsion of own
nationals (USSR
claimed
sovereignty over
Baltics)
Peacetime
expulsion

54

1947
–49

India,
Pakistan

55

1947
–49

UKcontrolled
Palestine,
Israel,
Arab states
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“Partition;” 1947
agreement
between Indian
National
Congress, Muslim
League and
British
End of British
Mandate; civil
war in Palestine;
Israeli War of
Independence
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Approx. 1 million Japanese
emigrants in China were
transported back to Japan by the
Chinese government operating
with U.S. military support61
During Greek civil war, attacks
on ethnic minority Macedonians
killed 17,000 and forced approx.
50,000 to flee;62 refugees and
descendents “are denied
permission to regain their
citizenship, to resettle in, or even
to visit, northern Greece”63
During Baltic guerilla wars
against Soviets,64 USSR expelled
approx. 200,000 Lithuanians,
160,000 Latvians, 60,000
Estonians65
Approx. 58,000 ethnic Greeks
removed from Black Sea coastal
area66 to cleanse area of
“politically unreliable
elements”67
See main text for details.
“Neither country expected the
refugees to return home and
each with varying degrees of
success resettled its refugees;”68
post-partition New Delhi Accord
of 1950 regulated repatriation69
See main text for details
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56

1948

Sri Lanka
(Ceylon),
India

Expulsion/flight
of denationalized
people

57

1948
–49

Burma

Peacetime
expulsion of de
facto
denationalized
people

58

1948
–51

Iraq,
Israel

59

1948
–52

Egypt

60

1950
–51

Bulgaria

Wartime (Israeli
War of
Independence)
and post-war
expulsion or flight
of own nationals
and
denationalized
persons
Wartime (Israeli
War of
Independence)
and post-war
expulsion or flight
of own nationals
and
denationalized
persons
Peacetime
expulsion
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Following independence, Sri
Lanka enacted laws to
disenfranchise, denationalize
and otherwise drive out Indian
Tamils; this begins a severaldecades long process, in part
coordinated with India, in which
nearly 9 million leave under
duress for India70
After independence in 1948,
Burma granted citizenship to few
of country’s 9,000,000 ethnic
Indians and took other measures
to drive them out of the country;
at least several million left71
Pogroms, harassment, seizure of
property and other anti-Jewish
laws made life precarious for
Jews of Iraq; more than 120,000
fled to Israel, many during Israeli
airlift72

Due to property seizures during
the war, official and private
harassment, and tenuous rights
due to lack of citizenship,
approx. 20,000 Jews left Egypt73

Approx. 140,000 to 160,000 ethnic
Turks expelled from Bulgaria74
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61

1952

Japan

Peacetime
expulsion of
denationalized
people

62

1956
–58

Egypt

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

63

1956
–59

China,
Tibet

64

1957
–58

Indonesia,
Netherlands

Intra-state war;
forced flight or
expulsion of
conquered people
Denouement of
anti-colonial
struggle

65

1959
–62

Rwanda

Intra-state war;
expulsion or
forced flight of
own nationals

66

1960

67

1961
–62

Belgian
Congo/
Zaire
Egypt

68

1962
+

Denouement of
anti-colonial
struggle
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of own
nationals

Burma
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During WW II, Japan moved
approx. 2 million Koreans to
Japan; after war, encouraged
them to leave; about 700,000
remaining in 1952 were stripped
of Japanese citizenship75 and
many thousands were
deported.76
As a result of Suez War, Nasser
government expelled about
13,000 French and British
citizens77 and expropriated and
caused to flee approx. 23,000 to
25,000 Jews78
80,000 Tibetans fled Chinese
invasion and repression,
resettled in India79
After Indonesia gained
independence from Holland, and
after several years of voluntary
departure from Indonesia of
native Dutch and mixed race
“Indos,” Indonesia government
expelled approx. 40,000 to 50,000
remaining Dutch80
1959 revolution ousted Tutsi
monarchy, replaced with Hutu
government; approx. 120,000 –
200,000 Rwandans (primarily
ethnic Tutsi) fled or expelled to
neighboring countries81
Expelled approx. 100,000 whites
after Belgian colonial regime
fell82
Egypt expelled about 40,000
ethnic Greeks83
Burma persecuted and drove out
perhaps as many as 1,500,000
Burmese of Indian descent84
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69

1964

India,
Sri Lanka

Peacetime
expulsion of own
nationals

70

1965,
1970

Ghana

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

71

1965

Indonesia

Peacetime
massacre and
flight of own
nationals

72

1969

Honduras

Wartime
expulsion of own
nationals and
foreign nationals

73

1969

Ghana

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

74

1969
–72

Iraq,
Iran

Peacetime
expulsions of own
nationals and
foreign nationals

75

1970

Libya

76

1971

Zambia

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
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“India and Sri Lanka agreed to
‘repatriate’ hundreds of
thousands of so-called Indian
Tamils to India, which most of
them had never seen”85
Ghana “expelled several
hundred thousand foreigners,
many of them Nigerian,
including children born in the
country”
Ethnic Chinese minority and
indigenous communists in
Indonesia are attacked, approx.
200,000 to 500,000 killed, many
thousands fled or expelled86
Longstanding tensions erupted
in massacre of ethnic
Salvadorans in Honduras
followed by brief war between El
Salvador and Honduras and
expulsion or flight of approx.
130,000 ethnic Salvadorans from
Honduras87
Approx. 200,000 to 500,000 nonGhanaian Africans, primarily
Nigerians, expelled from
Ghana88
As relations soured over issues
like navigation of Shatt-al-Arab
River and militarization of a
disputed border, Iraq expelled
approx. 60,000 Iranians89
During “Day of Vengeance,”
Khaddafi government expelled
some 150,000 Italians
“In 1971 Zambia expelled all
aliens—about 150,000 nationals
of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zaire,
Tanzania and Somalia—without
valid work permits”90
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77

1971

Iraq

Intra-state war
(against Kurds)

78

1971

East and West
Pakistan,
India

Intra-state war,
with Indian
intervention

79

1971
–72

Uganda

Peacetime
expulsion

80

1972

Burundi

Intra-state war

81

1972
–74

Bangladesh,
Pakistan

Post-war
agreement
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Iraq expelled as many as 40,000
Faili Kurds.91 In the next decade,
more than 100,000 more were
expelled after being declared
non-nationals92
India entered civil war because
believed West Pakistan was
intentionally driving millions of
Hindus out of East Pakistan into
India; after West Pakistan
surrendered and East (now
Bangladesh) declared
independence, most of the
9,000,000 refugees returned93
More than 40,000 people of
Indian or Pakistani descent
expelled for racial and economic
reasons94
Hutu revolt against Tutsi
government led to killing of
100,000 to 200,000 Hutus by
government and
flight/expulsion of approx.
300,00095
When Bangladesh became
independent from Pakistan in
1972 after the war, it desired to
remove Urdu-speaking Biharis,
some of whom had collaborated
with Pakistan in the war; several
massacres of Biharis occurred; in
1974, Pakistan agreed to take
170,000;96 Biharis in Bangladesh
were de facto stateless97
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82

1974

Cyprus,
Greece,
Turkey

Intra-state war;
inter-state war

83

1974
–76

Angola

Denouement of
anti-colonial
struggle

84

1975

Iraq

Intra-state war;
flight of own
nationals

85

1975

Cambodia

Intra-state war;
expulsion of own
nationals and
foreign nationals

86

1976

Morocco,
Western
Sahara

87

1976

Libya

Wartime
expulsion of
population of
disputed territory
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3

[Vol. 34:1
Inter-communal violence started
in 1963; in 1974, Turkey invaded
on behalf of ethnic Turks and
imposed partition; approx.
160,000 to 200,000 ethnic Greeks
and 40,000 to 45,000 ethnic Turks
fled across the de facto partition
line98
As Angola gained independence,
Portuguese lost political rights
and had property confiscated;
more than 505,000 fled to
Portugal99
After Kurdish rebellion against
Iraqi government failed, approx.
250,000 Kurds fled from Iraqi
forces to Iran; many returned in
next several years after amnesty
offered100
When Khmer Rouge took city of
Phnom Penh, approx. 2,000,000
people expelled, including many
of the persecuted ethnic
Vietnamese minority;
additionally, the Khmer Rouge
killed between 1,000,000 and
3,000,000 people before being
overthrown101
Invasion and subsequent abuses
by Moroccan troops drove out
more than 50,000 ethnic Sahrawi
people from Western Sahara102
Libya expelled for political
reasons some 130,000
foreigners, mainly Egyptians,
Mauritians, and Tunisians103
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88

1977
–78

Somalia,
Ethiopia

Ogaden War
(inter-state and
intra-state war)

89

1978

Cambodia

90

1978

Burundi

Intra-state war;
expulsion of own
nationals and
foreign nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

91–
92

1978

Burma,
Bangladesh

Intra-state war;
expulsion of own
nationals

93

1978
–79

Vietnam

Inter-state war
(Sino-Vietnamese
War); expulsion of
own nationals and
foreign nationals
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After Somalia under Siad Barre
regime invaded the Ogaden
region of Ethiopia where many
ethnic Somalis lived, more than
1,000,000 ethnic Somalis forced
to flee104
Khmer Rouge atrocities caused
flight of additional 170,000 ethnic
Vietnamese (and many
Cambodians as well)105
“In 1978, Burundi expelled
40,000–50,000 Zaireans, mostly
Bembe refugees, from the 1964
Mulelist rebellion, and jobless
migrant workers”106
Burmese military operation
against insurgency expelled or
put to flight approx. 2,000,000
ethnic Bengali Muslims, called
Rohingya, to Bangladesh;107
Bangladesh in turn expelled
approx. 200,000 back to
Burma;108 years later after
conflict winds down Burma
agreed to allow return of those
remaining abroad, and many
did109
“[B]order war with China . . .
resulted in a deliberate policy to
encourage the departure of
ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. In
1978-9, some 450,000 ethnic
Chinese left Vietnam or were
expelled across the land border
with China”110
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94

1978
–81

Bangladesh

Intra-state war;
expulsion of own
nationals

95

1978
–81

Ethiopia

96

1979

Thailand,
Cambodia

97

1980
–88

Iran,
Iraq

Eritrean War of
Independence
(intra-state war);
forced flight of
own nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
(refugees who had
fled Khmer Rouge
in Cambodia)
Iraq-Iran War
(inter-state war);
wartime expulsion
of alleged foreign
nationals

98

1982

Uganda

99

1983

Nigeria

100

1985

Nigeria

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3

Peacetime
expulsion of own
nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

[Vol. 34:1
Accused of collaborating with
Pakistan in the war and
discriminated against by
government, Chakmas—an
indigenous hill tribe—launched
insurgency; Bangladeshi military
persecution drove approx. 40,000
civilians to India111
Well over 500,000 ethnic
Eritreans fled from Ethiopia to
Sudan because of brutal counterinsurgency tactics by Ethiopian
army112
“[F]orced repatriation . . . of
40,000 Kampuchean refugees by
the Thai government”113

“About 350,000 of the Iraqi
refugees in Iran were expelled
from Iraq at the time of the IraqIran war because of their
suspected Iranian origin, and
have lived in the western region
of Iran for almost two decades.
In many cases, their citizenship
is disputed by both Iran and
Iraq, in effect, rendering many of
them stateless.”114
75,000 to 80,000 minority
Bayarwanda people were
expelled115
Approx. 1,300,000 to 2,000,000
alleged illegal immigrants from
African nations expelled from
Nigeria116
Approx. 100,000 Ghanaians
expelled by Nigeria117
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101

1985

Libya

102

1988

Iraq

103

1988

Ethiopia

104

1988

USSR
(Armenia,
Azerbaijan)

105

1988
–89

106

107

253

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
Genocide and
forced flight of
own nationals

Libya expelled approx. 20,000
Egyptians and 30,000
Tunisians118
During Iraq’s genocidal “Anfal”
campaign against Kurds, approx.
100,000 Kurds fled to Iran and
27,000 to Turkey119

Intra-state war
(Eritrean War of
Independence);
wartime massacre
and forced flight
of own nationals
Peacetime
expulsions/flight
of foreign
nationals

Ethiopian army killed ethnic
Eritrean civilians; 40,000 fled to
Sudan120

USSR
(Armenia,
Azerbaijan)

Intra-state war
(NagornoKarabakh war);
wartime
expulsions and
flight of own
nationals

In response to Armenian
separatist rebellion in NagornoKarabakh, Azeri government
launches punitive attacks;123
approx. 180,000 ethnic
Armenians fled to Armenia;124
more than 200,000 ethnic Azeris
fled rebels125

1989

USSR
(Uzbekistan)

1989

Mauritania

Peacetime
expulsion/flight
of own nationals
and stateless
people
Peacetime
expulsion of own
nationals and
foreign nationals

Persecution by Uzbeks caused
flight of approx. 63,000 to 70,000
Meskhetian Turks (whom Stalin
had displaced there from
Georgia during World War II)126
Inter-ethnic conflict lead to
expulsion of 40,000 to 75,000
Senegalese and Mauritanians of
Senegalese descent127
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In response to attacks on ethnic
Armenians in Azerbaijan,
Armenia expelled approx.
200,000 Kurds and ethnic
Azeris;121 several hundred
thousand ethnic Armenians fled
from Azerbaijan to Armenia122
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[Vol. 34:1

108

1989

Bulgaria,
Turkey

Peacetime
expulsion or
forced flight of
own nationals

Long-running conflict between
Christian Bulgarian government
and Muslim minority; after
Bulgarian government
crackdown on ethnic Turkish
demonstrations, including killing
and expulsion of activists,
approx. 300,000 to 350,000 ethnic
Turks/Muslims fled Bulgaria;128
after 1990, political opening in
Bulgaria allowed approx. 110,000
to return129

109

1989
–90

USSR
(Georgia)

Intra-state war
(against
separatists in
South Ossetia);
wartime expulsion
or flight of own
nationals

110

1989
–90

Liberia

Intra-state war;
wartime expulsion
or flight of own
nationals and
foreign nationals

111

1990

Sri Lanka

112

1990

Senegal

Intra-state war;
wartime expulsion
of own nationals
by de facto
government of
part of Sri Lanka
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

Bitter civil war over South
Ossetia’s desire to secede from
Georgia; approx. 50,000 S.
Ossetians fled to join kinsmen in
Russia (N. Ossetia), 23,000 S.
Ossetians in Georgia proper
displaced to S. Ossetia and
23,000 Georgians in S. Ossetia
fled/expelled to Georgia
proper130
The Doe government’s Armed
Forces of Liberia (AFL), mainly
ethnic Krahn, fought the rebel
National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL), mainly Gio and
Mano; both sides committed
ethnic massacres; about 730,000
Liberians fled to neighboring
countries131
In October 1990, the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
forcibly expelled the ethnic
Muslim population (approx
75,000) from the Northern
Province of Sri Lanka132
“In 1990, Senegal deported
approximately 500,000
Mauritanians”133

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3
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113

1990

Iraq,
Egypt

First Iraq War
(inter-state war),
expulsion of
foreign nationals

114

1990
–91

Saudi Arabia,
Yemen

post-First Iraq
War (inter-state
war); expulsion of
foreign nationals

115

1990
–95

Bhutan,
Nepal

116

1991

Dominican
Republic

Peacetime
expulsion and
flight of
denationalized
people
Peacetime
expulsion of
alleged foreign
nationals

117

1991

Iraq

Intra-state war
after First Iraq
War; massacre
and expulsion or
flight of own
nationals

118

1991

Ethiopia,
Sudan

Post-intra-state
war (Ethiopia);
expulsion of
foreign nationals
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Prior to and during the First Gulf
War, Iraq expelled approx.
500,000 Egyptians (Egypt joined
anti-Iraq military coalition) and
other migrant workers134
Large number of Yemenis
expelled from Saudi Arabia to
punish Yemen’s support for Iraq;
estimates range from 350,000 to
more than 700,000135
Bhutan denationalized the
Lhotsampas (ethnic Nepalis);
more than 100,000 fled Bhutan136

Dominican Army rounded up
and trucked to Haiti approx.
35,000 “suspected Haitians,”
claiming they were illegal
immigrants137
After failed Shi’a and Kurd
uprising against Saddam
Hussein government, Iraq killed
approx. tens of thousands of
Kurds and approx. 1,500,000 fled
to Iran or Turkey;138 thousands
of Shi’a “Marsh Arabs” killed
and approx. 40,000 fled to Iran139
“Following the overthrow of
Ethiopia’s Mengistu regime in
May [1991], approximately
285,000 Sudanese refugees from
the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) camps in
southwestern Ethiopia were
forced to return to Sudan”140
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119

1991

D.R. Congo

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

120

1991
–92

Kuwait

post-First Iraq
War; peacetime
expulsion

121

1991
–92

Burma

Peacetime
expulsion of own
nationals

122

1991
–95

Yugoslavia,
Croatia.
Bosnia

Intra-state war
accompanying
independence of
Croatia

123

1992
–93

Georgia

124

1992
–93

Zaire

Intra-state war
results in de facto
partition of
Georgia
Peacetime
expulsion of own
nationals

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3

[Vol. 34:1
“Tens of thousands of Zairians
have been expelled from
neighboring Congo … as the
Government here has ordered
them out as illegal aliens”141
After Iraqi forces removed from
Kuwait by U.S.-led coalition,
Kuwait expels approx. 300,000 to
380,000 Palestinians because they
were thought to have supported
Iraq;142 at same time, expels
about 150,000 bidun143
Burmese persecution caused
approx. 270,000 Rohingya
Muslims flee to Bangladesh144
After Croatia declared
independence in 1991, the
Yugoslav army (primarily Serb)
began ethnic cleansing of ethnic
Croats; Croats mobilized and
resisted; Bosnian Croat
paramilitaries ethnically
cleansed areas of Bosnian Serbs;
approx. 300,000 to 350,000 Serbs
and perhaps more than 400,000
Croats fled145
Ethnic cleansing by Abkhazian
militias lead approx. 200,000 to
270,000 ethnic Georgians to flee
disputed region146
In bid to cling to power, Mobutu
regime incited Shaban people to
attack and expel Kasaians;
several hundred thousand fled
or were expelled147
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125

1992
–95

Bosnia,
Yugoslavia,
Croatia

Intra-state war
accompanying
independence of
Bosnia &
Herzegovina

126

1992
–97

Tajikistan

Intra-state war

127

1993

Cambodia,
Vietnam

128

1993
–96

South Africa,
Mozambique

129

1994

Greece,
Albania

Intra-state war;
massacre and
flight of own
nationals and
foreign nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
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After Bosnia & Herzegovina
prepares to declare
independence in 1992, Yugoslav
army (Serb), Bosnian Serb
paramilitaries and Bosnian Croat
paramilitaries attack Muslims
and each other; widespread
genocide and ethnic cleansing of
Bosnian Muslims by Serbs and
Croats and ethnic cleansing of
Bosnian Serbs by Croats; inside
Yugoslavia, Serbian
paramilitaries also attack
Muslims; NATO intervenes
against Serbs in 1994148
During civil war sparked by
revolt by ethnic minority Pamiris
from Gorno-Badakhshan region
and other minority groups,
approx. 60,000 refugees fled to
Afghanistan in 1992–93 and
nearly 200,000 to other
countries149
After massacre of ethnic
Vietnamese by Khmer Rouge
army, approx. 30,000 fled to
Vietnam150
South Africa “forcibly deported”
approx. 310,000 refugees from
the Mozambique civil war151
30,000 Albanians declared to be
illegal immigrants and expelled
by Greece152
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130

1994

Rwanda

Genocide and
flight

131

1994

Greece

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

132

1994
–95

Gabon

133

1995

Libya

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

134

1996

Tanzania,
Rwanda

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

135

1996

136

1996

Burundi,
Rwanda
United Arab
Emirates

Expulsion of
foreign nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

137

1997

Dominican
Republic

Peacetime
expulsion of
alleged foreign
nationals

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3

[Vol. 34:1
Approx. 500,000 to 1,000,000
Rwandans killed in 6 week
period, mostly Tutsis killed by
Hutus; approx. 250,000 fled to
Tanzania; as Tutsi rebel group
began to take over country, Hutu
government organized mass
flight of 800,000 Hutu to Zaire153
In retaliation for criminal
conviction in Albania of Greek
dissidents, Greece expelled more
than 30,000 Albanians154
Gabon expelled approx. 55,000
foreign workers155
“Libya expelled 30,000
Palestinians in 1995 to express its
opposition to the Middle East
peace process”156
In Dec. 1996, Tanzania expelled
approx. 500,000 Rwandan
refugees, mainly Hutus;
Tanzania was concerned with
military activities emanating
from refugee camps and believed
that many who committed
genocide were sheltered in
them;157 the UNHCR approved
Tanzania’s demand for
immediate repatriation158
Burundi expelled approx. 75,000
Rwandan refugees159
The U.A.E. expelled approx.
145,000 illegal residents, mainly
from India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh160
Dominican Army rounded up
and trucked to Haiti approx.
25,000 “suspected Haitians,”
claiming they were illegal
immigrants161
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138

1997

Iraq

Peacetime
expulsion of own
nationals

Deportations pursuant to Iraq’s
Arabization campaign in the
predominantly Kurdish cities of
Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Douz
increase;162 estimated about
120,000 to 140,000 expelled
during 1990s, mostly Kurds but
also Turkmen and Assyrians163

139

1997

Peacetime
expulsions of
foreign nationals

140

1998
–99

Tanzania,
Rwanda,
Burundi,
Congo/Zaire
Yugoslavia,
Kosovo

141–
42

1998
–
2000

Eritrea,
Ethiopia

Eritrean–
Ethiopian War
(inter-state war);
expulsion of own
nationals and
foreign nationals

Tanzania expelled tens of
thousands of refugees from
Rwanda, Burundi, and
Congo/Zaire164
In response to Kosovar
Albanian’s move for
independence, murder and
ethnic cleansing of Kosovar
Albanians committed by Serb
military, paramilitary and police
forces; approx. 30,000 Kosovar
Albanians killed, approx. 850,000
to 900,000 expelled and 550,000
internally displaced; NATO
intervened against Yugoslavia
(Serbs) in 1999, and transferred
control of province to
Albanians;165 at this point, most
displaced Albanians return to
Kosovo but retaliatory violence
and insecurity caused approx.
160,000 Serbs and 90,000 Roma to
flee166
Ethiopia denationalized and
deported 67,000 to 75,000
Ethiopians of Eritrean ethnicity;
as many as 70,000 Ethiopians
expelled from Eritrea167
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Intra-state war
preceding
independence of
Kosovo
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143

1998
–
2001

Afghanistan

Intra-state war

144

1999

Indonesia,
East Timor

Intra- (or inter-?)
state war
accompanying
independence of
East Timor

145

2001

Iraq

Peacetime
expulsion of own
nationals

146

2002

Malaysia

147

2003

Iran

148

2003

Djibouti

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
Expulsion of
foreign nationals
to country at war
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3

[Vol. 34:1
As Taliban advance north taking
Northern Alliance territory,
Taliban murdered approx. 3,000
to 6,000 Hazara (Persian
speaking Shi’a Muslims) men
and boys in 1998; other
massacres in 1999, 2001; approx.
60,000 Hazaras were internally
displaced and many times that
number fled to Iran and
Pakistan168
After East Timorese voted for
independence in a 1999
referendum, Indonesian military
and military-backed militias
retaliated, murdering some
supporters of independence and
leveling most towns; approx.
300,000 East Timorese were
internally displaced and 200,000
either fled or were forcibly
expelled to West Timor,
Indonesia169
“[A]s many as 100,000 people,
mostly Kurds, Assyrians, and
Turkomans, [were] recently
expelled from centralgovernment-controlled Kirkuk
and surrounding districts in the
oil-rich region bordering the
Kurdish-controlled north”170
Malaysia “expelled hundreds of
thousands of undocumented
Indonesian workers”171
Iran expelled 50,000 to 60,000
Afghan refugees, whom it
describes as illegal immigrants172
Djibouti expelled approx. 100,000
allegedly illegal immigrants,
mostly Ethiopians, Somalis, and
Yemenis173
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149

2003
–05

Libya

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

150

2003
–09

Sudan

Intra-state war;
massacre and
expulsion of own
nationals

151

2004
–05

Angola

152

2005

Malaysia

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

153

2006

Angola

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

154

2007
–09

Angola,
D.R. of Congo

155

2007
–08

Iran,
Afghanistan

156

2009

Saudi Arabia,
Yemen

Expulsion of
foreign nationals
to country at war
Expulsion of
foreign nationals
to country at war
Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals
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Libya deported approx. 145,000
people, mainly sub-Saharan
Africans; Libya claimed were all
illegal economic migrants and
that most went willingly; both
claims are suspect174
From 2003–05, at least 200,000
ethnic Africans in Darfur, Sudan,
were killed by Sudan
government-backed Arab
“janjaweed” militias, and at least
2,000,000 driven into exile175
In Operation Brilhante, Angola
expelled from 125,000 to 250,000
foreigners176
“When Malaysia expelled
380,000 foreign labourers in 2005,
most of them from impoverished
Indonesia, . . . those that did not
leave before the deadline were
hunted by 300,000 vigilantes
recruited and armed by the
government and forcibly
expelled”177
“During 2006, Angola reportedly
expelled hundreds of thousands
of illegal migrants without
meaningful screening for
refugees or asylum seekers”178
More than 200,000 Congolese
refugees expelled by Angolan
government179
Iran expelled more than 720,000
Afghan refugees180
In December 2009, Saudi Arabia
expelled 54,000 Yemeni workers181
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157

2009

D.R. of Congo

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

158

2009

Angola

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

159

2009

Yemen

Peacetime
expulsion of
foreign nationals

[Vol. 34:1
“Tens of thousands” of
Angolans, many with refugee
status, expelled by D.R. Congo;
total expelled plus those who left
to avoid expulsion was approx.
50,000182
Angola “expelled tens of
thousands of allegedly irregular
migrants and their families-most
of them from the Democratic
Republic of Congo,” including
many refugees and asylum
seekers183
Likely that tens of thousands of
Ethiopian refugees were forcibly
deported by Yemen184

Table 2. 1900–1950: Instances of the Emergence of Independent States
During or After Ethnic Armed Conflict185
Case
#
1

New State

2

Czechoslovakia

3

Estonia

Lost
Territory
Germany,
Russia,
AustroHungarian
Empire
AustroHungarian
Empire
Russia

4

Ukraine

Russia

1918

5

Armenia

1918

6

Azerbaijan

Russia,
Ottoman
Empire
Russia

Poland

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3

Year

Ethnic Conflict

Year(s)

1918

Poles v. Germans, Ukrainians,
Russians

1917–
19

1918

Czechs v. Sudeten Germans
(1918), Poles (1919)

1918–
19

1918

Estonians v. Baltic Germans
Ukrainians v. Ukraine Poles,
Russians
Armenians v. Turkey,
Azerbaijani Tatars, Kurds

1918–
20
1918–
19
1917–
18

1918

Muslim Azeris, Turkey v.
Armenians, Dashnaks

1918
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7

Hungary

AustroHungarian
Empire

1919

8

Ireland

UK

1922

9

Germany

1945

10

Czechoslovakia
Albania

Italy

1945

11

Pakistan

India/UK

1948

Czechs, Slovaks v. Sudeten
Germans
Fascist Albanians v. Serbs,
Montenegrins; simultaneously,
Albanian communists fought
Italian and then German
invaders, and non-communist
Albanian resistance
Sikhs, Hindus v. Muslims

12

Israel

UK

1948

Jews v. Arabs

1947–
49

13

Indonesia

Netherlands

1949

During independence struggle,
the Dutch co-opted Sundanese,
Madurese, Dayaks and other
ethnic groups; Islamic groups
rejected both Dutch rule and
independence under a secular
government

1945–
50

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012

“White Terror”: Anticommunist Hungarians, aided
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Table 3. Major “Voluntary” Refugee Repatriations,
by Country of Origin
1. Time period 1992 to 2008
2. Data from UNHCR yearly statistical reports; voluntariness of
return asserted by UNHCR186
3. Numbers given in 1000s, rounded to nearest 1000
4. Threshold to list is 10,000 in given year, and 100,000 or more
total during 1992–2008 time period
1992–2000
92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

329

348

159

87

107

253

292

54

22

20

101

121

129

32

108

91

24

12

Afghanistan

1577

Angola

85

Bosnia & H.

10

Burundi

48

Croatia

29

16

25

11

19

Dem. Repub.
of Congo

15

45

66

17

14

Eritrea

70

Ethiopia

12

Iraq

18

Liberia

81

16

159

604

804

159

46

85
120

13
271

22
57

40

19

51

35

28

10

13

18

82

10

12

21

15

240

104

42

22

35

27

66

23

10

241

141

221

38

26

807

125

10

Macedonia
Mali
Mozambique

39

Myanmar
Rwanda

11

Fed. Rep. of
Yugoslavia
Sierra Leone
Somalia

13

195
67

61

43

52

Sudan
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26

46

128

49

63

Timor-Leste
(East Timor)
Togo

52

41

126

79

66
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2001–2008
01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

Afghanistan

26

1958

646

880

752

388

373

278

Angola

13

88

133

90

54

47

12

13

Bosnia & H.

19

42

14

Burundi

28

53

82

90

68

48

40

95

Croatia

12

17

10
14

39

41

59

54

Dem. Repub.
of Congo

14

Eritrea

33

Ethiopia

10

20

Iraq
Liberia
Macedonia

22

10

10

55

194

56

20

45

26

21

57

70

108

44

11

23

14

10

90

11

Rwanda

22

39

Fed. Rep. of
Yugoslavia

26

14

Sierra Leone

92

76

33

26

Somalia

51

32

10

18

Mali
Mozambique
Myanmar

Sudan
Timor-Leste
(East Timor)
Togo
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